On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 4:11:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the > physical Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism. > If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us > below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not > rulable in real time by any classical computer. > Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this > list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is > coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes > doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to > a constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the > laws of physics from machine theology or machine self-reference if you > prefer. And its works, the physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, > is already enough quantum like to cast light on the origin of the measure > on the computation/sigma_1 sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to > derive Gleason theorem, though, but that is just complicated. To refute > mechanism, we should have a proof that such measure does not exist. > > Bruno > > >
I still think we just don't know what *computation* completely means in the material world (what I have called synthetic pancomputationalism [1]). In particular, possibly the brain (neural material) is not a digital or an analog or a hyper computer, but a novel kind of computer (cf. references in [2]). [1] https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/07/synthetic-pancomputationalism/ [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualtiero_Piccinini - Philip Thrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
