On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:06:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Sep 2018, at 03:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 4:11:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the >> physical Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism. >> If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us >> below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not >> rulable in real time by any classical computer. >> Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this >> list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is >> coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes >> doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to >> a constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the >> laws of physics from machine theology or machine self-reference if you >> prefer. And its works, the physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, >> is already enough quantum like to cast light on the origin of the measure >> on the computation/sigma_1 sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to >> derive Gleason theorem, though, but that is just complicated. To refute >> mechanism, we should have a proof that such measure does not exist. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > I still think we just don't know what *computation* completely means in > the material world (what I have called synthetic pancomputationalism [1]). > In particular, possibly the brain (neural material) is not a digital or an > analog or a hyper computer, but a novel kind of computer (cf. references in > [2]). > > > The notion of computability is the most successful epistemological notion > ever defined in mathematics, thanks to the Church thesis. I might take a > look on your link, but usually I am not convinced by any non standard > notion of computations, which show very often that the authors have not > grasped Church’s thesis. > Then, in the mind-body problem studies, I think it is better to be neutral > on the ontology. I do not postulate a physical universe. It is part of what > I am interested in explaining. > > Bruno > > > [1] > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/07/synthetic-pancomputationalism/ > [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualtiero_Piccinini > > - Philip Thrift > > > I don't know whether the "unconventionalists" (e.g. at the UCNC conferences [ http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp ]) are misunderstanding the CT, but it is a thesis "reformulated" by some (at least in terms of questioning what computation means).
One of the references in [2] above: “Computation without Representation,” Philosophical Studies, 137.2 (2008), pp. 205–241. [ http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/Computation_without_Representation.pdf ] - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
