On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 4:44:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 28 Oct 2018, at 17:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 10:27:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 27 Oct 2018, at 22:59, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 3:21:33 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 2:52:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/26/2018 11:50 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> Logical consistency is a relation between sentences. It's not about >>>>> existence. The sentences might be about the existence of something, but >>>>> that's different. Or the sentences may have variables quantified by >>>>> existential quantifiers, but that's different too. To say logical >>>>> consistency is needed for existence would be a category error. >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>> >>>> In other words: >>>> >>>> https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language >>>> : >>>> >>>> >>>> *As long as we think that there is some relation called ‘fitting the >>>> world’ or ‘expressing the real nature of the human self’ which can be >>>> possessed or lacked by vocabularies-as-wholes, we shall continue the >>>> traditional philosophical search for a criterion which will tell us which >>>> vocabularies have this desirable feature. But if we could ever become >>>> reconciled to the idea that reality is indifferent to our descriptions of >>>> it, and that the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather >>>> than being adequately or inadequately expressed in a vocabulary, then we >>>> should at last have assimilated what was true in the romantic idea that >>>> truth is made rather than found. What is true about this claim is just >>>> that >>>> languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of >>>> linguistic entities, of sentences.* >>>> >>>> - pt >>>> >>>> >>>> But what is true about the sentence, *"What is true about this claim >>>> is just that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a >>>> property of linguistic entities, of sentences."*? Is it not >>>> correspondence with some physical events, i.e. facts? >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> >>> In the Rortian philosophical world of *neopragmatism* [ >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism ], the correspondence >>> concept of truth is wrong: >>> >>> "The thought was that in order for a statement or proposition to be true >>> it must give facts which correspond to what is actually present in reality. >>> This is called the correspondence theory of truth and is to be >>> distinguished from a neopragmatic conception of truth." >>> >>> A "neopragmatic conception of truth"has Rorty, Quine, Wittgenstein, ... >>> spins, but it's basically that language is in a pragmatic relationship with >>> reality. >>> >>> - pt >>> >> >> Or a Rortian way to put it: Truth claims are just sentences in reference >> to other sentences. >> >> >> Truth claims, yes, and gossip. But we can also bet on a reality making >> sense of the sentences, and if we want to progress build from what we can >> agree on, (even if we interpret it differently). If not, we will fall in >> relativism, which is inconsistent at the start, as it asks us to relativise >> relativism, which needs some absolute. >> >> Bruno >> >> > > Instead of relativism, philosophers talk of *perspectivism*. > > > > Perpectivisme still assume some reality, be it numbers or matter. What you > said above looks more relativism than perspectivism. > > Mechanism is perspectivist, given that the ontology is any Turing complete > theory, and physics, mathematics, psychology theology are explained from > perspective (self-rerefntial different modes imposed by incompleteness). > > > > > (Nietzsche is said to be the father of perspectivism. I say, actually, > Kant. ...) > > A Scientist sees a bunch of phenomena (recorded as data) and says, I have > written a theory θ in a language λ that models the data!. Other Scientists > say, I have done the same, but mine's "better"! So then there are a bunch > of θ_λs (perspectives). The odd thing is that each Scientist talks about > their pet θ_λ as being the world-as-it-is. > > > That are not scientist. A genuine scientist will only ask why this or that > theory, and ask for experimental testing and decision about it. > > Bruno > > > > > Like I've shown, there seems to be little evidence of that. There must be a lot of un-"genuine" scientists writing articles today. See also Sabine Hossenfelder's book Lost in Math.
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