> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:02, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > I think truth is primitive. > > Jason > > > As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy), truth and matter are linked: > > "As a matter of fact, ..." > "The truth of the matter is ..." > "It matters that ..." > ... > [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter > <https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter> ] > > I agree they are linked. Though matter may be a few steps removed from > truth. Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly: > > There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to be > true, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its variables) > maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave function of > our universe. You might say that we (literally not figuratively) live within > such an equation. That its truth reifies what we call matter. > > But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this. e.g. > because the following statement is true "two has a successor" then there > exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number. Similarly, the > truth of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 > and 9. > > Jason > > > > > Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has material truth if its concepts are > based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a > judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called > logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure > science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, > empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth." > [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth> ] > > > I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the integers > is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see around us. > > Jason > > > > In my view there is basically just material (from matter) truth and > linguistic (from language) truth.
Linguistic is concerned with grammar. To have a notion of truth, you need a notion of reality, or semantic, or model (in the logician’s sense). > > [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ ] > > Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , > functional type theory (FTT) languages. > > Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of Peano > arithmetic (PA). “Fictional” is a bad adjective as it enforces the choice of the ontology. I understand that you believe in matter as a base. I can only wait for your solution of the mind-body problem, but usually non-mechanist theories have a tradition of being unclear (to say the least). > > Numbers can be "materialized" via nominalization (cf. Hartry Field, refs. in > [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field ]). Please do it. That could be a good subject of Phd thesis in philosophy, but I am not sure you have understand the main things about universal machine, which is that we don’t understand them at all, we are just discovering them. It put some mess in the arithmetical Platonia. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
