On Thursday, November 22, 2018 at 5:54:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Nov 2018, at 15:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, November 21, 2018 at 3:48:31 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> Matter plays a fundamental role in sensibility, but that is a theorem in >> Mechanism, and that “matter” is phenomenological. It does not exist in the >> base ontology. Or f it does, then how could it play a non mechanist role? >> No problem with rejecting computationalism, if you want matter or other >> god to play a role, but why not testing this before complicating the >> cognitive science for … what? >> >> Bruno >> >> > > > If the starting point is > > *There are no such things as numbers* [ or - in general terms - > *mathematical > entities* ], > > > > I guess you mean: there is no number in the basic reality that I assume. > OK. > > I hope you believe that x + 0 = x, and things like that. > > > > > > > then one is left with something (assuming there is something) and > something is matter. > > > Why? In some social groups, I met often people who disbelieve in number > and in matter. They argue that the fundamental reality is consciousness, > and that number, and matter, is a product of consciousness. > > With mechanism, consciousness is more easy to explain than numbers, and > consciousness is explained by number relations (build from logic + the laws > of + and *). > > > > > > There is no evidence in any scientific sense that mathematical entities > exist. > > > There are many evidence that they exist, and assuming mechanism, > contemporary physics confirmed their existence, and the choice for talking > them as irreducible (except on Turing equivalent). > > Without assuming a universal machinery, we cannot derive their existence, > but once assumed we can explain the rest. > > As elementary arithmetic is Turing universal, we can assume only the > numbers. It is less sophisticated than assuming this or that physical > theory, which leads to the problem of consciousness (solved with mechanism). > > But there is no empirical evidence for irreducible matter. > > > > Mathematics is fiction (in the sense of mathematical fictionalism). > > > > We would not promise 1000,000$ for solving the Riemann Conjecture if it > was fiction. Fictionalism in mathematics does not make any sense to me. > With mechanism, fictionalism in analysis and physics is obligatory though. > > > > > That applies to computation, if computation is viewed as a branch of > mathematics. > > > Computation and computability theory are indeed branch of mathematics, > even arithmetic. > > > > But matter that has intrinsic experientiality can be that something that > does exist for both behavioral (information) and phenomenological > (experience, consciousness) aspects of the universe. > > > That makes both mind and matter quite weird. How could any 3p thing be > identified with 1p notion? > > How would you explain facts like consciousness. How could “matter” (and > what is that) have experience, memories them, without emulating some > self-referential processes? When would a piece of matter have an > experience? How would you relate the role of that matter and the > functioning of the brain? I see only complications here, which are > premature for me, as the physical reality appears to look exactly like > mechanism predicts it to look like. > > Bruno >
Rorty wrote an introduction to one of his books, in full here: https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm Source: Consequences of Pragmatism This is the gist of it (and what I think): Where did the (bad) idea that there are such things as "abstractions" (numbers, relations, processes, minds, etc.) and "truths" about those abstractions come from? That's a real mystery. *We would not promise 1000,000$ for solving the Riemann Conjecture if it was fiction. * Publishers advance millions of dollars for works of fiction by popular fiction writers all the time! *How would you explain facts like consciousness. How could “matter” (and what is that) have experience, memories them, without emulating some self-referential processes? When would a piece of matter have an experience? How would you relate the role of that matter and the functioning of the brain? I see only complications here, which are premature for me, as the physical reality appears to look exactly like mechanism predicts it to look like.* What the Goff-Strawson breed of "panpsychists" say: *Matter without experientiality is not true matter.* *In some social groups, I met often people who disbelieve in number and in matter. They argue that the fundamental reality is consciousness, and that number, and matter, is a product of consciousness.* Now *that* [~ cosmopsychism] is a much more interesting starting point, and comes close to *experiential materialism*: "Our picture of matter is incomplete, at least if it is drawn only with (colorless) pencils of information—the current mathematical language of physics. What is needed to finish the picture are paint brushes dipped in the (colorful) elements of experience." Cosmopsychists and material panpsychists have some common basis for progress. cf. https://philarchive.org/rec/GOFCMA "Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism, and the Grounding Relation" Philip Goff In William Seager (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge * (forthcoming) [pdf: https://philarchive.org/archive/GOFCMA ] - pt > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
