> On 9 Sep 2018, at 21:51, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 10:04:20 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > >>Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you. > > >It is just a more precise version of what popular books described by > >“sufficiently rich theory”. > > There is nothing precise about homemade slang used by nobody but you. > > > There are many definition, but they are all equivalent. > > And there is nothing profound about a definition, it's easy to define a > perpetual motion machine but that doesn't mean they exist, I can define a > Clark Machine as a machine that can solve the halting problem but that > doesn't mean I have the any idea how to make one or can even show that such a > thing could in principle exist. > > >Any Turing complete theory of any universal machine, with sufficiently > >strong induction axiom (like sigma_1 induction) constitute a Löbian machine. > > In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually works > pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never works > continuously, eventually it always fails. > > >>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but you > >>have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine" or > >>even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t. > > >? > ! > > >That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis, > > Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal > pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch. > > > The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct, > > The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as is the > Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far more > than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed exactly how > to make one. But we're not as smart as Turing, I can't do that with my Clark > Machine and you can't do that with your Löbian machine. > > > and the mathematical reality is full of example of Löbian machine, and > > Löbian god > > Löbian machine, Löbian god, the propositional part of the theology .... tell > me, have you ever wondered why so many people fail to take you seriously? > > >A Lpobian machine is just a universal machine capable of proving its own > >universality. > > I have no trouble believing a universal machine is universal, but no Turing > Machine can in general prove it will halt and but no machine of any sort, or > anything else for that matter, can prove its own consistency unless it is > inconsistent. > > > Why do you want it to be able to do what a god can do? > > Odd question, who wouldn't want to do what a God can do? But if God can solve > the Halting Problem then He can also make a rock so heavy He can't lift it. > > >>How would things be different if "the propositional part of the theology" > >>were not decidable? > > >Solovay theorem would be false, and the subject of machine theology would be > >far more complex. > > I don't know if that's true or not because "machine theology" is more of your > homemade gibberish, just like "the propositional part of the theology". > > > Note that the theology of machine has highly undecidable at the first order > > level. > > And I don't know if that is true or not either because "the theology of > machine" is yet more of your patented homemade baby talk. > > John K Clark > > > > The only relevant "physical" theory I know about and is discussed widely is > in terms of relativistic computers (which probably most think are forever > merely fictional). > > Relativistic computers and the Turing barrier > > > > https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0096300305008398 > > http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.150.783&rep=rep1&type=pdf > > > > We examine the current status of the physical version of the Church-Turing > Thesis (PhCT for short) in view of latest developments in spacetime theory. > This also amounts to investigating the status of hypercomputation in view of > latest results on spacetime. We agree with [D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. > Lupacchini, Machines, logic and quantum physics, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 > (3) (2000) 265–283] that PhCT is not only a conjecture of mathematics but > rather a conjecture of a combination of theoretical physics, mathematics and, > in some sense, cosmology. Since the idea of computability is intimately > connected with the nature of time, relevance of spacetime theory seems to be > unquestionable. We will see that recent developments in spacetime theory show > that temporal developments may exhibit features that traditionally seemed > impossible or absurd. We will see that recent results point in the direction > that the possibility of artificial systems computing non-Turing computable > functions may be consistent with spacetime theory. All these trigger new open > questions and new research directions for spacetime theory, cosmology, and > computability. > > > > - pt > >
I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the physical Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism. If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not rulable in real time by any classical computer. Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to a constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the laws of physics from machine theology or machine self-reference if you prefer. And its works, the physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, is already enough quantum like to cast light on the origin of the measure on the computation/sigma_1 sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to derive Gleason theorem, though, but that is just complicated. To refute mechanism, we should have a proof that such measure does not exist. Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
