> On 21 Oct 2018, at 18:30, Tomas Pales <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 5:22:20 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote: > > BTW, on "non-relations [which] are the non-mathematical objects and they (or > at least some of them) may be the qualities of consciousness (qualia)", that > is what I try to address in > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ > <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/> > > where there is information processing (which is all mathematical processing) > and something else: experience processing. > > - pt > > I would say that any description is relational and therefore > mathematical/logical. When you describe an object you always define/present > it in relations to other objects - in relations to its parts or properties. > You can't describe the object itself, only give it a label. So you can't > describe qualities of consciousness themselves either. Not sure how you would > "process" them then. > > Is there really a fundamental difference between hardware and software? I > mean, software can be seen as part of hardware: software is a particular > configuration of electron flows in hardware.
Locally, that is right. Hardware is even an indexical (like “here” and “now”), but globally, the harwdware has to be recovered as a sum on all possible “software” generating my current state. That makes the hardware into a sort of absolute, and indeed all universal machine/number, “residing” in the arithmetical standard reality, will have the same physics, and differ only on histories and geographies. There is no notion of mathematical universe, at least not in mathematics. We cannot define “arithmetical” in the arithmetical language, and it can only be worst for something as large as “mathematical”. A case can give given that “mathematical” might be defined in a richer theory, perhaps theology, but this can be shown to entail non-mechanism. All attempt to define mathematics mathematically leads to a new type of structure, which embed itself naturally in something bigger. It is akin to the older problem of defining the set of all sets, which admits different formal solutions (it does not exist in ZF, it exists in NF, and it is a different sort of object in VBG. ZF = Zermelo Fraenkel set theory, NF = Quine’s New Foundations, and VBG = von Neuman Bernays Gödel set theory). Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
