On Wednesday, November 21, 2018 at 3:48:31 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Matter plays a fundamental role in sensibility, but that is a theorem in 
> Mechanism, and that “matter” is phenomenological. It does not exist in the 
> base ontology. Or f it does, then how could it play a non mechanist role? 
> No problem with rejecting computationalism, if you want matter or other 
> god to play a role, but why not testing this before complicating the 
> cognitive science for … what?
>
> Bruno
>
>


If the starting point is

       *There are no such things as numbers* [ or - in general terms - 
*mathematical 
entities* ],

then one is left with something (assuming there is something) and something 
is matter.

There is no evidence in any scientific sense that mathematical entities 
exist.

Mathematics is fiction (in the sense of mathematical fictionalism). That 
applies to computation, if computation is viewed as a branch of mathematics.

But matter that has intrinsic experientiality can be that something that 
does exist for both behavioral (information) and phenomenological 
(experience, consciousness) aspects of the universe.

- pt

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