> On 21 Nov 2018, at 15:11, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wednesday, November 21, 2018 at 3:48:31 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Matter plays a fundamental role in sensibility, but that is a theorem in 
> Mechanism, and that “matter” is phenomenological. It does not exist in the 
> base ontology. Or f it does, then how could it play a non mechanist role? 
> No problem with rejecting computationalism, if you want matter or other god 
> to play a role, but why not testing this before complicating the cognitive 
> science for … what?
> Bruno
> If the starting point is
>        There are no such things as numbers [ or - in general terms - 
> mathematical entities ],

I guess you mean: there is no number in the basic reality that I assume. OK.

I hope you believe that x + 0 = x, and things like that.

> then one is left with something (assuming there is something) and something 
> is matter.

Why? In some social groups, I met often people who disbelieve in number and in 
matter. They argue that the fundamental reality is consciousness, and that 
number, and matter, is a product of consciousness.

With mechanism, consciousness is more easy to explain than numbers, and 
consciousness is explained by number relations (build from logic + the laws of 
+ and *).

> There is no evidence in any scientific sense that mathematical entities exist.

There are many evidence that they exist, and assuming mechanism, contemporary 
physics confirmed their existence, and the choice for talking them as 
irreducible (except on Turing equivalent).

Without assuming a universal machinery, we cannot derive their existence, but 
once assumed we can explain the rest.

As elementary arithmetic is Turing universal, we can assume only the numbers. 
It is less sophisticated than assuming this or that physical theory, which 
leads to the problem of consciousness (solved with mechanism).

But there is no empirical evidence for irreducible matter.

> Mathematics is fiction (in the sense of mathematical fictionalism).

We would not promise 1000,000$ for solving the Riemann Conjecture if it was 
fiction. Fictionalism in mathematics does not make any sense to me. With 
mechanism, fictionalism in analysis and physics is obligatory though.

> That applies to computation, if computation is viewed as a branch of 
> mathematics.

Computation and computability theory are indeed branch of mathematics, even 

> But matter that has intrinsic experientiality can be that something that does 
> exist for both behavioral (information) and phenomenological (experience, 
> consciousness) aspects of the universe.

That makes both mind and matter quite weird. How could any 3p thing be 
identified with 1p notion?

How would you explain facts like consciousness. How could “matter” (and what is 
that) have experience, memories them, without emulating some self-referential 
processes? When would a piece of matter have an experience? How would you 
relate the role of that matter and the functioning of the brain? I see only 
complications here, which are premature for me, as the physical reality appears 
to look exactly like mechanism predicts it to look like.


> - pt
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