> On 13 Aug 2018, at 03:32, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 6:51:23 PM UTC, [email protected] wrote: > > > On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 4:44:18 PM UTC, [email protected] <> wrote: > > > On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 4:26:39 PM UTC, [email protected] <> wrote: > > > On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 12:01:56 PM UTC, [email protected] <> wrote: > > > On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 9:55:39 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 10 Aug 2018, at 22:05, [email protected] <> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, August 10, 2018 at 4:01:37 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 9 Aug 2018, at 18:50, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, August 9, 2018 at 7:32:07 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 9 Aug 2018, at 02:02, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at 5:46:22 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 8 Aug 2018, at 13:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <>> >>>>>>> On 8 Aug 2018, at 01:39, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information >>>>>>>> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality >>>>>>>> interpretation of special relativity, notably well described by >>>>>>>> Maudlin. Maudlin agrees that many-mind restore locality, and its >>>>>>>> “many-mind” theory is close to what I think Everett had in mind, and >>>>>>>> is close to what I defended already from the mechanist hypothesis. To >>>>>>>> be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds assumes an infinity of mind for >>>>>>>> one body, where in mechanism we got an infinity of relative body for >>>>>>>> one mind, but the key issue is that all measurement outcomes belongs >>>>>>>> to some mind. The measurement splits locally the observers, and >>>>>>>> propagate at subliminal speed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you >>>>>>> would want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in >>>>>>> the superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be >>>>>>> in such a superposition, >>>>>> >>>>>> That sides with Mechanism. In arithmetic there is an infinity of >>>>>> identical (at the relevant representation level) brains. Now Albert and >>>>>> Loewer seems to associate an infinity of mind with one body. >>>>> >>>>> The 'infinity of minds for each body' was postulated by Albert and Lowe >>>>> to avoid the 'mindless hulk' problem. In other words, it was just an ad >>>>> hoc fix for a problem in the theory. This alone should have been >>>>> sufficient to render the theory unacceptable. >>>> >>>> I agree. That is why I remain closer to Everett. This problem is >>>> automatically solved with Mechanism. There is no empty hulk, given that >>>> there is no hulk. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I do not understand this, and with the Mechanist “many-dreams” it is the >>>>>> contrary: each mind as an infinity of (virtual) bodies, and the >>>>>> consciousness will differentiate along their computational different >>>>>> continuations. Take the WM-duplication. After the reconstitution, but >>>>>> before the copies open the door, one mind is associated to two bodies, >>>>>> and then differentiates in W or in M from each location perspective. To >>>>>> say that the mind is not in a superposition is equivalent with Everett’s >>>>>> justification that the observer cannot feel the split, and it is where >>>>>> Everett use (more or less explicitly) the mechanist hypothesis. >>>>> >>>>> The splitting in Everett's theory at least makes some sort of sense, and >>>>> is not postulated ad hoc. >>>> >>>> I agree. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> The real problem I see with many-minds theory is that it does not >>>>> actually explain the observed correlations. The correlations are presumed >>>>> not to exist in reality -- all possible combinations of experimental >>>>> outcomes happen, but when Alice and Bob meet, their bodies are still in >>>>> indefinite states -- no actual results are recorded by entanglement with >>>>> their bodies -- but their minds will be in definite states that agree >>>>> with the quantum correlations. This step seems to introduce yet more >>>>> unreasonable magic into the 'explanation'. Why are the minds like this >>>>> when they communicate? >>>> >>>> Because all Alice and Bob are coupled in that way, by the singlet state. >>>> That works if we keep in mind that the singlet state (when not already >>>> observed by neither Alice nor Bob) describes an infinity of Alice and Bob, >>>> with the spin in all directions, but always correlated. When Alice and Bob >>>> make their measurement, if they are space separated, it makes no sense to >>>> ask if they are or not in the same world or branches. The result they >>>> obtained only entangle each of them with the environment, locally, and >>>> that spread on the whole universe (at subliminal speed) so that both of >>>> them will encounter only their “correlated” counterparts. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Especially since there are pairs of observers who get results that do not >>>>> agree with QM (the 'mindless hulks!’). >>>> >>>> Alice and Bob always get results which confirms QM. But when they are >>>> space-like separated, their consciousness will only be able to >>>> differentiate into histories which contains the correlation. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Maudlin moved on in the years between the first edition of his book in >>>>> 1994 and the third edition in 2011. >>>> >>>> You told me. Maudlin is very good, but is not a fan of Everett, nor even >>>> of Mechanism. He argued also, and independently of me, that it makes no >>>> sense to keep both mechanism and materialism. The end of his paper >>>> “Computation and Consciousness” (Journal of Philosophy, 1989) suggests he >>>> is more willing to keep Materialism instead of Mechanism. I show that >>>> indeed the mechanist solution generalises Everett on the whole (sigma_1, >>>> semicomputable) part of the arithmetical reality/truth. I reduce the >>>> mind-body problem to the problem of recovering physics from a statistics >>>> on first person experience in arithmetic (where there is no hulk, nor need >>>> of hulk). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> In his 2011 thinking I can only imagine that he would have seen >>>>> many-minds in much the same way as he later saw many-worlds -- if appeal >>>>> is made to the wave function to make sense of the correlations in >>>>> many-worlds, then we have to recognize that this is not a local account >>>>> since the wave function is not a local object. >>>> >>>> >>>> I don’t really understand what you mean by that. I am reading your paper, >>>> which is nice and well written, but too quick for me on both Tipler and >>>> Baylock. It helps me to better see how you interpret the wave, and where >>>> we might differ. >>>> >>>> It seems to me that when Alice and Bob prepare the singlet state, even >>>> before their long distance separation, there is no sense to say that they >>>> are still in the same world. They are only because their interact and >>>> entangle and re-entangle very quickly, but still always at light speed or >>>> slower. But even if there is only one cm between Alice and Bob, it makes >>>> no sense to say that they are in the same world. >>>> >>>> And when I didn't think the MWI could get more foolish, it does! AG >>> >>> But any other options would introduce FTL, which does not make any sense if >>> we keep special relativity and QM’s predictions correct, with some amount >>> of physical realism. >>> Foolish? Probably, but less than any other option, I would say. Foolishness >>> has degrees, and is subjective. >>> >>> I sympathize, I really do, but your real problem is with QM -- which >>> *assumes* something worse than FTL; instantaneous propagation of >>> information! >> >> I doubt this, even with collapse. The local indeterminacy of the collapse >> prevent signalling information from that FTL influence. Then I argue that >> with the MW, there is not even any FTL needed. >> >> >> >> >>> This situation bears some resemblance to Newtonian gravity or the plane >>> waves in classical E&M, where the force or wave respectively propagates >>> instantaneously, not simply FTL. >> >> Yes. And Newton seems to have been conscious of this, and he suspected his >> theory of force to be essentially wrong. Einstein made the correction, and >> to keep that correction of Newton’s physics valid in the frame of QM, we >> need the many-worlds. >> >>> Indeed, whenever you write a WF, you're assuming the probabilities >>> propagate instantaneously throughout infinite space. Now you know your real >>> problem. AG >> >> >> I don’t think anything can propagate FTL (starting from speed 0, say, I know >> about tachyons…). There is not probability at all in the global MW picture, >> and actually, I think there is no time either in any decent MW relativistic >> block-pictures. >> In the mechanist frame, there is no physical universe at all. It is an >> emerging pattern from all computations (which can be proved to be realise in >> any semantic of elementary arithmetic). >> >> Bruno >> >> You're not listening. You're not acknowledging a simple fact of QM. It >> ASSUMES -- whether you like it or not, or whether you believe it or not -- >> that information propagates INSTANTANEOUSLY. > > > The wave propagates locally. Again, as Einstein made already clear at > Brussels Solvay Congress in 1927, the collapse of the wave should be > instantaneous, but again, without collapse, I do not see anything > instantaneous in QM. > > Just to the math! You can calculate the probability density for the double > slit from minus to plus infinity! Nothing to do with collapse or branches! > I'm done. AG > > I meant to write; Just DO the math! Since QM allows the probability > calculation for the double slit from minus to plus infinitely for any moment > in time, it means we have and know the data simultaneously for all positions > on the screen. This has nothing to do with branches or collapse. AG
To be sure, if you accept functions which do not tend to zero ad infinity, you get a non renormalisable probability. You just go out of the Hilbert space of square integrable functions. That describe waves, and the formalism ensures that they propagate by purely local means, like always with waves. > > FWIW, I would add that IMO non locality as illustrated by the singlet state > DOES imply FTL action, specifically between the subsystems. I agree with you. In all one-world theory (ie.QM+collapse (Copenhagen) or QM+hidden-variables à-la Bohm de Broglie)) there will be some FTL. Not so with the non-collapse theory. 5t least that is my point). > Describing the phenomenon as "influencing" does not avoid the conclusion that > QM contradicts SR, even though no messages can be sent using singlet state > non locality. AG I essentially agree. But some people often disagree on this. But discussing with the makes them at some point invoking the famous “FAPP” at some point. > > The usual suspects are fond of using words like 'influences" and > "non-separable" to make peace between SR and QM, but I find this peace > wanting. QM assumes, somewhat analogous to Newtonian Gravity, that the wf, > and hence the probability density, extends infinity in all spatial > directions. This might be the root cause of the inconsistency between the > theories. Denying it won't wash IMO. AG > > Bruno; maybe the mistake you're making is to equate the calculation of a > possible result of a measurement, with the collapse of the wf. I don't see > calculating what the probabilities are, as identical to doing a measurement > that might involve collapse (depending on one's interpretation of QM). Me neither. You might need to search for another “mistake”. > IMO, the fact that we can calculate the probability density from minus to > plus infinity for the double slit, implies the wf has spread across the > universe BEFORE any measurement has been performed. All wave start from some location (in phase space) and evolve locally and deterministically. There is no wave such that the probability is uniform in the whole universe. > Hence, the conclusion of instantaneous spread of the wf is unavoidable. Instantaneous spread? > You might disagree with this conclusion, but then you're objecting to QM > itself, not just collapse. AG You loss me. There is nothing more local and computable than a wave. It is its collapse which needs to be instantaneous in a reality which violate Bell’s inequality and where only one Bob and one Alice exist. But my point is that the violation of Bell’s inequality + no FTL just implies the MW. To me, Aspect experience is a very string evidences for the “other worlds” (which with mechanism will appear to be only other computations (seen from the self-referential perspective of some universal machine). Bruno > >> For example, in the double slit experiment, QM gives the probability density >> to plus and minus INFINITY! > > The Pascal triangle and its Gaussian limit too, without the need of any > instantaneity. > > It's not about "needing" anything. It's about what can be calculated and what > it obviously means! AG > > > >> It's worse than FTL, much worse. If you want to deny FTL or INSTANTANEOUS >> propagation, you must acknowledge that you are denying QM itself. > > Only the collapse. What you say is right if you assume that only one branch > survive, or only one branche supports “real” particles, etc. > > > >> It's OK to deny QM, but you don't seem to know the FACT of your denial. You >> post as if to affirm the theory of QM, but in fact you're denying it. And >> this has nothing to do with collapse! AG > > > I am just skeptical about the collapse. > > Bruno > > > > >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> They might find uncorrelated results, but, at the speed of alight, each >>>> one will only be able to talk to its correctly correlated counterparts. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> The same can clearly be said of the many-minds approach. >>>>> >>>>> The wave function is not local because the entangled singlet state is >>>>> non-separable. >>>> >>>> OK. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Non-separability means that if you interact with one part of the state, >>>>> you affect the whole state: >>>> >>>> >>>> I am not sure you affect any state. You just discover in which branch you >>>> are. The wave only described a multiplicity of realties(available >>>> history), and in this case, when someone, Alice say, look at something >>>> inseparable, she got information about her branche(s), and of course she >>>> knows that any possible future Bob will have the correlated result. But >>>> Bob, if space-separated, might very well find a non correlated result, >>>> which means that he localised itself in another branch, where him too will >>>> only be able to meet his corresponding correctly correlated Alice. >>>> >>>> That is how I interpret the QM wave, or the Heisenberg matrices. I am >>>> afraid that a “real” treatment would need a quantum theory of space >>>> itself, but this needs a solution to the quantum gravity problem. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> the state cannot be split into separate non-interacting parts, one for >>>>> each particle in the singlet. >>>> >>>> I agree with this. But that can be interpreted by the fact that we are >>>> ignorant in which branch we are. Being in the same branch is an >>>> equivalence relation on the object with which we can interact with, and >>>> space separation entails that the measurement are truly uncorrelated “in >>>> the absolute”, yet all the Alices and Bobs couples localises themselves in >>>> the branches violating the Bell’s inequality. Alice would need to go >>>> quicker than the speed of light to see some Bob finding an uncorrelated >>>> result, like overpassing the decoherence time. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> That is why the non-locality is unavoidable -- in many minds as in >>>>> many-worlds -- it is an intrinsic part of quantum theory, and is perhaps >>>>> the most significant way in which quantum mechanics differs from >>>>> classical mechanics (you don't get non-separable states in classical >>>>> mechanics, although you do get interference between classical waves). >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree with all this, but the many-worlds, or the relative states >>>> explains this without a physical action acting FTL. It is very special >>>> indeed, as the confirmation of that Bell’s Inequality violation confirms >>>> that LOCALITY + DETERMINACY (+ some amount of physical realism) makes the >>>> Relative States existence obligatory. >>>> Which of course I find nice, as it makes QM looking exactly like a >>>> solution of the Mechanist Mind-body problem, where the physical body can >>>> be shown to make sense only through a statistics on all computational >>>> states (structured by self-referential correctness). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> so stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the >>>>>>> mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the >>>>>>> following comment might be relevant for you: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction >>>>>>> between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so >>>>>>> it seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis >>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> >>>>>>> or postulating a physical model for consciousness.” >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> What does they mean by “Strong Church-Turing hypothesis”? >>>>> >>>>> I imagine that the Wikipedia author means that the strong CT hypothesis >>>>> supposes that the world is nothing more than a computation. >>>> >>>> >>>> STRONG CT would be Digital Physicalism. This has been refuted since long, >>>> if by world we mean the physical world. If my local body is Turing >>>> emulable (with consciousness preservation), then physics is reduced to a >>>> statistics on all computations, which can be shown to have non computable >>>> elements. >>>> The physical reality can be very well approximated by a computation, but >>>> in the limit (where the first person lives) it cannot be computable. To >>>> make some measurement and get all correct decimal in a theory for that >>>> measurement, you need to execute the whole universal dovetailing in an >>>> instant, which is impossible. Mechanism makes also matter trivially not >>>> clonable. You cannot clone your infinite ignorance about which >>>> computations execute you. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> The above sentence does not make sense. The many-worlds theory is a >>>>>> direct consequence of the SWE + the mechanist theory theory of mind. It >>>>>> is the collapse of the wave which would be threat to Mechanism (and of >>>>>> Rationalism). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a >>>>>>> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate >>>>>>> in any such superposition), >>>>>> >>>>>> The mind cannot NOT participate to the infinite superposition which is >>>>>> not eliminable from arithmetic. That is why we have an infinity of body >>>>>> in arithmetic, and why when we look closely to the environment, i.e. >>>>>> below our mechanist substitution level, we must find the sign of the >>>>>> presence of the alternate computations, like QM-without-collapse >>>>>> confirmed. >>>>> >>>>> So, contrary to what you said above, you do not really agree that the >>>>> supposedly local 'many-minds' account given by Maudlin in his book is >>>>> close to what you think? >>>> >>>> You can say that. Maudlin saw that the Many-Mind theory is local (at least >>>> in his 2009 book, I will buy the 2011 soon or later) but he surimposed a >>>> “one world” structure, which leads to empty hulk and zombie and to an >>>> infinity of mind for one body, which makes not much sense. I think all >>>> this comes from too much naive notion of mind and world. With >>>> computationalism we get the opposite: each mind get associated with an >>>> infinity of relative computational states, the different modes (true, >>>> believable, knowable, observable, sensible) result from the incompleteness >>>> of all universal theories. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you might not want >>>>>>> to say "Yes, Doctor". >>>>>> >>>>>> I think the complete opposite of this is correct. Church’s thesis go >>>>>> hand in hand with the non collapse (and non guiding potential) of the >>>>>> quantum wave. The only problem that Everett missed, is that, for all >>>>>> this to be consistent, extract the formalism of the Wave itself from the >>>>>> statistic on all computations. Then the logic of machine self-reference >>>>>> and its variants imposed by incompleteness gives the complete solution >>>>>> at the propositional level, and that works, in the sense that we get >>>>>> quantum logic where we should, making Mechanism not (yet) refuted by >>>>>> observations. >>>>> >>>>> But that is your theory of mechanism, which is not to be found in quantum >>>>> theory at all. >>>> >>>> Everett use Mechanism. Darwin uses Mechanism. Diderot defined rationalism >>>> by Mechanism, and when Milinda ask to Arjuna what Arjuna is, Arjuna >>>> explained what a machine is. >>>> It is not my theory of Mechanism. It is a very old idea. Then >>>> Incompleteness, which is a one-diagonalization consequence of the >>>> Church-Turing, shows that we are quite ignorant of what machine can and >>>> cannot do, and the execution of all computations in arithmetic invites us >>>> by itself to doubt physicalism. There is a non physical reason for the >>>> physical laws: they emerge from the logic of what the average universal >>>> machine (an arithmetical notion) can bet to live from its first person >>>> perspective. >>>> >>>> There is a many-dreams interpretation of arithmetic/combinator, and all >>>> universal number/combinator converges to it. >>>> >>>> And if that differ from the observations, it will be time to invoke >>>> magical things like primary matter or spooky action at a distance, or >>>> elves and gods and other actual infinities. But then I need strong >>>> evidence, and a departure of Nature from the machine’s observable mode >>>> might be such. But up to now, nature seems to obey the laws of the >>>> universal machine dreams. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruce >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] <>. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <>. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] <>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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