> On 12 Sep 2018, at 17:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 9/12/2018 2:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Assuming that matter exist, yes, matter appearance is Turing universal, so >> can run any other digital machine, but that does not imply that something >> else cannot run a machine, and indeed “run” has been defined first in >> between any two universal machine. What you call “run” is the particular >> case of physical implementation, and the existence of the appearance of >> those physical implementations is well explained in arithmetic. > > No, it is not. You can only claim that because you identify "appear" with > “provable"
You mean with probable? Provable(p) is the “[]p” Probable with Probability 1 is not at all provable(p) but provable(p) & consistent(p), that is []p & <>t. And p is a halting computation (a sigma-1 proposition). > and there are infinitely many provable propositions in arithmetic so among > them must be those corresponding to the computations we think instantiate > minds. You confuse two levels/ The computation are realised in arithmetic, independently of this being proved or not. The proof appears only the mind of the (Löbian) number, in virtue of the computations which are independent of their mind. That follows from the mechanist hypothesis. > But it is no explanation of what we experience to point to an infinite set > and say, "Well it must be in there because your experience is a member of > that set.” You could demolish Born by telling him that it is of no value to say that the squared wave tel us that the solution is given by this distribution of probability. Deutsch made a similar point against Schmidhuber, or against Tegmark, and I agree with Deutsch. The physical reality is not a computation among others, although some approximation can exist. Quite the contrary, mechanism explain quanta (and qualia) from incompleteness and the greek standard definition of belief, knowledge and matter, which are also motivated by the first person indeterminacy, and the reduction of the mind body problem to a derivation of matter from a theory of mind (here the theory of mind is what I called theology, and is the mathematical theory G*). Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
