On Thursday, August 9, 2018 at 7:32:07 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Aug 2018, at 02:02, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at 5:46:22 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 8 Aug 2018, at 13:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >> >> On 8 Aug 2018, at 01:39, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >> >> >> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information >> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation >> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees >> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to >> what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already >> from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds >> assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an >> infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all >> measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally >> the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed. >> >> >> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would >> want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the >> superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such >> a superposition, >> >> >> That sides with Mechanism. In arithmetic there is an infinity of >> identical (at the relevant representation level) brains. Now Albert and >> Loewer seems to associate an infinity of mind with one body. >> >> >> The 'infinity of minds for each body' was postulated by Albert and Lowe >> to avoid the 'mindless hulk' problem. In other words, it was just an *ad >> hoc* fix for a problem in the theory. This alone should have been >> sufficient to render the theory unacceptable. >> >> >> I agree. That is why I remain closer to Everett. This problem is >> automatically solved with Mechanism. There is no empty hulk, given that >> there is no hulk. >> >> >> >> >> I do not understand this, and with the Mechanist “many-dreams” it is the >> contrary: each mind as an infinity of (virtual) bodies, and the >> consciousness will differentiate along their computational different >> continuations. Take the WM-duplication. After the reconstitution, but >> before the copies open the door, one mind is associated to two bodies, and >> then differentiates in W or in M from each location perspective. To say >> that the mind is not in a superposition is equivalent with Everett’s >> justification that the observer cannot feel the split, and it is where >> Everett use (more or less explicitly) the mechanist hypothesis. >> >> >> The splitting in Everett's theory at least makes some sort of sense, and >> is not postulated *ad hoc*. >> >> >> I agree. >> >> >> >> The real problem I see with many-minds theory is that it does not >> actually explain the observed correlations. The correlations are presumed >> not to exist in reality -- all possible combinations of experimental >> outcomes happen, but when Alice and Bob meet, their bodies are still in >> indefinite states -- no actual results are recorded by entanglement with >> their bodies -- but their minds will be in definite states that agree with >> the quantum correlations. This step seems to introduce yet more >> unreasonable magic into the 'explanation'. Why are the minds like this when >> they communicate? >> >> >> Because all Alice and Bob are coupled in that way, by the singlet state. >> That works if we keep in mind that the singlet state (when not already >> observed by neither Alice nor Bob) describes an infinity of Alice and Bob, >> with the spin in all directions, but always correlated. When Alice and Bob >> make their measurement, if they are space separated, it makes no sense to >> ask if they are or not in the same world or branches. The result they >> obtained only entangle each of them with the environment, locally, and that >> spread on the whole universe (at subliminal speed) so that both of them >> will encounter only their “correlated” counterparts. >> >> >> >> >> >> Especially since there are pairs of observers who get results that do not >> agree with QM (the 'mindless hulks!’). >> >> >> Alice and Bob always get results which confirms QM. But when they are >> space-like separated, their consciousness will only be able to >> differentiate into histories which contains the correlation. >> >> >> >> >> >> Maudlin moved on in the years between the first edition of his book in >> 1994 and the third edition in 2011. >> >> >> You told me. Maudlin is very good, but is not a fan of Everett, nor even >> of Mechanism. He argued also, and independently of me, that it makes no >> sense to keep both mechanism and materialism. The end of his paper >> “Computation and Consciousness” (Journal of Philosophy, 1989) suggests he >> is more willing to keep Materialism instead of Mechanism. I show that >> indeed the mechanist solution generalises Everett on the whole (sigma_1, >> semicomputable) part of the arithmetical reality/truth. I reduce the >> mind-body problem to the problem of recovering physics from a statistics on >> first person experience in arithmetic (where there is no hulk, nor need of >> hulk). >> >> >> >> In his 2011 thinking I can only imagine that he would have seen >> many-minds in much the same way as he later saw many-worlds -- if appeal is >> made to the wave function to make sense of the correlations in many-worlds, >> then we have to recognize that this is not a *local* account since the >> wave function is not a local object. >> >> >> >> I don’t really understand what you mean by that. I am reading your paper, >> which is nice and well written, but too quick for me on both Tipler and >> Baylock. It helps me to better see how you interpret the wave, and where we >> might differ. >> >> It seems to me that when Alice and Bob prepare the singlet state, even >> before their long distance separation, there is no sense to say that they >> are still in the same world. They are only because their interact and >> entangle and re-entangle very quickly, but still always at light speed or >> slower. But even if there is only one cm between Alice and Bob, it makes no >> sense to say that they are in the same world. >> > > *And when I didn't think the MWI could get more foolish, it does! AG* > > > But any other options would introduce FTL, which does not make any sense > if we keep special relativity and QM’s predictions correct, with some > amount of physical realism. > Foolish? Probably, but less than any other option, I would say. > Foolishness has degrees, and is subjective. >
*I sympathize, I really do, but your real problem is with QM -- which *assumes* something worse than FTL; instantaneous propagation of information! This situation bears some resemblance to Newtonian gravity or the plane waves in classical E&M, where the force or wave respectively propagates instantaneously, not simply FTL. Indeed, whenever you write a WF, you're assuming the probabilities propagate instantaneously throughout infinite space. Now you know your real problem. AG* > > Bruno > > > > > > >> They might find uncorrelated results, but, at the speed of alight, each >> one will only be able to talk to its correctly correlated counterparts. >> >> >> >> >> The same can clearly be said of the many-minds approach. >> >> The wave function is not local because the entangled singlet state is >> non-separable. >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> >> Non-separability means that if you interact with one part of the state, >> you affect the whole state: >> >> >> >> I am not sure you affect any state. You just discover in which branch you >> are. The wave only described a multiplicity of realties(available history), >> and in this case, when someone, Alice say, look at something inseparable, >> she got information about her branche(s), and of course she knows that any >> possible future Bob will have the correlated result. But Bob, if >> space-separated, might very well find a non correlated result, which means >> that he localised itself in another branch, where him too will only be able >> to meet his corresponding correctly correlated Alice. >> >> That is how I interpret the QM wave, or the Heisenberg matrices. I am >> afraid that a “real” treatment would need a quantum theory of space itself, >> but this needs a solution to the quantum gravity problem. >> >> >> >> >> the state cannot be split into separate non-interacting parts, one for >> each particle in the singlet. >> >> >> I agree with this. But that can be interpreted by the fact that we are >> ignorant in which branch we are. Being in the same branch is an equivalence >> relation on the object with which we can interact with, and space >> separation entails that the measurement are truly uncorrelated “in the >> absolute”, yet all the Alices and Bobs couples localises themselves in the >> branches violating the Bell’s inequality. Alice would need to go quicker >> than the speed of light to see some Bob finding an uncorrelated result, >> like overpassing the decoherence time. >> >> >> >> That is why the non-locality is unavoidable -- in many minds as in >> many-worlds -- it is an intrinsic part of quantum theory, and is perhaps >> the most significant way in which quantum mechanics differs from classical >> mechanics (you don't get non-separable states in classical mechanics, >> although you do get interference between classical waves). >> >> >> >> I agree with all this, but the many-worlds, or the relative states >> explains this without a physical action acting FTL. It is very special >> indeed, as the confirmation of that Bell’s Inequality violation confirms >> that LOCALITY + DETERMINACY (+ some amount of physical realism) makes the >> Relative States existence obligatory. >> Which of course I find nice, as it makes QM looking exactly like a >> solution of the Mechanist Mind-body problem, where the physical body can be >> shown to make sense only through a statistics on all computational states >> (structured by self-referential correctness). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> so stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the >> mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the >> following comment might be relevant for you: >> >> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction >> between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it >> seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> >> or postulating a physical model for consciousness.” >> >> >> >> What does they mean by “Strong Church-Turing hypothesis”? >> >> >> I imagine that the Wikipedia author means that the strong CT hypothesis >> supposes that the world is nothing more than a computation. >> >> >> >> STRONG CT would be Digital Physicalism. This has been refuted since long, >> if by world we mean the physical world. If my local body is Turing emulable >> (with consciousness preservation), then physics is reduced to a statistics >> on all computations, which can be shown to have non computable elements. >> The physical reality can be very well approximated by a computation, but >> in the limit (where the first person lives) it cannot be computable. To >> make some measurement and get all correct decimal in a theory for that >> measurement, you need to execute the whole universal dovetailing in an >> instant, which is impossible. Mechanism makes also matter trivially not >> clonable. You cannot clone your infinite ignorance about which computations >> execute you. >> >> >> >> >> >> The above sentence does not make sense. The many-worlds theory is a >> direct consequence of the SWE + the mechanist theory theory of mind. It is >> the collapse of the wave which would be threat to Mechanism (and of >> Rationalism). >> >> >> >> >> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a >> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in >> any such superposition), >> >> >> The mind cannot NOT participate to the infinite superposition which is >> not eliminable from arithmetic. That is why we have an infinity of body in >> arithmetic, and why when we look closely to the environment, i.e. below our >> mechanist substitution level, we must find the sign of the presence of the >> alternate computations, like QM-without-collapse confirmed. >> >> >> So, contrary to what you said above, you do not really agree that the >> supposedly local 'many-minds' account given by Maudlin in his book is close >> to what you think? >> >> >> You can say that. Maudlin saw that the Many-Mind theory is local (at >> least in his 2009 book, I will buy the 2011 soon or later) but he >> surimposed a “one world” structure, which leads to empty hulk and zombie >> and to an infinity of mind for one body, which makes not much sense. I >> think all this comes from too much naive notion of mind and world. With >> computationalism we get the opposite: each mind get associated with an >> infinity of relative computational states, the different modes (true, >> believable, knowable, observable, sensible) result from the incompleteness >> of all universal theories. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you might not want to >> say "Yes, Doctor". >> >> >> I think the complete opposite of this is correct. Church’s thesis go hand >> in hand with the non collapse (and non guiding potential) of the quantum >> wave. The only problem that Everett missed, is that, for all this to be >> consistent, extract the formalism of the Wave itself from the statistic on >> all computations. Then the logic of machine self-reference and its variants >> imposed by incompleteness gives the complete solution at the propositional >> level, and that works, in the sense that we get quantum logic where we >> should, making Mechanism not (yet) refuted by observations. >> >> >> But that is your theory of mechanism, which is not to be found in quantum >> theory at all. >> >> >> Everett use Mechanism. Darwin uses Mechanism. Diderot defined rationalism >> by Mechanism, and when Milinda ask to Arjuna what Arjuna is, Arjuna >> explained what a machine is. >> It is not my theory of Mechanism. It is a very old idea. Then >> Incompleteness, which is a one-diagonalization consequence of the >> Church-Turing, shows that we are quite ignorant of what machine can and >> cannot do, and the execution of all computations in arithmetic invites us >> by itself to doubt physicalism. There is a non physical reason for the >> physical laws: they emerge from the logic of what the average universal >> machine (an arithmetical notion) can bet to live from its first person >> perspective. >> >> There is a many-dreams interpretation of arithmetic/combinator, and all >> universal number/combinator converges to it. >> >> And if that differ from the observations, it will be time to invoke >> magical things like primary matter or spooky action at a distance, or elves >> and gods and other actual infinities. But then I need strong evidence, and >> a departure of Nature from the machine’s observable mode might be such. But >> up to now, nature seems to obey the laws of the universal machine dreams. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Bruce >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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