> On 11 Sep 2018, at 03:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 4:11:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the physical > Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism. > If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us > below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not > rulable in real time by any classical computer. > Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this list > more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is coherent > with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes doctor, the first > person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to a constructive > reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the laws of physics from > machine theology or machine self-reference if you prefer. And its works, the > physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, is already enough quantum > like to cast light on the origin of the measure on the computation/sigma_1 > sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to derive Gleason theorem, though, > but that is just complicated. To refute mechanism, we should have a proof > that such measure does not exist. > > Bruno > > > > > I still think we just don't know what computation completely means in the > material world (what I have called synthetic pancomputationalism [1]). In > particular, possibly the brain (neural material) is not a digital or an > analog or a hyper computer, but a novel kind of computer (cf. references in > [2]).
The notion of computability is the most successful epistemological notion ever defined in mathematics, thanks to the Church thesis. I might take a look on your link, but usually I am not convinced by any non standard notion of computations, which show very often that the authors have not grasped Church’s thesis. Then, in the mind-body problem studies, I think it is better to be neutral on the ontology. I do not postulate a physical universe. It is part of what I am interested in explaining. Bruno > > > > [1] > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/07/synthetic-pancomputationalism/ > [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualtiero_Piccinini > > - Philip Thrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
