> On 10 Dec 2018, at 20:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 11:00:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:02, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> >> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> I think truth is primitive. >> >> Jason >> >> >> As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy), truth and matter are linked: >> >> "As a matter of fact, ..." >> "The truth of the matter is ..." >> "It matters that ..." >> ... >> [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter >> <https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter> ] >> >> I agree they are linked. Though matter may be a few steps removed from >> truth. Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly: >> >> There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to be >> true, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its >> variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave >> function of our universe. You might say that we (literally not >> figuratively) live within such an equation. That its truth reifies what we >> call matter. >> >> But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this. e.g. >> because the following statement is true "two has a successor" then there >> exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number. Similarly, the >> truth of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 >> and 9. >> >> Jason >> >> >> >> >> Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has material truth if its concepts are >> based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a >> judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called >> logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure >> science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, >> empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth." >> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth> ] >> >> >> I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the >> integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see >> around us. >> >> Jason >> >> >> >> In my view there is basically just material (from matter) truth and >> linguistic (from language) truth. > > Linguistic is concerned with grammar. To have a notion of truth, you need a > notion of reality, or semantic, or model (in the logician’s sense). > > > >> >> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ >> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/> ] >> >> Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , >> functional type theory (FTT) languages. >> >> Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of >> Peano arithmetic (PA). > > “Fictional” is a bad adjective as it enforces the choice of the ontology. I > understand that you believe in matter as a base. I can only wait for your > solution of the mind-body problem, but usually non-mechanist theories have a > tradition of being unclear (to say the least). > > > > >> >> Numbers can be "materialized" via nominalization (cf. Hartry Field, refs. in >> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field> ]). > > > Please do it. That could be a good subject of Phd thesis in philosophy, but I > am not sure you have understand the main things about universal machine, > which is that we don’t understand them at all, we are just discovering them. > It put some mess in the arithmetical Platonia. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Language theory (both natural and programming) includes syntax, semantics, > pragmatics. > > The nominalization of scientific theories expressed in mathematical language > began with Field. > > "Science Without Numbers" > https://books.google.com/books/about/Science_Without_Numbers.html?id=Exc1DQAAQBAJ > > "Progress in Field’s Nominalistic Program" > http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13083/1/Chen_Intrinsic_Nom_QM.pdf > > In this paper, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state.
So we are already put of the computationalist hypothesis. Bruno > This account contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic > account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects > such as complex numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual arbitrary > conventions in the wave function representation, and (3) it explains why the > quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom. > > > Consequently, this account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in Science > Without Numbers (1980), responds to David Malament’s long-standing > impossibility conjecture (1982), and establishes an important first step > towards a genuinely intrinsic and nominalistic account of quantum mechanics. > > > One way to nominalize (mathematical) theories expressed in first-order > languages is via the finitization of Jan Mycielski. > > - pt > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
