On Saturday, October 13, 2018 at 6:51:53 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 10/13/2018 3:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Saturday, October 13, 2018 at 12:37:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/12/2018 9:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, October 12, 2018 at 4:09:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/10/2018 4:12 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> >>> It's not intelligent behaviour. There are tons of things (human >>> artifacts that have been created to automate certain complex input-output >>> systems) that exhibit complex, intelligent-ish behaviour that I seriously >>> doubt have any more sentience than a rock, though I'm open to the >>> possibility of some sentience in rocks. My "method of determining if >>> something is conscious" is the same as most people who don't believe their >>> smart phones are having experiences. It's being a biological organism with >>> a nervous system, though again, I'm agnostic on organisms like trees. When >>> *you're* not being a philosopher I bet that's your real criterion >>> too! You're not worrying about killing your smartphone when you trash it >>> for the next model. >>> >>> Of course this is based on a guess, as yours is. My lack of a good >>> theory of the relationship between matter and mind does not force me into >>> solipsism because the absence of a test proves nothing about reality. >>> Things are as they are. All people are conscious, I assume. Probably all >>> animals. Possibly plants and rocks and stars and atoms, in some very >>> different way from us. Whatever way it is, it *is* that way regardless >>> of whether I can devise a test for it, even in principle. >>> >>> >>> I generally agree. I like to resort to my intuition pump, the AI Mars >>> Rover, because I think the present Mars Rovers have a tiny bit of >>> intelligence and a corresponding tiny bit of consciousness. Their >>> intelligence is in their navigation, deployment of instruments, >>> self-monitoring, and reporting to JPL. They make some decisions about >>> these things, but they don't learn from experience so they probably at the >>> level of some insects or spiders, except that they have more language with >>> which they communicate with JPL. But an AI Mars Rover that was designed to >>> learn from experience would, I think, be made conscious in some degree. >>> This is because it will need to remember experiences and recall relevant >>> ones when faced with unusual problems. Solving the problem by using >>> experience means having a self-model in a simulation to try to foresee the >>> outcome of different choices. I think that's the essence of basic >>> consciousness, learning from experience and self-modeling as part of >>> decisions. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> Still, purely* informational* processing, which includes intentional >> agent programming (learning from experience, self-modeling), I don't think >> captures all true *experiential* processing (phenomenal consciousness). >> >> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/ >> >> *To say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to say—on >> a certain understanding of these terms—that you have an experience, or a >> state there is something it’s like for you to be in. Feeling pain or >> dizziness, appearances of color or shape, and episodic thought are some >> widely accepted examples. Intentionality, on the other hand, has to do with >> the directedness, aboutness, or reference of mental states—the fact that, >> for example, you think of or about something. Intentionality includes, and >> is sometimes seen as equivalent to, what is called “mental representation”.* >> >> >> If an AIMR runs a simulation in which it models itself in order to decide >> on a course of action isn't that "directedness", "intentionality", and >> "mental representation"? >> > > > That is indeed intentional (or representational) processing. > > intentionalism (or representationalism): "Consciousness is entirely > intentional or representational. intentionalism implies that facts about > the representational content of an experience (together with facts about > the representational content of the subject’s other mental events or > states) fix or determine the facts about its phenomenal character. In other > words, intentionalism implies that phenomenal character supervenes on > representational content." > [ http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/what_phen_conc_is_like.html ] > > The experientialist (Strawson, etc.) rejects the representationalist > supervenience thesis. In other words: > > > * experience processing > information processing.* > > > You know if I wanted to read Strawson or the SEP I could easily do that. > When I post here I'd rather know what you think. > > > This seems like it should be obvious:
"The [conventional] computer is indeed a great and powerful* information processing* machine, which the brain hardly is. The brain is an *experience processing* system, which creates information during its processing." *Brain Experience: Neuroexperiential Perspectives of Brain-mind* C.R. Mukundan https://books.google.com/books?id=12_gDy18_YIC > > > >> When it stores into memory incidents to learn from it must also associate >> some valuation to the outcome of the incident. Isn't that a "feeling" >> about it? If it lost a wheel wouldn't it feel something analogous to >> "pain"? Damasio says that human emotion is just perception of internal >> states, e.g. hormones, etc. >> >> Brent >> > > > > What I've read about Damasio, e.g. > > "He also demonstrated that while the insular cortex plays a major role in > feelings, it is not necessary for feelings to occur, suggesting that brain > stem structures play a basic role in the feeling process." > > suggests he is not decoupling biological material from emotions. > > Which would mean again : Substrate [Material composition] matters. > > > That's just sloganeering. It doesn't say anything about what kind of > substrate matters, except that we only have the one example. > > Brent > The particular molecular substrate matters for experience (vs. information) processing. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
