On Tuesday, August 14, 2018 at 9:01:25 PM UTC, [email protected] wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, August 14, 2018 at 11:00:23 AM UTC, [email protected] wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, August 14, 2018 at 1:20:26 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> From: Jason Resch <[email protected]>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 12:05 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> From: Jason Resch <[email protected]>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Aug 12, 2018 at 5:06 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11 Aug 2018, at 02:29, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> They do not "belong to different branches" because they do not exist, 
>>>>> and have never existed. This notion seems to be important to your idea, 
>>>>> and 
>>>>> I can assure you that you are wrong about this.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> How could that be possible? You suppress the infinities of Alice and 
>>>>> Bob only because you know in advance what is the direction in which Alice 
>>>>> will make her measurement. What if she changes her mind? 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Right.
>>>>
>>>> I would like Bruce to consider the case Alice measures alternately x 
>>>> and z spin axes of an electron 1000 times and interprets those measurement 
>>>> results as binary digits following a decimal point to define the real 
>>>> number to which she will set her measurement angle to (before she measures 
>>>> her entangled particle).
>>>>
>>>> Certainly in the no-collapse case there would be at least 2^1000 Alices 
>>>> who perform the measurement at each of the possible measurement angles 
>>>> that 
>>>> can be defined by 1000 binary digits.  What I wonder is how many Alices 
>>>> Bruce would believe to exist in this scenario before she measures her 
>>>> entangled particle.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How do 2^1000 copies of Alice make any difference? Each measures the 
>>>> entangled particles only once. Besides, This is not what is done. I see 
>>>> little point in making up alternative scenarios -- why not explain the 
>>>> straightforward original scenario? Imaginary copies are beside the point.
>>>>
>>>> If you cannot focus your attention on the original scenario, I see 
>>>> little point in your trying to do physics.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I bring this question up because you repeatedly refer to only "one 
>>> Alice" before the measurement, and also say that Alice and Bob are "in one 
>>> and the same branch" prior to measurement.  But normal QM without collapse 
>>> would say Alice and Bob are branching all the time, even before they 
>>> measure their entangled pair.  So isn't it necessary to take this into 
>>> consideration (that this is implicitly the original scenario):
>>>
>>>
>>> You seem to be trying to re-introduce the 'jellification' or 'mushiness' 
>>> that so worried Schrödinger. Fortunately, that worry has long since been 
>>> laid to rest by the advent of modern decoherence theory. In that theory, 
>>> splitting of the world into distinct (quasi-)classical branches occurs only 
>>> when the microscopic quantum phenomenon has been amplified to macroscopic 
>>> level, and a thermodynamically irreversible record (or many records, as 
>>> suggested by Zurek) has been laid down in the environment.  So micro-level 
>>> quantum events generally do not lead to splittings into disjoint worlds, 
>>> and we don't need to worry about the fact that a genuine classical world 
>>> emerges from the quantum substrate.
>>>
>>> So there are no 'many Alices and Bobs' before or during the experiment 
>>> -- there is only one classical Alice and one classical Bob who get involved 
>>> in the experiment. Besides, even if, by chance, some quantum event in 
>>> Alice's makeup does get amplified, so that copies of Alice exist in 
>>> superposition, that makes no essential difference. In the normal way with 
>>> quantum superpositions, we simply select out one typical Alice-Bob pair and 
>>> work with these. So my implicit assumption of just one Alice-Bob pair is 
>>> completely harmless. If you want to claim that quantum jellification makes 
>>> a difference, then it is up to you do make the case -- which no one has 
>>> seriously attempted to do, for very good reason.
>>>
>>> There are many Alices, and many Bobs, and depending on the experimental 
>>> setup, many measurement angle choices?
>>>
>>>
>>> No, there are not, and even if there were it would make no difference. 
>>> Alice and Bob have to measure the same entangled pair and persist as 
>>> identifiable individuals for long enough to record their results and later 
>>> compare them -- or else they would not observe any correlations at all! The 
>>> entangled singlet does not change its identity in its passage between Alice 
>>> and Bob -- it has to maintain its coherence, or else it is not en entangled 
>>> pair. So the Bob that measures the partner of Alice's particle is really 
>>> and truly the same Bob that she met for breakfast before the experiment 
>>> began.Your (and Bruno's) idea that somehow their identities are not fixed 
>>> because of quantum fluctuations is truly fatuous.
>>>
>>
>> *Jason isn't thinking of quantum fluctuations. Rather, he's thinking of 
>> all possible orientations of the SG device, and extending the principle, in 
>> my  view erroneously, that all possible results of spin, is intended to 
>> mean the possible results of all possible experiments which depend on 
>> orientation. AG *
>>
>
>
> *For example, if Joe the Plumber enters a casino and pulls once on the 
> one-armed bandit, the crude analogy to QM is that the wf superposition will 
> consist of all possible outcomes. Jason is thinking of pulling the arm on 
> EACH slot machine in the casino, and from this interpretation (wrongly IMO) 
> concludes the existence of many Alices (and Bobs). AG*
>

*IOW, Jason is thinking that every relative orientation of the devices 
represents another Alice-Bob pair.  The corollary to this discussion is 
that Australia, like America, is becoming another shit-hole when it comes 
to good manners. AG*

>
>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>

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