On 10/13/2018 3:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Saturday, October 13, 2018 at 12:37:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 10/12/2018 9:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Friday, October 12, 2018 at 4:09:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 10/10/2018 4:12 PM, Pierz wrote:
It's not intelligent behaviour. There are tons of things
(human artifacts that have been created to automate certain
complex input-output systems) that exhibit complex,
intelligent-ish behaviour that I seriously doubt have any
more sentience than a rock, though I'm open to the
possibility of some sentience in rocks. My "method of
determining if something is conscious" is the same as most
people who don't believe their smart phones are having
experiences. It's being a biological organism with a nervous
system, though again, I'm agnostic on organisms like trees.
When /you're/ not being a philosopher I bet that's your real
criterion too! You're not worrying about killing your
smartphone when you trash it for the next model.
Of course this is based on a guess, as yours is. My lack of
a good theory of the relationship between matter and mind
does not force me into solipsism because the absence of a
test proves nothing about reality. Things are as they are.
All people are conscious, I assume. Probably all animals.
Possibly plants and rocks and stars and atoms, in some very
different way from us. Whatever way it is, it /is/ that way
regardless of whether I can devise a test for it, even in
principle.
I generally agree. I like to resort to my intuition pump,
the AI Mars Rover, because I think the present Mars Rovers
have a tiny bit of intelligence and a corresponding tiny bit
of consciousness. Their intelligence is in their navigation,
deployment of instruments, self-monitoring, and reporting to
JPL. They make some decisions about these things, but they
don't learn from experience so they probably at the level of
some insects or spiders, except that they have more language
with which they communicate with JPL. But an AI Mars Rover
that was designed to learn from experience would, I think, be
made conscious in some degree. This is because it will need
to remember experiences and recall relevant ones when faced
with unusual problems. Solving the problem by using
experience means having a self-model in a simulation to try
to foresee the outcome of different choices. I think that's
the essence of basic consciousness, learning from experience
and self-modeling as part of decisions.
Brent
Still, purely/*informational*/ processing, which includes
intentional agent programming (learning from experience,
self-modeling), I don't think captures all true /*experiential*/
processing (phenomenal consciousness).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/>
/To say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to
say—on a certain understanding of these terms—that you have an
experience, or a state there is something it’s like for you to be
in. Feeling pain or dizziness, appearances of color or shape, and
episodic thought are some widely accepted examples.
Intentionality, on the other hand, has to do with the
directedness, aboutness, or reference of mental states—the fact
that, for example, you think of or about something.
Intentionality includes, and is sometimes seen as equivalent to,
what is called “mental representation”./
If an AIMR runs a simulation in which it models itself in order to
decide on a course of action isn't that "directedness",
"intentionality", and "mental representation"?
That is indeed intentional (or representational) processing.
intentionalism (or representationalism): "Consciousness is entirely
intentional or representational. intentionalism implies that facts
about the representational content of an experience (together with
facts about the representational content of the subject’s other mental
events or states) fix or determine the facts about its phenomenal
character. In other words, intentionalism implies that phenomenal
character supervenes on representational content."
[ http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/what_phen_conc_is_like.html ]
The experientialist (Strawson, etc.) rejects the representationalist
supervenience thesis. In other words:
* experience processing > information processing.*
You know if I wanted to read Strawson or the SEP I could easily do
that. When I post here I'd rather know what you think.
When it stores into memory incidents to learn from it must also
associate some valuation to the outcome of the incident. Isn't
that a "feeling" about it? If it lost a wheel wouldn't it feel
something analogous to "pain"? Damasio says that human emotion is
just perception of internal states, e.g. hormones, etc.
Brent
What I've read about Damasio, e.g.
"He also demonstrated that while the insular cortex plays a major role
in feelings, it is not necessary for feelings to occur, suggesting
that brain stem structures play a basic role in the feeling process."
suggests he is not decoupling biological material from emotions.
Which would mean again : Substrate [Material composition] matters.
That's just sloganeering. It doesn't say anything about what kind of
substrate matters, except that we only have the one example.
Brent
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