On Sunday, August 12, 2018 at 9:55:39 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Aug 2018, at 22:05, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Friday, August 10, 2018 at 4:01:37 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 9 Aug 2018, at 18:50, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, August 9, 2018 at 7:32:07 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 9 Aug 2018, at 02:02, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at 5:46:22 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 8 Aug 2018, at 13:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> >>>> On 8 Aug 2018, at 01:39, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> >>>> >>>> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information >>>> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality >>>> interpretation >>>> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees >>>> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to >>>> what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already >>>> from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds >>>> assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an >>>> infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all >>>> measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally >>>> the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed. >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you >>>> would want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the >>>> superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such >>>> a superposition, >>>> >>>> >>>> That sides with Mechanism. In arithmetic there is an infinity of >>>> identical (at the relevant representation level) brains. Now Albert and >>>> Loewer seems to associate an infinity of mind with one body. >>>> >>>> >>>> The 'infinity of minds for each body' was postulated by Albert and Lowe >>>> to avoid the 'mindless hulk' problem. In other words, it was just an *ad >>>> hoc* fix for a problem in the theory. This alone should have been >>>> sufficient to render the theory unacceptable. >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree. That is why I remain closer to Everett. This problem is >>>> automatically solved with Mechanism. There is no empty hulk, given that >>>> there is no hulk. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I do not understand this, and with the Mechanist “many-dreams” it is >>>> the contrary: each mind as an infinity of (virtual) bodies, and the >>>> consciousness will differentiate along their computational different >>>> continuations. Take the WM-duplication. After the reconstitution, but >>>> before the copies open the door, one mind is associated to two bodies, and >>>> then differentiates in W or in M from each location perspective. To say >>>> that the mind is not in a superposition is equivalent with Everett’s >>>> justification that the observer cannot feel the split, and it is where >>>> Everett use (more or less explicitly) the mechanist hypothesis. >>>> >>>> >>>> The splitting in Everett's theory at least makes some sort of sense, >>>> and is not postulated *ad hoc*. >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The real problem I see with many-minds theory is that it does not >>>> actually explain the observed correlations. The correlations are presumed >>>> not to exist in reality -- all possible combinations of experimental >>>> outcomes happen, but when Alice and Bob meet, their bodies are still in >>>> indefinite states -- no actual results are recorded by entanglement with >>>> their bodies -- but their minds will be in definite states that agree with >>>> the quantum correlations. This step seems to introduce yet more >>>> unreasonable magic into the 'explanation'. Why are the minds like this >>>> when >>>> they communicate? >>>> >>>> >>>> Because all Alice and Bob are coupled in that way, by the singlet >>>> state. That works if we keep in mind that the singlet state (when not >>>> already observed by neither Alice nor Bob) describes an infinity of Alice >>>> and Bob, with the spin in all directions, but always correlated. When >>>> Alice >>>> and Bob make their measurement, if they are space separated, it makes no >>>> sense to ask if they are or not in the same world or branches. The result >>>> they obtained only entangle each of them with the environment, locally, >>>> and >>>> that spread on the whole universe (at subliminal speed) so that both of >>>> them will encounter only their “correlated” counterparts. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Especially since there are pairs of observers who get results that do >>>> not agree with QM (the 'mindless hulks!’). >>>> >>>> >>>> Alice and Bob always get results which confirms QM. But when they are >>>> space-like separated, their consciousness will only be able to >>>> differentiate into histories which contains the correlation. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Maudlin moved on in the years between the first edition of his book in >>>> 1994 and the third edition in 2011. >>>> >>>> >>>> You told me. Maudlin is very good, but is not a fan of Everett, nor >>>> even of Mechanism. He argued also, and independently of me, that it makes >>>> no sense to keep both mechanism and materialism. The end of his paper >>>> “Computation and Consciousness” (Journal of Philosophy, 1989) suggests he >>>> is more willing to keep Materialism instead of Mechanism. I show that >>>> indeed the mechanist solution generalises Everett on the whole (sigma_1, >>>> semicomputable) part of the arithmetical reality/truth. I reduce the >>>> mind-body problem to the problem of recovering physics from a statistics >>>> on >>>> first person experience in arithmetic (where there is no hulk, nor need of >>>> hulk). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In his 2011 thinking I can only imagine that he would have seen >>>> many-minds in much the same way as he later saw many-worlds -- if appeal >>>> is >>>> made to the wave function to make sense of the correlations in >>>> many-worlds, >>>> then we have to recognize that this is not a *local* account since the >>>> wave function is not a local object. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don’t really understand what you mean by that. I am reading your >>>> paper, which is nice and well written, but too quick for me on both Tipler >>>> and Baylock. It helps me to better see how you interpret the wave, and >>>> where we might differ. >>>> >>>> It seems to me that when Alice and Bob prepare the singlet state, even >>>> before their long distance separation, there is no sense to say that they >>>> are still in the same world. They are only because their interact and >>>> entangle and re-entangle very quickly, but still always at light speed or >>>> slower. But even if there is only one cm between Alice and Bob, it makes >>>> no >>>> sense to say that they are in the same world. >>>> >>> >>> *And when I didn't think the MWI could get more foolish, it does! AG* >>> >>> >>> But any other options would introduce FTL, which does not make any sense >>> if we keep special relativity and QM’s predictions correct, with some >>> amount of physical realism. >>> Foolish? Probably, but less than any other option, I would say. >>> Foolishness has degrees, and is subjective. >>> >> >> *I sympathize, I really do, but your real problem is with QM -- which >> *assumes* something worse than FTL; instantaneous propagation of >> information! * >> >> >> I doubt this, even with collapse. The local indeterminacy of the collapse >> prevent signalling information from that FTL influence. Then I argue that >> with the MW, there is not even any FTL needed. >> >> >> >> >> *This situation bears some resemblance to Newtonian gravity or the plane >> waves in classical E&M, where the force or wave respectively propagates >> instantaneously, not simply FTL.* >> >> >> Yes. And Newton seems to have been conscious of this, and he suspected >> his theory of force to be essentially wrong. Einstein made the correction, >> and to keep that correction of Newton’s physics valid in the frame of QM, >> we need the many-worlds. >> > > >> * Indeed, whenever you write a WF, you're assuming the probabilities >> propagate instantaneously throughout infinite space. Now you know your real >> problem. AG* >> >> >> >> I don’t think anything can propagate FTL (starting from speed 0, say, I >> know about tachyons…). There is not probability at all in the global MW >> picture, and actually, I think there is no time either in any decent MW >> relativistic block-pictures. >> In the mechanist frame, there is no physical universe at all. It is an >> emerging pattern from all computations (which can be proved to be realise >> in any semantic of elementary arithmetic). >> >> Bruno >> > > *You're not listening. You're not acknowledging a simple fact of QM. It > ASSUMES -- whether you like it or not, or whether you believe it or not -- > that information propagates INSTANTANEOUSLY. * > > > > The wave propagates locally. Again, as Einstein made already clear at > Brussels Solvay Congress in 1927, the collapse of the wave should be > instantaneous, but again, without collapse, I do not see anything > instantaneous in QM. >
*Just to the math! You can calculate the probability density for the double slit from minus to plus infinity! Nothing to do with collapse or branches! I'm done. AG * > *For example, in the double slit experiment, QM gives the probability > density to plus and minus INFINITY! * > > > The Pascal triangle and its Gaussian limit too, without the need of any > instantaneity. > *It's not about "needing" anything. It's about what can be calculated and what it obviously means! AG * > > > > * It's worse than FTL, much worse. If you want to deny FTL or > INSTANTANEOUS propagation, you must acknowledge that you are denying QM > itself. * > > > Only the collapse. What you say is right if you assume that only one > branch survive, or only one branche supports “real” particles, etc. > > > > *It's OK to deny QM, but you don't seem to know the FACT of your denial. > You post as if to affirm the theory of QM, but in fact you're denying it. > And this has nothing to do with collapse! AG* > > > > I am just skeptical about the collapse. > > Bruno > > > > > >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> They might find uncorrelated results, but, at the speed of alight, each >>>> one will only be able to talk to its correctly correlated counterparts. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The same can clearly be said of the many-minds approach. >>>> >>>> The wave function is not local because the entangled singlet state is >>>> non-separable. >>>> >>>> >>>> OK. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Non-separability means that if you interact with one part of the state, >>>> you affect the whole state: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I am not sure you affect any state. You just discover in which branch >>>> you are. The wave only described a multiplicity of realties(available >>>> history), and in this case, when someone, Alice say, look at something >>>> inseparable, she got information about her branche(s), and of course she >>>> knows that any possible future Bob will have the correlated result. But >>>> Bob, if space-separated, might very well find a non correlated result, >>>> which means that he localised itself in another branch, where him too will >>>> only be able to meet his corresponding correctly correlated Alice. >>>> >>>> That is how I interpret the QM wave, or the Heisenberg matrices. I am >>>> afraid that a “real” treatment would need a quantum theory of space >>>> itself, >>>> but this needs a solution to the quantum gravity problem. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> the state cannot be split into separate non-interacting parts, one for >>>> each particle in the singlet. >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree with this. But that can be interpreted by the fact that we are >>>> ignorant in which branch we are. Being in the same branch is an >>>> equivalence >>>> relation on the object with which we can interact with, and space >>>> separation entails that the measurement are truly uncorrelated “in the >>>> absolute”, yet all the Alices and Bobs couples localises themselves in the >>>> branches violating the Bell’s inequality. Alice would need to go quicker >>>> than the speed of light to see some Bob finding an uncorrelated result, >>>> like overpassing the decoherence time. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> That is why the non-locality is unavoidable -- in many minds as in >>>> many-worlds -- it is an intrinsic part of quantum theory, and is perhaps >>>> the most significant way in which quantum mechanics differs from classical >>>> mechanics (you don't get non-separable states in classical mechanics, >>>> although you do get interference between classical waves). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree with all this, but the many-worlds, or the relative states >>>> explains this without a physical action acting FTL. It is very special >>>> indeed, as the confirmation of that Bell’s Inequality violation confirms >>>> that LOCALITY + DETERMINACY (+ some amount of physical realism) makes the >>>> Relative States existence obligatory. >>>> Which of course I find nice, as it makes QM looking exactly like a >>>> solution of the Mechanist Mind-body problem, where the physical body can >>>> be >>>> shown to make sense only through a statistics on all computational states >>>> (structured by self-referential correctness). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> so stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the >>>> mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the >>>> following comment might be relevant for you: >>>> >>>> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical >>>> distinction between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring >>>> device, so it seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing >>>> hypothesis >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> >>>> or postulating a physical model for consciousness.” >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What does they mean by “Strong Church-Turing hypothesis”? >>>> >>>> >>>> I imagine that the Wikipedia author means that the strong CT hypothesis >>>> supposes that the world is nothing more than a computation. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> STRONG CT would be Digital Physicalism. This has been refuted since >>>> long, if by world we mean the physical world. If my local body is Turing >>>> emulable (with consciousness preservation), then physics is reduced to a >>>> statistics on all computations, which can be shown to have non computable >>>> elements. >>>> The physical reality can be very well approximated by a computation, >>>> but in the limit (where the first person lives) it cannot be computable. >>>> To >>>> make some measurement and get all correct decimal in a theory for that >>>> measurement, you need to execute the whole universal dovetailing in an >>>> instant, which is impossible. Mechanism makes also matter trivially not >>>> clonable. You cannot clone your infinite ignorance about which >>>> computations >>>> execute you. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The above sentence does not make sense. The many-worlds theory is a >>>> direct consequence of the SWE + the mechanist theory theory of mind. It is >>>> the collapse of the wave which would be threat to Mechanism (and of >>>> Rationalism). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a >>>> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in >>>> any such superposition), >>>> >>>> >>>> The mind cannot NOT participate to the infinite superposition which is >>>> not eliminable from arithmetic. That is why we have an infinity of body in >>>> arithmetic, and why when we look closely to the environment, i.e. below >>>> our >>>> mechanist substitution level, we must find the sign of the presence of >>>> the >>>> alternate computations, like QM-without-collapse confirmed. >>>> >>>> >>>> So, contrary to what you said above, you do not really agree that the >>>> supposedly local 'many-minds' account given by Maudlin in his book is >>>> close >>>> to what you think? >>>> >>>> >>>> You can say that. Maudlin saw that the Many-Mind theory is local (at >>>> least in his 2009 book, I will buy the 2011 soon or later) but he >>>> surimposed a “one world” structure, which leads to empty hulk and zombie >>>> and to an infinity of mind for one body, which makes not much sense. I >>>> think all this comes from too much naive notion of mind and world. With >>>> computationalism we get the opposite: each mind get associated with an >>>> infinity of relative computational states, the different modes (true, >>>> believable, knowable, observable, sensible) result from the incompleteness >>>> of all universal theories. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you might not want >>>> to say "Yes, Doctor". >>>> >>>> >>>> I think the complete opposite of this is correct. Church’s thesis go >>>> hand in hand with the non collapse (and non guiding potential) of the >>>> quantum wave. The only problem that Everett missed, is that, for all this >>>> to be consistent, extract the formalism of the Wave itself from the >>>> statistic on all computations. Then the logic of machine self-reference >>>> and >>>> its variants imposed by incompleteness gives the complete solution at the >>>> propositional level, and that works, in the sense that we get quantum >>>> logic >>>> where we should, making Mechanism not (yet) refuted by observations. >>>> >>>> >>>> But that is your theory of mechanism, which is not to be found in >>>> quantum theory at all. >>>> >>>> >>>> Everett use Mechanism. Darwin uses Mechanism. Diderot defined >>>> rationalism by Mechanism, and when Milinda ask to Arjuna what Arjuna is, >>>> Arjuna explained what a machine is. >>>> It is not my theory of Mechanism. It is a very old idea. Then >>>> Incompleteness, which is a one-diagonalization consequence of the >>>> Church-Turing, shows that we are quite ignorant of what machine can and >>>> cannot do, and the execution of all computations in arithmetic invites us >>>> by itself to doubt physicalism. There is a non physical reason for the >>>> physical laws: they emerge from the logic of what the average universal >>>> machine (an arithmetical notion) can bet to live from its first person >>>> perspective. >>>> >>>> There is a many-dreams interpretation of arithmetic/combinator, and all >>>> universal number/combinator converges to it. >>>> >>>> And if that differ from the observations, it will be time to invoke >>>> magical things like primary matter or spooky action at a distance, or >>>> elves >>>> and gods and other actual infinities. But then I need strong evidence, and >>>> a departure of Nature from the machine’s observable mode might be such. >>>> But >>>> up to now, nature seems to obey the laws of the universal machine dreams. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruce >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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