On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 7:59:04 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 5 Mar 2019, at 19:27, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 6:23:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 5 Mar 2019, at 00:43, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 3/4/2019 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >>> >> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" >> possibility): Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* >> (a spigot one, in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that >> stream of digits is the Standard Model Equation >> >> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here) >> >> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png >> >> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.) >> >> >> Nothing. Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any >> sequence of symbols. It's just a special case of the rock that computes >> everything. >> >> >> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do >> not compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the >> rock. A rock is not even a definable digital object. >> >> >> It's an ostensively definable object...which is much better. >> >> >> Ostension is dream-able. >> >> >> >> >> >> If someone want to convince me that a rock can compute everything, I will >> ask them to write a complier of the combinators, say, in the rock. I will >> ask an algorithm generating the phi_i associated to the rock. >> >> >> There is no particular phi_i associated to the rock. That's the point. >> The rock goes thru various states so there exists a mapping from that >> sequence of states to any computation with a similar number of states. >> >> >> It is a mapping of states. It is like a bijection. You need something >> like a morphism preserving the computability structure, which do not exist >> in the rock. A computation is not just a sequence of states, it is a >> sequence of states defined by the universal machine which brought those >> states. >> >> There are bijections between N and Z, but only Z is a group, because >> those bijections does not preserve the algebraic structure. Similarly, >> there is a bijection between a computation and a movie of that computation, >> but it does not preserve the causal/logical relation between the states, >> which is a universal machine for the computation, and just a linear order >> for the sequence, without structure, of the states. >> >> >> >> Of course one may object that the actual computation is in the >> mapping...but that's because of our prejudice for increasing entropy. >> >> >> OK.Now, a bijection between a physical computation and an arithmetical >> computation do preserve the computability structure, that is why we can say >> that the arithmetical reality/model implements genuinely the computations. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > The bijection > > material [physical] computation ↔ arithmetical computation > > is like (New Testament) Paul's thesis: There's earthly bodies and > spiritual bodies. > > > Hmm… You could say that, as a reductio ad absurd of the idea that there > are *primitive* material bodies. > > But my point was that a bijection is not enough, you need a fiathftull, > consciousness preserving transformation, then this can help to derive > constructively physics from arithmetic, and the physical reality is > recvovred as a part of the machine theology (G*). > > > > > "Not all flesh is the same: People have one kind of flesh, animals have > another, birds another and fish another. > > > That reminds me of the argument by the catholic that “obviously” Indian > have no souls. > > I am not sure by what you mean “have different flesh”. We are all using > the sae DNA, quite similar protein and enzyme, and the difference are as > contingent as the fact that you and me are different person, in our > relative current incarnation/implementation. > > > > > There are also heavenly bodies and there are earthly bodies; but the > splendor of the heavenly bodies is one kind, and the splendor of the > earthly bodies is another. ... If there is a natural body, there is also a > spiritual body.” > > > Possible, when you assume non-mechanism, which you do. I’am afraid that > many things are possible in that case. > > > > > Spiritual or heavenly fictionalism is like arithmetical fictionalism: > spirits (like numbers) do not exist. > > > > I will try to convince my tax perceptor … > > Bruno > > > Thanks for the Commentary above on the New Testament text:
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+Corinthians+15%3A39-44&version=NIV A tax auditor may think of (fictional) numbers, but is in reality looking for a pound of (material) flesh. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
