> On 11 Oct 2018, at 01:12, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, October 10, 2018 at 12:16:59 PM UTC+11, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 7:54 PM Pierz <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
> 
> >I refuse to accept that "axiom", and I also do not feel compelled to embrace 
> >solipsism.
> 
> You are able to function is the world so you must have some method of 
> deciding when something is conscious and when it is not, if its not 
> intelligent behavior what is it? 
>  
> > I think it is entirely possible - and indeed sensible - to believe that 
> > some entities that behave "intelligently", like the chess app on my iPhone, 
> > are insentient.
> 
> I don't know what the quotation marks in the above means but if something 
> acts intelligently then it is sensible to say it has some degree of 
> sentience.  
>  
> The quotation marks are there because a lot of what passes for intelligent in 
> the domain of machines is in fact dumb as dogshit. I know this because it's 
> the field I work in. Computers are literal to a mind-numbingly stupid degree. 
> People who expect robots to take over my job (software developer) any time 
> soon have no idea what they are talking about. This is the one thing that AI 
> *should* be good at, but it is utterly incompetent because of its complete 
> lack of flexibility and understanding of the actual domain in question. I'm 
> not holding my breath on a truly human-level artificial intelligence any time 
> soon.


I guess you mean to will take time for the machine to come as stupid as the 
humans. The more there is neurones, the greater is the number of possible 
stupidities to be asserted.

I distinguish Intelligence/conscience (not saying falsehood) from competence 
(diverses and domain dependent). In that sense, the universal machine is 
maximally intelligent, and can only be maintained that way, or have its 
intelligence handicapped (leading to some [][][][][]f type of weak lie, still 
consistent and less unsound than []f, and of course f).

How far nature exploits lies?  (A question which occupies my mind since long).





>   
>  
> > Whereas some entities that behave unintelligently (like Donald Trump 
> > (sorry, I really shouldn't)) are sentient.
> 
> I admit it's a imperfect tool but it's all we've got and all we'll ever have 
> so we just have to make good with what we have. A failure to act 
> intelligently does not necessarily mean its non-sentient, perhaps both a rock 
> and Donald Trump are really brilliant but are just pretending to be stupid. 
> If so then both are conscious and both are very good actors.    
>   
> > The absence of an objective test for third-party sentience does not force 
> > one into solipsism. It may point to 1) a problem with your ontology (qualia 
> > aren't "real")
> 
> That means nothing. I detect qualia from direct experience and that outranks 
> everything, it even outranks the scientific method; so if qualia isn't real 
> then nothing is real which would be equivalent to everything being real which 
> is equivalent to "real" having no meaning because meaning needs contrast.
> 
> I wasn't saying qualia aren't real. I was suggesting that might be your 
> ontology. I mistook you for an eliminativist. Glad to stand corrected on that 
> point at least.
>  
>  
> > or 2) a deficient state of knowledge wth respect to the (pre) conditions of 
> > consciousness.
> 
> I don't know what that means either. 
> 
> We don't know for shit what consciousness is.

Really?

I think that it is what we know the best.

It is a sort of knowledge that there is a reality, usually called “I”, and 
often confused with many shape, when it has no shape, and no name (I is only an 
indexical).

Would you agree that consciousness might be characterised, from the view of a 
conscious person, by

True
Even indubitable
Not provable
Not definable
Yet immediately knowable

Then any number in a Turing universal relation with another (or not) universal 
number can know such things.

Consciousness is a sort of guess on our own consistency. Or equivalently a 
guess that there is something satisfying our beliefs. 

Consciousness is related to the diamond <>t (consistency), when <> is the 
diamond of G, but also to that diamond in G*, and, more importantly, in all the 
intensional variants of it, imposed to 


Consciousness is the first person point of view of whodifferentiates along the 
infinitely many (halting/non halting) computations.

A brain, a computer, a universal number might only filter consciousness. The 
universal number would have maximal consciousness, and what “universal machine 
having a long and deep linear/tensorial history” is too differentiates the 
consistent selection of memories in a first person plural ways. 


> Perhaps there are some preconditions for it to arise.


To be Turing universal.

Now, to also be able to talk about consciousness, you need to be Gödel-Löbian. 
You need to be a K4 four reasoner  visiting the Löb Island, if you have read 
Smullyan’s Forever Undecides”, or just to be a universal machine knowing (in a 
technical sense) to be universal. 
That happens if you accept classical logic, Robinson Arithmetic, and the 
induction axiom. Peano Arithmetic, seen as theorem-prover machine, is already 
Löbian, and *all* what I say is what it/he/she said.



> Even in an information/data processing based conception, we seem to need some 
> notion of preconditions for consciousness, seeing as some complex brain 
> processing occurs in the absence of qualia.


Consciousness is the intimate knowledge of the existence of oneself. It sides 
with semantic It is shared by every existing things which believes they are 
existing.

Your laptop got it already. But, his consciousness state is an “altered one”. 
It is a highly dissociative state of consciousness “ready” to differentiate if 
you help it a bit with the memory and the self-reference.

Consciousness is not associated to a computational state, but to a person 
associated to a more topological structured space. The phenomenology of 
observation requires/provided proximity space.





>  
> > Seeing as you have no theory of consciousness at all,
> 
> Yes I do. My theory is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is 
> being processed and that is a brute fact, meaning it terminates a chain of 
> "why is that?" questions.  
> 
> Great theory! I love a theory that says, "because". I have sooo many 
> questions. Like what relations in the data correspond to what qualia. Like 
> how data which is inherently just an aggregate of bits somehow experiences 
> itself as a whole. Like why some data being processed have no qualia - like 
> unconscious mental processes.And so on and so forth. But fortunately your 
> theory answers all this. It's... because.

Lol



> 
> Now I know that you may claim that any better theory is impossible in 
> principle. I think it's technically extraordinarily difficult but not 
> impossible in principle. We would need two preconditions: the use of 
> conscious reports of qualia as an accepted datum in science, and highly 
> sophisticated technology to interface with the brain, a known conscious 
> entity with the ability to report its experiences. At least in principle I 
> believe experiments of this sort could cast light on the relationship between 
> material structures and qualia and the preconditions of conscious awareness.
>  
> > statements like "you have no alternative but to..." don't have much force. 
> > There are plenty of alternatives,
> 
> Name one! I ask once more, in you everyday life when you're not being 
> philosophical you must have some method of determining when something is 
> conscious, if its not intelligent behavior what on earth is it? 
> 
> It's not intelligent behaviour.

Indeed. It is a knowing state, the indubitable part is in the non communicable 
part.




> There are tons of things (human artifacts that have been created to automate 
> certain complex input-output systems) that exhibit complex, intelligent-ish 
> behaviour that I seriously doubt have any more sentience than a rock, though 
> I'm open to the possibility of some sentience in rocks.

Assuming rocks exist, because as far as I know, when we interrogate a rock 
closely what we see in more like an ocean of infinitely many computations. I am 
not sure a “rock” or any body, is a well determined notion.



> My "method of determining if something is conscious" is the same as most 
> people who don't believe their smart phones are having experiences. It's 
> being a biological organism with a nervous system, though again, I'm agnostic 
> on organisms like trees. When you're not being a philosopher I bet that's 
> your real criterion too! You're not worrying about killing your smartphone 
> when you trash it for the next model.
> 
> Of course this is based on a guess, as yours is. My lack of a good theory of 
> the relationship between matter and mind does not force me into solipsism 
> because the absence of a test proves nothing about reality. Things are as 
> they are. All people are conscious, I assume. Probably all animals. Possibly 
> plants and rocks and stars and atoms, in some very different way from us. 
> Whatever way it is, it is that way regardless of whether I can devise a test 
> for it, even in principle. 


We know since the 1930s that a very elementary part of the arithmetical reality 
(the so called (by logicians) standard model of arithmetic, which is taught in 
high school, and on which Diophantus, Ferlat, and Wyles get famous, also). But 
here se see it more like the logicians, and it is a rational machine believing 
in the axiom of Q. That machine realises all computations, including those 
transporting richer machine, believing in the axiom of Zermelo-Fraenkel set 
theory, and actually, assuming mechanism, you and me.

Consciousness is just the first person point of view of any universal machine. 
That determine a consciousness/knowledge/beliefs flux in arithmetic and matter 
is a sort of derivative of that flux. That requires the algebraical approach to 
G. There has been work on this In Georgia (near Russia).




>  
> > a refusal to engage it as a problem, in spite of the increasingly 
> > widespread acceptance among scientists that it is a real problem, and 
> > possibly the biggest problem of all in our current state of knowledge
> 
> I think intelligence implies consciousness but consciousness does not 
> necessarily imply intelligence, so the problem I want answered is abut how 
> intelligence works not consciousness.
>  
> Wait up! "consciousness does not necessarily imply intelligence". So you are 
> positing conscious unintelligent beings? I presume, based on your theory of 
> mind, that these are entities that process data, but do so in a dumb way? 
> According to your own argument the consciousness of these entities can never 
> be proved. Yet you claim to believe in them despite the lack of a test.  And 
> at the same time you assert that if I reject the intelligent behaviour test 
> for consciousness, I am "forced" into solipsism. No. I also believe in 
> consciousness that exists despite the lack of a definitive test.

Tell me if you are OK with “consciousness” is something true, indubitable, non 
provable, yet immediately knowable.

Then incompleteness shows the universal machine, on itself, leads to something 
like that. 

The numbers can be seen as sort of zombie. 3 divides 6 quite instinctively, it 
does not have to doubt for a second, but things get harder when the numbers 
encodes the relation with itself in his social nets (in arithmetic), and 
eventually, the person and the matter arise from the stable relations, which 
multiplies themselves enough, which remain to be seen both in Mechanism, and in 
whatever unify QM and GR.
Gleason theorem, and its hopefully equivalent in (sigma_1) arithmetic, is what 
saves us from solipsism, we share our possible interactions. It is a "video 
game", and the quanta appears among the qualia.

Bruno




>  
> John K Clark  
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to [email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>.
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list 
> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to