> On 28 Oct 2018, at 00:27, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 10:07:26 PM UTC, Tomas Pales wrote: > > > On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 11:38:36 PM UTC+2, [email protected] <> > wrote: > > > On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 9:10:50 PM UTC, Tomas Pales wrote: > > > On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 10:36:30 PM UTC+2, [email protected] <> > wrote: > > As I understand the MUH, it states that every well defined mathematical form > or function is reified, or instantiated, or manifested concretely in the > physical universe > > Surely not in every physical universe > > Mathematics, and thus plane waves, consists of constructs which are > independent of any physical universe. AG > > Not when they are part of a universe. Like that rectangle you are looking at > right now (the screen). > > This goes back to Plato.
Actually no. Xeusippes would agree with you, and some neopythagoreans too. But Plato remains agnostic on this, and mathematics only inspired him for its World of Idea. OK. I see what you mean. I wrote “actually, no”, but I was about writing “exactly”. It is just that arithmetical “platonism” (the belief that classical logic can be applied to the arithmetical propositions) is far aways a priori from Mechanism, although that changes drastically with the mechanist assumption, but as a consequence (not an assumption). Bruno > There are no rectangles in this or any universe. Mathematics consists of pure > forms and their relationships, independent of any physical universe. The MUH > is not a scientific theory. It's no better than claiming some number of > angels can fit on the head of a pin. According to theories like the MUH, it > would depend on which universe one is referring to. This model is bad > philosophy at best. AG Mechanism (computationalism) add the precision needed to make it into a testable science. It precedes also Tegmark’s mathematicalism, and now, he seems to endorse that finitists requirement. I am not sure Tegmark takes into account the nuances imposed by incompleteness on the inside view, so the phenomenologies are not well distinguishes from the ontology/ontologies possible. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
