> On 19 Nov 2018, at 21:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, November 19, 2018 at 4:54:47 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 16 Nov 2018, at 19:55, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, November 16, 2018 at 11:05:51 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 15 Nov 2018, at 18:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, November 15, 2018 at 5:15:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 13 Nov 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, November 12, 2018 at 8:35:23 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> A model is a model of a theory. The notion of model of a model can make >>>> sense, by considering non axiomatisable theory, but that can lead to >>>> confusion, so it is better to avoid this. When a model is seen as a >>>> theory, if it contains arithmetic, the theory cannot be axiomatised, >>>> proofs cannot be checked, the set of theorems is not recursively >>>> enumerable, etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> This is why some have mathematical theories (alternatives to ZF) that have >>>> finite (i.e. Only a finite number of numbers needed!) models (e.g. Jan >>>> Mycielski, "Locally Finite Theories" [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2273942 >>>> <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2273942> ]). In this approach quantifiers >>>> are effectively replaced by typed quantifiers, where the type says "this >>>> quantifier ranges over some finite set". >>>> >>>> Another approach is to nominalize physical theories theories (Hartry >>>> Field, Science Without Numbers, summary [ >>>> http://www.nyu.edu/projects/dorr/teaching/objectivity/Handout.5.10.pdf >>>> <http://www.nyu.edu/projects/dorr/teaching/objectivity/Handout.5.10.pdf> >>>> ]). In this approach the model of the theory is a finite set of >>>> (references to) physical objects. >>>> >>>> This is the best point-of-view to have: The set of natural numbers simply >>>> doesn't exist! >>> >>> >>> I agree. It is actually a consequence of mechanism. The set of natural >>> numbers does not exist, nor any infinite set. But that does not make a >>> physical universe into something existing. Analysis, physics, sets, … >>> belongs to the numbers “dreams” (a highly structured set, which has no >>> ontology, but a rich and complex phenomenological accounts). >>> >>> I gave my axioms (Arithmetic, or Kxy = x, Sxyz = xz(yz)). As you can see, >>> there is no axiom of infinity. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> PS Sorry for the delay. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The "highest" programming may be higher-type (or higher-order) programming: >>> >>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf >>> >>> <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf> >>> examples @ http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/ <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/> >>> >>> >>> "Higher-order [programming involves] infinite objects, such as infinite >>> strings, real numbers, and even functions themselves, etc. [which >>> themselves] are computable. And, more importantly, how to compute them. In >>> practice, computation with infinite objects often takes place in languages >>> such as ML, Haskell, Agda etc. In theory, some canonical systems are >>> Godel’s system T, Platek-Scott-Plotkin PCF, Martin-Lof’s dependent type >>> theory, among many others. But how can we (or a computer) compute with >>> infinite objects, given that we have a finite amount of time and a finite >>> amount of memory and a finite amount of any resource? Topology comes to the >>> rescue [revolving] around the [finite vs. infinite dichotomy], mediated by >>> topology. We can say that topology is precisely about the relation between >>> finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to computation." >>> >>> >>> >>> But there is a new biochemical programming language: >>> >>> CRN++: Molecular Programming Language >>> (Submitted on 19 Sep 2018) >>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.07430 <https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.07430> >>> "We present its syntax and semantics, and build a compiler translating >>> CRN++ programs into chemical reactions...laying the foundation of a >>> comprehensive framework for molecular programming." >>> >>> A programming language whose purpose is to create bugs! >>> >>> So the question becomes: Is bioprogramming > programming? (if biomatter has >>> experiential qualities in addition to informational quantities) >> >> Assuming some primary matter, and some non mechanist theory, why not. That >> seems to quite speculative, though, and adding difficulties to a subject >> which is already difficult when assuming the “simplifying” assumption of >> Mechanism. With mechanism, the mind-body problem reduced into justifying the >> existence of a canonical measure on all computations “seen from inside” >> (which admits a number of modes, imposed by incompleteness). In case the >> physics in the head of the universal machine/number departs from >> observation, we get the mean to make sense of some non-mechanism, and this >> might show you right. So let us continue the testing/comparison. >> >> What do you think your biomatter do which would be non Turing emulable, nor >> “first person measurable(*) and in what sense would that be relevant with >> respect of consciousness? >> >> I have no doubt chemical computation is a wonderful subject, but with >> “Indexical Digital Mechanism”, the theology and the physics is independent >> of the language and the basic theories as far as they are Turing >> complete(*), the physical appearance, needs to be justified in term of a >> relative measure state/computations "seen from inside” (Incompleteness makes >> the usual standard definition getting sense in those “enough rich” Turing >> complete(**) theories. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> (*) This provides some “free oracle”, like the random oracle and the halting >> oracle, due to the limiting behaviour of the first person indeterminacy). >> >> (**) Turing complete means that for all p sigma_1 (shape ExA(x, y), A >> decidable) we have, with “[]” Gödel’s arithmetical provability predicate, >> >> p -> []p >> >> is true. >> >> Löbian (sufficiently rich) means that for all such p,"p -> []p" is not only >> true, but provable. Put it in another way, this means that >> >> [](p -> []p) >> >> is true. (This makes the machine obeying to G and G* and their intensional >> variants). >> >> (See all definitions in the second part of sane04, I recall them in most of >> my papers). >> >> >> >> What do you think your biomatter do which would be non Turing emulable, nor >> “first person measurable(*) and in what sense would that be relevant with >> respect of consciousness? >> >> One analogy I came up with (will see how this goes): Think of a Turing >> computing that doesn't manipulate (only) symbols (information, or numbers), >> but manipulates (also) emojis [ https://emojipedia.org/ >> <https://emojipedia.org/> ]! Now emojis themselves are symbols of course, >> but suppose that they "embody" real elements of experience that are >> ontologically separate from information (or numbers). >> >> (One could call this e-Turing computing non-Turing or not, depending on >> whether how one defines unconventional computing.) > > Hmm… The emojis would be pointer to expérience. That would be just a coding, > if we assume computationalism, or an oracle, perhaps, or something unknown … > just to claim that the brain is not digitalis able? > This seems to me only to make things more complex, and if the things invoked > through the emoji needs to be material, it looks like an artificial trick > “just” to save a metaphysical option. Personally, I could do that the day I > have more empirical evidence for matter or for non-mechanism. > > Bruno > > > I wrote this short Note: > > EMP: Effective Matter Programming > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/11/19/emp-effective-matter-programming/ > > > "Matter compilers receive their raw materials from the Feed, a system > analogous to the electrical grid of modern society. The Feed carries streams > of both energy and basic molecules <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molecules>, > which are rapidly assembled into usable goods by matter compilers." > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Diamond_Age > > > From usable goods to sensitive robots?
Matter plays a fundamental role in sensibility, but that is a theorem in Mechanism, and that “matter” is phenomenological. It does not exist in the base ontology. Or f it does, then how could it play a non mechanist role? No problem with rejecting computationalism, if you want matter or other god to play a role, but why not testing this before complicating the cognitive science for … what? Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
