> On 14 Aug 2018, at 20:19, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 8/14/2018 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 13 Aug 2018, at 23:32, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 8/13/2018 7:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> I bring this question up because you repeatedly refer to only "one Alice" >>>> before the measurement, and also say that Alice and Bob are "in one and >>>> the same branch" prior to measurement. But normal QM without collapse >>>> would say Alice and Bob are branching all the time, even before they >>>> measure their entangled pair. So isn't it necessary to take this into >>>> consideration (that this is implicitly the original scenario): >>> There are many branchings of the wf describing Alice, almost all of them >>> are irrelevant to who Alice is. They are below the quasi-classical level >>> at which "Alice" exists; below the level at which her brain decides at what >>> angle to measure the particle. All those Alices are one person. So they >>> are treated as one classical being. That they split into two (up or down) >>> classically distinct beings, is unrelated to the fact there are many >>> microscopically different Alices. >>> >>> It is not clear to me how Bruno thinks of these many quasi-classical, >>> Alices. He seems to just dismiss their differences as below replacement >>> level the Doctor promises. >> ? >> On the contrary, it is by taking into account all computations below the >> substitution level that we recover qualitatively the “many-worlds”, and >> quantatively the quantum logical structure. > > The many-worlds of Everett are above the substitution level. They > differences of which we are classically aware. The "many-worlds" are > quasi-classical worlds.
That is why I am skeptical about them. If the measure on all computations needs second order logic to be defined, the multiverse theory might be not compact, and no computational state could be extended into a universal world coherent with the local data. That is why “many-dreams” or “many-histories” is less wrong, Imo, than many-worlds. > And you have not recovered the quantitative aspect of the quantum structure, I did at the propositional level, which is enough to have the quantum logic. It is richer than the quantum logic of the physicians, so this predicts new things. > because you have not defined a measure on the computations of the UD. Not yet, but I am willing to hear some constructive suggestion to progress. It is only the math which get hard, but where everyone predicted that “my” logics would collapse into propositional calculus, we get the quantum logic, confirming the prediction of it by the UD-Argument. The measure one has to obey to the material modes of self-reference (the one obeying the modal probability law: []p -> <>p). They all gives a quantum logic, which gives some room for adding nuances. Also, that theory is not refuted yet, where physicalism is. > In fact almost all the computations of the UD will be irrelevant. I am not sure of this. > >> >> >> >>> That seems like assuming that they are really classical entities, just >>> similar computational threads in the UD. >> ? >> On the contrary, you forget the first person indeterminacy which makes any >> physical history NOT emulable by a computer, except a quantum one (which >> exploits that infinity of computations). The arithmetical non-cloning >> proceeds from this too. You forgot that the invariance of the first person >> experiences for the delays of the universal dovetailing makes physics non >> classical, and even not entirely computable (yet still approximable, if I >> can say). > > I didn't forget any of that. The point is that Alice is a subset of many > classically similar rays in Hilbert space, i.e. there are physical > differences which make no difference to her consciousness. So what is the > relation of Alice's thoughts, the physics of Alice's body and brain, and the > computations of the UD? They have to be given by the modes of self-reference. See my (last) papers for details, so that you can make a specific question, perhaps. You might read: - The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 - The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
