On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 6:51:23 PM UTC, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 4:44:18 PM UTC, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 4:26:39 PM UTC, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 12:01:56 PM UTC, [email protected] >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 9:55:39 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10 Aug 2018, at 22:05, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, August 10, 2018 at 4:01:37 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 9 Aug 2018, at 18:50, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, August 9, 2018 at 7:32:07 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 9 Aug 2018, at 02:02, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at 5:46:22 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 8 Aug 2018, at 13:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 8 Aug 2018, at 01:39, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no >>>>>>>> information transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any >>>>>>>> reality >>>>>>>> interpretation of special relativity, notably well described by >>>>>>>> Maudlin. >>>>>>>> Maudlin agrees that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” >>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> is close to what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I >>>>>>>> defended already from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and >>>>>>>> Lower Many-Minds assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in >>>>>>>> mechanism we got an infinity of relative body for one mind, but the >>>>>>>> key >>>>>>>> issue is that all measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The >>>>>>>> measurement splits locally the observers, and propagate at subliminal >>>>>>>> speed. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you >>>>>>>> would want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in >>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>> a superposition, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That sides with Mechanism. In arithmetic there is an infinity of >>>>>>>> identical (at the relevant representation level) brains. Now Albert >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> Loewer seems to associate an infinity of mind with one body. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The 'infinity of minds for each body' was postulated by Albert and >>>>>>>> Lowe to avoid the 'mindless hulk' problem. In other words, it was just >>>>>>>> an *ad >>>>>>>> hoc* fix for a problem in the theory. This alone should have been >>>>>>>> sufficient to render the theory unacceptable. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree. That is why I remain closer to Everett. This problem is >>>>>>>> automatically solved with Mechanism. There is no empty hulk, given >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> there is no hulk. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I do not understand this, and with the Mechanist “many-dreams” it >>>>>>>> is the contrary: each mind as an infinity of (virtual) bodies, and the >>>>>>>> consciousness will differentiate along their computational different >>>>>>>> continuations. Take the WM-duplication. After the reconstitution, but >>>>>>>> before the copies open the door, one mind is associated to two bodies, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> then differentiates in W or in M from each location perspective. To >>>>>>>> say >>>>>>>> that the mind is not in a superposition is equivalent with Everett’s >>>>>>>> justification that the observer cannot feel the split, and it is where >>>>>>>> Everett use (more or less explicitly) the mechanist hypothesis. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The splitting in Everett's theory at least makes some sort of >>>>>>>> sense, and is not postulated *ad hoc*. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The real problem I see with many-minds theory is that it does not >>>>>>>> actually explain the observed correlations. The correlations are >>>>>>>> presumed >>>>>>>> not to exist in reality -- all possible combinations of experimental >>>>>>>> outcomes happen, but when Alice and Bob meet, their bodies are still >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> indefinite states -- no actual results are recorded by entanglement >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> their bodies -- but their minds will be in definite states that agree >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> the quantum correlations. This step seems to introduce yet more >>>>>>>> unreasonable magic into the 'explanation'. Why are the minds like this >>>>>>>> when >>>>>>>> they communicate? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Because all Alice and Bob are coupled in that way, by the singlet >>>>>>>> state. That works if we keep in mind that the singlet state (when not >>>>>>>> already observed by neither Alice nor Bob) describes an infinity of >>>>>>>> Alice >>>>>>>> and Bob, with the spin in all directions, but always correlated. When >>>>>>>> Alice >>>>>>>> and Bob make their measurement, if they are space separated, it makes >>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>> sense to ask if they are or not in the same world or branches. The >>>>>>>> result >>>>>>>> they obtained only entangle each of them with the environment, >>>>>>>> locally, and >>>>>>>> that spread on the whole universe (at subliminal speed) so that both >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> them will encounter only their “correlated” counterparts. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Especially since there are pairs of observers who get results that >>>>>>>> do not agree with QM (the 'mindless hulks!’). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Alice and Bob always get results which confirms QM. But when they >>>>>>>> are space-like separated, their consciousness will only be able to >>>>>>>> differentiate into histories which contains the correlation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Maudlin moved on in the years between the first edition of his book >>>>>>>> in 1994 and the third edition in 2011. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You told me. Maudlin is very good, but is not a fan of Everett, nor >>>>>>>> even of Mechanism. He argued also, and independently of me, that it >>>>>>>> makes >>>>>>>> no sense to keep both mechanism and materialism. The end of his paper >>>>>>>> “Computation and Consciousness” (Journal of Philosophy, 1989) suggests >>>>>>>> he >>>>>>>> is more willing to keep Materialism instead of Mechanism. I show that >>>>>>>> indeed the mechanist solution generalises Everett on the whole >>>>>>>> (sigma_1, >>>>>>>> semicomputable) part of the arithmetical reality/truth. I reduce the >>>>>>>> mind-body problem to the problem of recovering physics from a >>>>>>>> statistics on >>>>>>>> first person experience in arithmetic (where there is no hulk, nor >>>>>>>> need of >>>>>>>> hulk). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In his 2011 thinking I can only imagine that he would have seen >>>>>>>> many-minds in much the same way as he later saw many-worlds -- if >>>>>>>> appeal is >>>>>>>> made to the wave function to make sense of the correlations in >>>>>>>> many-worlds, >>>>>>>> then we have to recognize that this is not a *local* account since >>>>>>>> the wave function is not a local object. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don’t really understand what you mean by that. I am reading your >>>>>>>> paper, which is nice and well written, but too quick for me on both >>>>>>>> Tipler >>>>>>>> and Baylock. It helps me to better see how you interpret the wave, and >>>>>>>> where we might differ. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It seems to me that when Alice and Bob prepare the singlet state, >>>>>>>> even before their long distance separation, there is no sense to say >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> they are still in the same world. They are only because their interact >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> entangle and re-entangle very quickly, but still always at light speed >>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>> slower. But even if there is only one cm between Alice and Bob, it >>>>>>>> makes no >>>>>>>> sense to say that they are in the same world. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *And when I didn't think the MWI could get more foolish, it does! AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But any other options would introduce FTL, which does not make any >>>>>>> sense if we keep special relativity and QM’s predictions correct, with >>>>>>> some >>>>>>> amount of physical realism. >>>>>>> Foolish? Probably, but less than any other option, I would say. >>>>>>> Foolishness has degrees, and is subjective. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *I sympathize, I really do, but your real problem is with QM -- which >>>>>> *assumes* something worse than FTL; instantaneous propagation of >>>>>> information! * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I doubt this, even with collapse. The local indeterminacy of the >>>>>> collapse prevent signalling information from that FTL influence. Then I >>>>>> argue that with the MW, there is not even any FTL needed. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *This situation bears some resemblance to Newtonian gravity or the >>>>>> plane waves in classical E&M, where the force or wave respectively >>>>>> propagates instantaneously, not simply FTL.* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes. And Newton seems to have been conscious of this, and he >>>>>> suspected his theory of force to be essentially wrong. Einstein made the >>>>>> correction, and to keep that correction of Newton’s physics valid in the >>>>>> frame of QM, we need the many-worlds. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> * Indeed, whenever you write a WF, you're assuming the probabilities >>>>>> propagate instantaneously throughout infinite space. Now you know your >>>>>> real >>>>>> problem. AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don’t think anything can propagate FTL (starting from speed 0, say, >>>>>> I know about tachyons…). There is not probability at all in the global >>>>>> MW >>>>>> picture, and actually, I think there is no time either in any decent MW >>>>>> relativistic block-pictures. >>>>>> In the mechanist frame, there is no physical universe at all. It is >>>>>> an emerging pattern from all computations (which can be proved to be >>>>>> realise in any semantic of elementary arithmetic). >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *You're not listening. You're not acknowledging a simple fact of QM. >>>>> It ASSUMES -- whether you like it or not, or whether you believe it or >>>>> not >>>>> -- that information propagates INSTANTANEOUSLY. * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The wave propagates locally. Again, as Einstein made already clear at >>>>> Brussels Solvay Congress in 1927, the collapse of the wave should be >>>>> instantaneous, but again, without collapse, I do not see anything >>>>> instantaneous in QM. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *Just to the math! You can calculate the probability density for the >>>> double slit from minus to plus infinity! Nothing to do with collapse or >>>> branches! I'm done. AG * >>>> >>> >>> >>> *I meant to write; Just DO the math! Since QM allows the probability >>> calculation for the double slit from minus to plus infinitely for any >>> moment in time, it means we have and know the data simultaneously for all >>> positions on the screen. This has nothing to do with branches or collapse. >>> AG* >>> >> >> *FWIW, I would add that IMO non locality as illustrated by the singlet >> state DOES imply FTL action, specifically between the subsystems. >> Describing the phenomenon as "influencing" does not avoid the conclusion >> that QM contradicts SR, even though no messages can be sent using singlet >> state non locality. AG * >> > > *The usual suspects are fond of using words like 'influences" and > "non-separable" to make peace between SR and QM, but I find this peace > wanting. QM assumes, somewhat analogous to Newtonian Gravity, that the wf, > and hence the probability density, extends infinity in all spatial > directions. This might be the root cause of the inconsistency between the > theories. Denying it won't wash IMO. AG* >
*Bruno; maybe the mistake you're making is to equate the calculation of a possible result of a measurement, with the collapse of the wf. I don't see calculating what the probabilities are, as identical to doing a measurement that might involve collapse (depending on one's interpretation of QM). IMO, the fact that we can calculate the probability density from minus to plus infinity for the double slit, implies the wf has spread across the universe BEFORE any measurement has been performed. Hence, the conclusion of instantaneous spread of the wf is unavoidable. You might disagree with this conclusion, but then you're objecting to QM itself, not just collapse. AG* > *For example, in the double slit experiment, QM gives the probability >>>>> density to plus and minus INFINITY! * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The Pascal triangle and its Gaussian limit too, without the need of >>>>> any instantaneity. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *It's not about "needing" anything. It's about what can be calculated >>>> and what it obviously means! AG * >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> * It's worse than FTL, much worse. If you want to deny FTL or >>>>> INSTANTANEOUS propagation, you must acknowledge that you are denying QM >>>>> itself. * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Only the collapse. What you say is right if you assume that only one >>>>> branch survive, or only one branche supports “real” particles, etc. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *It's OK to deny QM, but you don't seem to know the FACT of your >>>>> denial. You post as if to affirm the theory of QM, but in fact you're >>>>> denying it. And this has nothing to do with collapse! AG* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am just skeptical about the collapse. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> They might find uncorrelated results, but, at the speed of alight, >>>>>>>> each one will only be able to talk to its correctly correlated >>>>>>>> counterparts. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The same can clearly be said of the many-minds approach. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The wave function is not local because the entangled singlet state >>>>>>>> is non-separable. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Non-separability means that if you interact with one part of the >>>>>>>> state, you affect the whole state: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I am not sure you affect any state. You just discover in which >>>>>>>> branch you are. The wave only described a multiplicity of >>>>>>>> realties(available history), and in this case, when someone, Alice >>>>>>>> say, >>>>>>>> look at something inseparable, she got information about her >>>>>>>> branche(s), >>>>>>>> and of course she knows that any possible future Bob will have the >>>>>>>> correlated result. But Bob, if space-separated, might very well find a >>>>>>>> non >>>>>>>> correlated result, which means that he localised itself in another >>>>>>>> branch, >>>>>>>> where him too will only be able to meet his corresponding correctly >>>>>>>> correlated Alice. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That is how I interpret the QM wave, or the Heisenberg matrices. I >>>>>>>> am afraid that a “real” treatment would need a quantum theory of space >>>>>>>> itself, but this needs a solution to the quantum gravity problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the state cannot be split into separate non-interacting parts, one >>>>>>>> for each particle in the singlet. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree with this. But that can be interpreted by the fact that we >>>>>>>> are ignorant in which branch we are. Being in the same branch is an >>>>>>>> equivalence relation on the object with which we can interact with, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> space separation entails that the measurement are truly uncorrelated >>>>>>>> “in >>>>>>>> the absolute”, yet all the Alices and Bobs couples localises >>>>>>>> themselves in >>>>>>>> the branches violating the Bell’s inequality. Alice would need to go >>>>>>>> quicker than the speed of light to see some Bob finding an >>>>>>>> uncorrelated >>>>>>>> result, like overpassing the decoherence time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That is why the non-locality is unavoidable -- in many minds as in >>>>>>>> many-worlds -- it is an intrinsic part of quantum theory, and is >>>>>>>> perhaps >>>>>>>> the most significant way in which quantum mechanics differs from >>>>>>>> classical >>>>>>>> mechanics (you don't get non-separable states in classical mechanics, >>>>>>>> although you do get interference between classical waves). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree with all this, but the many-worlds, or the relative states >>>>>>>> explains this without a physical action acting FTL. It is very special >>>>>>>> indeed, as the confirmation of that Bell’s Inequality violation >>>>>>>> confirms >>>>>>>> that LOCALITY + DETERMINACY (+ some amount of physical realism) makes >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> Relative States existence obligatory. >>>>>>>> Which of course I find nice, as it makes QM looking exactly like a >>>>>>>> solution of the Mechanist Mind-body problem, where the physical body >>>>>>>> can be >>>>>>>> shown to make sense only through a statistics on all computational >>>>>>>> states >>>>>>>> (structured by self-referential correctness). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> so stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from >>>>>>>> the mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> following comment might be relevant for you: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical >>>>>>>> distinction between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring >>>>>>>> device, so it seems to require eliminating the strong >>>>>>>> Church–Turing hypothesis >>>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> >>>>>>>> or postulating a physical model for consciousness.” >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What does they mean by “Strong Church-Turing hypothesis”? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I imagine that the Wikipedia author means that the strong CT >>>>>>>> hypothesis supposes that the world is nothing more than a computation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> STRONG CT would be Digital Physicalism. This has been refuted since >>>>>>>> long, if by world we mean the physical world. If my local body is >>>>>>>> Turing >>>>>>>> emulable (with consciousness preservation), then physics is reduced to >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> statistics on all computations, which can be shown to have non >>>>>>>> computable >>>>>>>> elements. >>>>>>>> The physical reality can be very well approximated by a >>>>>>>> computation, but in the limit (where the first person lives) it cannot >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>> computable. To make some measurement and get all correct decimal in a >>>>>>>> theory for that measurement, you need to execute the whole universal >>>>>>>> dovetailing in an instant, which is impossible. Mechanism makes also >>>>>>>> matter >>>>>>>> trivially not clonable. You cannot clone your infinite ignorance about >>>>>>>> which computations execute you. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The above sentence does not make sense. The many-worlds theory is a >>>>>>>> direct consequence of the SWE + the mechanist theory theory of mind. >>>>>>>> It is >>>>>>>> the collapse of the wave which would be threat to Mechanism (and of >>>>>>>> Rationalism). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a >>>>>>>> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot >>>>>>>> participate in >>>>>>>> any such superposition), >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The mind cannot NOT participate to the infinite superposition which >>>>>>>> is not eliminable from arithmetic. That is why we have an infinity of >>>>>>>> body >>>>>>>> in arithmetic, and why when we look closely to the environment, i.e. >>>>>>>> below >>>>>>>> our mechanist substitution level, we must find the sign of the >>>>>>>> presence of >>>>>>>> the alternate computations, like QM-without-collapse confirmed. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So, contrary to what you said above, you do not really agree that >>>>>>>> the supposedly local 'many-minds' account given by Maudlin in his book >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> close to what you think? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You can say that. Maudlin saw that the Many-Mind theory is local >>>>>>>> (at least in his 2009 book, I will buy the 2011 soon or later) but he >>>>>>>> surimposed a “one world” structure, which leads to empty hulk and >>>>>>>> zombie >>>>>>>> and to an infinity of mind for one body, which makes not much sense. I >>>>>>>> think all this comes from too much naive notion of mind and world. >>>>>>>> With >>>>>>>> computationalism we get the opposite: each mind get associated with an >>>>>>>> infinity of relative computational states, the different modes (true, >>>>>>>> believable, knowable, observable, sensible) result from the >>>>>>>> incompleteness >>>>>>>> of all universal theories. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you might not >>>>>>>> want to say "Yes, Doctor". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think the complete opposite of this is correct. Church’s thesis >>>>>>>> go hand in hand with the non collapse (and non guiding potential) of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> quantum wave. The only problem that Everett missed, is that, for all >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> to be consistent, extract the formalism of the Wave itself from the >>>>>>>> statistic on all computations. Then the logic of machine >>>>>>>> self-reference and >>>>>>>> its variants imposed by incompleteness gives the complete solution at >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> propositional level, and that works, in the sense that we get quantum >>>>>>>> logic >>>>>>>> where we should, making Mechanism not (yet) refuted by observations. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But that is your theory of mechanism, which is not to be found in >>>>>>>> quantum theory at all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Everett use Mechanism. Darwin uses Mechanism. Diderot defined >>>>>>>> rationalism by Mechanism, and when Milinda ask to Arjuna what Arjuna >>>>>>>> is, >>>>>>>> Arjuna explained what a machine is. >>>>>>>> It is not my theory of Mechanism. It is a very old idea. Then >>>>>>>> Incompleteness, which is a one-diagonalization consequence of the >>>>>>>> Church-Turing, shows that we are quite ignorant of what machine can >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> cannot do, and the execution of all computations in arithmetic invites >>>>>>>> us >>>>>>>> by itself to doubt physicalism. There is a non physical reason for the >>>>>>>> physical laws: they emerge from the logic of what the average >>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> machine (an arithmetical notion) can bet to live from its first person >>>>>>>> perspective. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> There is a many-dreams interpretation of arithmetic/combinator, and >>>>>>>> all universal number/combinator converges to it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And if that differ from the observations, it will be time to invoke >>>>>>>> magical things like primary matter or spooky action at a distance, or >>>>>>>> elves >>>>>>>> and gods and other actual infinities. But then I need strong evidence, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> a departure of Nature from the machine’s observable mode might be >>>>>>>> such. But >>>>>>>> up to now, nature seems to obey the laws of the universal machine >>>>>>>> dreams. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruce >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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