> On 14 Aug 2018, at 06:05, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 8/13/2018 6:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 4:32 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> >> On 8/13/2018 7:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> > I bring this question up because you repeatedly refer to only "one >> > Alice" before the measurement, and also say that Alice and Bob are "in >> > one and the same branch" prior to measurement. But normal QM without >> > collapse would say Alice and Bob are branching all the time, even >> > before they measure their entangled pair. So isn't it necessary to >> > take this into consideration (that this is implicitly the original >> > scenario): >> >> There are many branchings of the wf describing Alice, almost all of them >> are irrelevant to who Alice is. They are below the quasi-classical >> level at which "Alice" exists; below the level at which her brain >> decides at what angle to measure the particle. All those Alices are one >> person. So they are treated as one classical being. That they split >> into two (up or down) classically distinct beings, is unrelated to the >> fact there are many microscopically different Alices. >> >> I agree. >> >> I believe this is exactly why Bruno raised the issue of whether Bruce was >> operating under the "Mind-brain identity" theory of mind, vs. the >> "computational/mechanist" theory of mind. >> >> The former would attribute 1 mind per each physical incarnation, while the >> latter would say there is a 1-to-many relationship between a mind and its >> physical instantiations. >> >> Bruce thinks it is irrelevant, but I think your point above shows one needs >> to make explicit the theory of mind one is operating within. >> >> >> It is not clear to me how Bruno thinks of these many quasi-classical, >> Alices. He seems to just dismiss their differences as below replacement >> level the Doctor promises. That seems like assuming that they are >> really classical entities, just similar computational threads in the UD. >> >> >> Computation is a classical notion. I believe Bruno would say there is a >> 1-to-many relationship between a mind and its implementations, so long as >> those implementations differ functionally only below the level of detail >> necessary to describe the computation associated with that mind (i.e. they >> differ only below that "substitution level"). > > This actually seems incoherent though. The very idea of a substitution level > is part of our theory of physics and how computations are implemented. If > computations are in Platonia and physics is just an inference from > computational consciousness there isn't really any lower level.
Why? That makes not much sense. Computationalism requires the existence of that level, and that is why blow that level we see the quantum “manyness”. > Physics and the world and personal identity are all illusions instantiated in > all possible computations. OK. But the theory explains the persittece and the physical aspect of the observed reality. > > As I understand Bruno's UD theory, there are many threads being implemented > that correspond, over some number of computational states, to the same > thoughts and hence represent only one person during that interval. Yes, but the physics will be non trivial, as this imposes a quantum logical structure on the observables. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Jason >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
