On Saturday, October 13, 2018 at 6:51:53 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 10/13/2018 3:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Saturday, October 13, 2018 at 12:37:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/12/2018 9:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, October 12, 2018 at 4:09:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/10/2018 4:12 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> >>> It's not intelligent behaviour. There are tons of things (human >>> artifacts that have been created to automate certain complex input-output >>> systems) that exhibit complex, intelligent-ish behaviour that I seriously >>> doubt have any more sentience than a rock, though I'm open to the >>> possibility of some sentience in rocks. My "method of determining if >>> something is conscious" is the same as most people who don't believe their >>> smart phones are having experiences. It's being a biological organism with >>> a nervous system, though again, I'm agnostic on organisms like trees. When >>> *you're* not being a philosopher I bet that's your real criterion >>> too! You're not worrying about killing your smartphone when you trash it >>> for the next model. >>> >>> Of course this is based on a guess, as yours is. My lack of a good >>> theory of the relationship between matter and mind does not force me into >>> solipsism because the absence of a test proves nothing about reality. >>> Things are as they are. All people are conscious, I assume. Probably all >>> animals. Possibly plants and rocks and stars and atoms, in some very >>> different way from us. Whatever way it is, it *is* that way regardless >>> of whether I can devise a test for it, even in principle. >>> >>> >>> I generally agree. I like to resort to my intuition pump, the AI Mars >>> Rover, because I think the present Mars Rovers have a tiny bit of >>> intelligence and a corresponding tiny bit of consciousness. Their >>> intelligence is in their navigation, deployment of instruments, >>> self-monitoring, and reporting to JPL. They make some decisions about >>> these things, but they don't learn from experience so they probably at the >>> level of some insects or spiders, except that they have more language with >>> which they communicate with JPL. But an AI Mars Rover that was designed to >>> learn from experience would, I think, be made conscious in some degree. >>> This is because it will need to remember experiences and recall relevant >>> ones when faced with unusual problems. Solving the problem by using >>> experience means having a self-model in a simulation to try to foresee the >>> outcome of different choices. I think that's the essence of basic >>> consciousness, learning from experience and self-modeling as part of >>> decisions. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> Still, purely* informational* processing, which includes intentional >> agent programming (learning from experience, self-modeling), I don't think >> captures all true *experiential* processing (phenomenal consciousness). >> >> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/ >> >> *To say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to say—on >> a certain understanding of these terms—that you have an experience, or a >> state there is something it’s like for you to be in. Feeling pain or >> dizziness, appearances of color or shape, and episodic thought are some >> widely accepted examples. Intentionality, on the other hand, has to do with >> the directedness, aboutness, or reference of mental states—the fact that, >> for example, you think of or about something. Intentionality includes, and >> is sometimes seen as equivalent to, what is called “mental representation”.* >> >> >> If an AIMR runs a simulation in which it models itself in order to decide >> on a course of action isn't that "directedness", "intentionality", and >> "mental representation"? >> > > > That is indeed intentional (or representational) processing. > > intentionalism (or representationalism): "Consciousness is entirely > intentional or representational. intentionalism implies that facts about > the representational content of an experience (together with facts about > the representational content of the subject’s other mental events or > states) fix or determine the facts about its phenomenal character. In other > words, intentionalism implies that phenomenal character supervenes on > representational content." > [ http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/what_phen_conc_is_like.html ] > > The experientialist (Strawson, etc.) rejects the representationalist > supervenience thesis. In other words: > > > * experience processing > information processing.* > > > You know if I wanted to read Strawson or the SEP I could easily do that. > When I post here I'd rather know what you think. > > > This seems like it should be obvious:
"The [conventional] computer is indeed a great and powerful* information processing* machine, which the brain hardly is. The brain is an *experience processing* system, which creates information during its processing." *Brain Experience: Neuroexperiential Perspectives of Brain-mind* C.R. Mukundan https://books.google.com/books?id=12_gDy18_YIC > > > >> When it stores into memory incidents to learn from it must also associate >> some valuation to the outcome of the incident. Isn't that a "feeling" >> about it? If it lost a wheel wouldn't it feel something analogous to >> "pain"? Damasio says that human emotion is just perception of internal >> states, e.g. hormones, etc. >> >> Brent >> > > > > What I've read about Damasio, e.g. > > "He also demonstrated that while the insular cortex plays a major role in > feelings, it is not necessary for feelings to occur, suggesting that brain > stem structures play a basic role in the feeling process." > > suggests he is not decoupling biological material from emotions. > > Which would mean again : Substrate [Material composition] matters. > > > That's just sloganeering. It doesn't say anything about what kind of > substrate matters, except that we only have the one example. > > Brent > The particular molecular substrate matters for experience (vs. information) processing. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
