> On 13 Aug 2018, at 00:55, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> >>> On 11 Aug 2018, at 02:57, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au >>> <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote: >>> >>> From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> >>> >>>> You are the one telling that the Bell’s inequality violation entails FTL >>>> influence. Personally, I do not dig on that issue, because I use only >>>> Everett QM to evaluate what mechanism predicts. I might try to send a post >>>> why I do not follow your critic of Tipler and Baylock, some day. >>> >>> That would be useful. I was perhaps dismissive of Tipler and Baylock >>> because their analyses were so obviously incorrect -- for different >>> reasons, however. >> >> Nothing is obvious here. The debate is far from finished. >> >>> Tipler simply collapsed the non-separable state without realizing that that >>> was a non-local operation. >> >> I would suggest you elaborate on this in your paper. I see the non local >> consideration, but I do not see any FTL appearing from that. The EPR-Bell >> type of experience is non local, and bear on non separable entities, but >> only the collapse makes them into physical FTL/instantaneity. > > If you see the non-locality in Tipler's account, why is there still an issue > about non-locality?
Non-locality, or inseparability, or Bell’s inequality violation is NOT the issue. As I said, my issue is only with those who claim that there is still need of some physical FTL influence in the MW theory. > You are the only one obsessed about physical FTL. Well, I was just replying (to Clark) that with the MW there is no more physical FTL influence. > I have repeatedly stressed that there is no physical FTL or instantaneous > transfer of physical information. But Clark was OK with this, and me too. But without the MW, there is still some action at a distance, even if they cannot be used to transfer information. With the MW, there is no need for such action at a distance at all. > It is epistemological. As you say, EPR-Bell bear on non-separable states. So it looks we agree again. > That is all there is to it. When you interact with a non-separable state you > destroy the symmetry and make it separable. There need not be any collapse or > physical FTL. OK. That is what I thought. We have never disagreed. My point is only that with the MW, or without collapse and without hidden variable, we have no need of a physical action at a distance. But for someone believing implicitly (or explicitly) in only one universe, in that case there are FTL influence, even if it remains true that there is no transfer of information at a distance. > > >>> Baylock made valiant attempts to introduce some measurements that were not >>> made in order to show that Bell assumed counterfactual definiteness, but >>> his attempts to reconstruct Bell's arguments in this way were so contrived >>> as to be laughable -- Bell's result does not depend on the assumption of >>> counterfactual definiteness. >> >> You have not et convince me. > > Why does Baylock introduce unnecessary references to experiments that were > not performed? To have, or not, a notion of counterfactual definiteness. > If you can think of any reason other than a silly attempt to deflect Bell's > theorem, then tell me. Would you have a link to Baylock? Maybe you gave one in your paper? In this discussion we should perhaps distinguish: 1) FTL-with-tranfer-of-information (we all agree, I think, that this does not exist, even with QM+collapse) 2) FTL-without-tranfer-of-information. (This has to exist with QM+collapse+the wave-is-physically-real) 3) No FTL-at-all (this is realised, I think, by any sensible interpretation of QM-without collapse). Do you have the book by Susskind & Friedman “Quantum Mechanics, the theoretical minimum”. A lovely book. Last year I gave as exercise for some of my students to criticise its sections 7.9/10/11 “Entanglement and Locality, ...”. Susskind and Friedamn shows correctly that if you want to simulate Bell’s inequality violation with two computers (one for Alice and one for Bob), That requires necessarily an “instantaneous cable” between the two computers. The proof is correct, only by assuming (as they do implicitly in the whole book) a unique universe. What they show (implicitly) is that if wa want simulate QM with a computer, the only way to get the violation of Bell’s inequality requires to simulate the observers too, and apply QM to them too. But they do not even mention tat possibility, and indeed Everett is not mentioned in the index, and the MW is to even suggested nowhere in the book (which is still a very good introduction to QM, a good companion to Albert’s book, for the beginners). Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
