On 8/14/2018 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Aug 2018, at 23:32, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
On 8/13/2018 7:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
I bring this question up because you repeatedly refer to only "one Alice" before the
measurement, and also say that Alice and Bob are "in one and the same branch" prior to
measurement. But normal QM without collapse would say Alice and Bob are branching all the time,
even before they measure their entangled pair. So isn't it necessary to take this into
consideration (that this is implicitly the original scenario):
There are many branchings of the wf describing Alice, almost all of them are irrelevant
to who Alice is. They are below the quasi-classical level at which "Alice"
exists; below the level at which her brain decides at what angle to measure the particle.
All those Alices are one person. So they are treated as one classical being. That they
split into two (up or down) classically distinct beings, is unrelated to the fact there
are many microscopically different Alices.
It is not clear to me how Bruno thinks of these many quasi-classical, Alices.
He seems to just dismiss their differences as below replacement level the
Doctor promises.
?
On the contrary, it is by taking into account all computations below the
substitution level that we recover qualitatively the “many-worlds”, and
quantatively the quantum logical structure.
The many-worlds of Everett are above the substitution level. They
differences of which we are classically aware. The "many-worlds" are
quasi-classical worlds. And you have not recovered the quantitative
aspect of the quantum structure, because you have not defined a measure
on the computations of the UD. In fact almost all the computations of
the UD will be irrelevant.
That seems like assuming that they are really classical entities, just similar
computational threads in the UD.
?
On the contrary, you forget the first person indeterminacy which makes any
physical history NOT emulable by a computer, except a quantum one (which
exploits that infinity of computations). The arithmetical non-cloning proceeds
from this too. You forgot that the invariance of the first person experiences
for the delays of the universal dovetailing makes physics non classical, and
even not entirely computable (yet still approximable, if I can say).
I didn't forget any of that. The point is that Alice is a subset of
many classically similar rays in Hilbert space, i.e. there are physical
differences which make no difference to her consciousness. So what is
the relation of Alice's thoughts, the physics of Alice's body and brain,
and the computations of the UD?
Brent
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