On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 12:18:45 PM UTC, Tomas Pales wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 12:50:04 PM UTC+1, [email protected] > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 10:27:07 AM UTC, Tomas Pales wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 3:37:05 AM UTC+1, [email protected] >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> *So what? The point I am making is that some mathematical objects exist >>>> but are not instantiated in physical reality, thus falsifying his >>>> hypothesis, unless you insist that they are instantiated in other >>>> universes, in which case you have a non falsifiable theory, which isn't a >>>> scientific theory. AG* >>>> >>> >>> If it is logically consistent for a mathematical object to be >>> instantiated in a universe then it is instantiated there. >>> >> >> *I think you mean that if some mathematical construct does not contradict >> the laws of physics in some universe, then it must be instantiated in that >> universe. And the reason for that is what? Why must all logically >> consistent constructs be instantiated?* >> > > Because it follows from the definition of existence as logical consistency. >
*This definition of existence is self serving, and IMO theoretically and philosophically extraneous. There is no reason to assume something exists simply because it's consistent with anything, even the laws of physics. AG * > > > >> >> * This idea seems perilously close to another false idea; namely, that >> every outcome of a quantum experiment must be observed in some universe. AG* >> > > How do you know many-worlds interpretation of QM is false? As far as I am > concerned, it is false if it is inconsistent. > > >> *Since it can't be falsified and makes no testable predictions, what >> value does it have? AG* >> > > Some multiverse theories may be testable. As for Tegmark's ultimate > multiverse theory, I don't know if it can be useful for physics. For me it > is philosophically useful because it clarifies what it means to exist. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
