Hi, Grayson, Bruce, or anyone, it is a bit for you that I answer to John Clark. If you agree with John, and can better explain its point, let me no.
I recall the problem. With digital mechanism we can be be “read and cut” in Helsinki, and reconstituted in two cities, Washington and Moscow, simultaneously, where he get, in both places a cup of coffee. I claim that, in Helsinki the guy, who believes in Digital Mechanism can predict this: I will with certainty drink a cup of coffee, but I am not sure if it will be Russian or American coffee. The question is about the first person experience, and my justification is that, if we write anything else, in its prediction diary, different from “I will feel to be drinking a cup of coffee in W, or I will feel to be drinking a cup of coffee in W”. Then the prediction will be wrong, for at least one copy. By definition, a correct prediction on the first person experience possible, has to be true for all copies, so that they can all confirm it in the prediction diary, which has been taken in the read and cut box in Helsinki. This later is used to say that a universal machine is unable to know which computations she is supported by, in the infinitely many computations executed, in the mathematical Church-Turing sense, in arithmetic, and that plays a key rôle to understand that physics will have to be reduced to a relative statistics on computation (a concept definable in any enough rich theory of arithmetic, like the theory of combinators + induction, or in Peano arithmetic. It shows that if Everett used Mechanism, as he claims in some of its paper, and in his long text, then the wave itself, not just the collapse, has to be explained from the statistics on computations in arithmetic. I got this in my childhood, never met anyone taking more than 2 years to grasp. Usually, people grasp this in ten minutes. The only exception I know is John Clark. Then it took me 30 years to get the quantum logic for the logic of “probability one” in that mechanist and arithmetical context, so that QM confirms mechanism, up to now. You can skip the first comment, to get at this thought experience. It is the “step 3” of the reasoning given in the sane04 paper (http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html ). > On 19 Mar 2019, at 00:35, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 11:49 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <http://ac.be/>> wrote: > > >>> the academy of Plato .... > >> ... knew less science than one bright third grader today. > > >You told me you did not have study it. > > You only need to look at Plato's academy for about 25 seconds to know that > they didn't know where the sun went at night but a bright modern third grader > does. >From Plato came neoplatonism. From this came mathematics and physics. For a >scientist, it is not a problem to be wrong, on the contrary, it is a honour to >be refuted, and he/she is open to improvement, dialog and research. > > > You invoke your god. > > Apparently your a fan of transcendental meditation and believe if you just > keep chanting your mantra long enough you can make it come true. You've been > doing it for a decade now but I guess that's not quite long enough. Then why do you keep saying that a computation is real only when implemented in a primary physical reality? You can call the objet of your ontological commitment a “physical universe”, this does not change that it is non valid to refute a claim by invoking a personal ontological commitment. Mathematician like to homogenise concept, like making 0 and 1 into number, which meant numerous, at the start. God is defined by whatever is at the origin of everything. The god of the believer in primary Matter is a primary physical universe. The god of the abrahamic religion is “God” (say). Note that the statement “there is no god” is still a theological statement, but with no value if the notion of God is not made more precise. You do seem like a “strong (non agnostic) atheist”, which share the definition of God of the Christians, and share the belief in the “material creation”. > > > >> A valid proof shows that a statement is grammatically correct in the > >> language of mathematics but it does not prove that it exists. If you prove > >> that every sentence in a Harry Potter book is grammatically correct in the > >> language of English you have not proven that dragons exist. Dragons don't > >> exist but the English word "dragons" does. > > > > 2+2 = 5 is grammatically correct in arithmetic, but that has nothing to do > > with ^provability or with truth. > > Exactly. All true statements about things that exist made in the language of > mathematics are grammatically correct, but there is no reason to think all > grammatically correct statements made in the language of mathematics are > about things that exist. You can write both fiction and nonfiction in the > English language and the same is true of the Mathematics language. The same is true for physics and any science." London is the capital of Belgium" is grammatically correct, but false. “2+2=5” is grammatically correct, but false, even if they were no universe at all. > > > >>A digital computer needs atoms > > > Not at all. A physical computer needs some physical objects, but the whole > > point of the discovery of the universal machine, is that they are not > > physical machine. > > And a non-physical Turing Machine can make real calculations in exactly the > same way as a dragon in a Harry Potter book can breath real fire. No. If the quadruplets of a Turing machine are inappropriate, it cannot compute what it should. It would be like “2+2=5”. > > >> it is a fact that even AFTER your "experiment" is over there is STILL no > >> way for anyone > > > For anyone? > > Yes for anyone. ? > > > Then you deny consciousness to both copies. > > I deny that your "question" is a question at all because it is about the fate > of a personal pronoun No. It s about the fate of a person, as seen from its own personal perspective, which is duplicated, but still seen as unique by each of its copies. The test to confirm the prediction is easy, and has been given ... > with no clear referent that a personal pronoun with no clear referent is > supposed to answer. The referent is the first person experience possible. I will be duplicated, but I know with certainty that I will taste some coffee, but I am not sure, nor can I be sure if it will taste like Russian coffee or American coffee. The test to confirm consists in reading the prediction made in the prediction book before the duplication, and then read the TWO copies of them in W and M, together with the results. > It takes more than a question mark at the end of a stream of gibberish to > turn it into into a question. So let us see. The guy wrote in Helsinki “I will taste some coffee, and it will be either in W or in M, but not in both. After the duplication, the guy can wrote “confirmed” in both places. You keep denying the first person report of the copies, like if they were transformed into zombie. > > > > Basically, you say that we die in the teleportation experience, > > The Helsinki Man does indeed die in the teleportation experience, But then he dies in the simple brain transplantation, and Mechanism is wrong. Also, that would change the definition of the Helsinki guy on which we do agree (the guy who remember having been in Helsinki and who pushed on the “button". > but only if a very very silly definition of "The Helsinki Man" is used. It's > silly because even without teleportation or people duplicating machined it > would mean even in the everyday non exotic world we all die a billion times > every second or so. That is why we don’t say that he died in the duplication experience. But that is the reason of the FPI. I will survive the duplication, but I am sure that I will feel to be in only one place. > > > “The” alludes to the first person experience. > > In a world with people duplicating machines there is no such thing as THE > first person experience; Proof? You do the 3-1-p - 1-p confusion. Just read both diaries. > you need to be more specific but you can't because if you did the glaring > flaws in your argument would be obvious to all, so things must remain > ambiguous. You are the only one who have a problem with this, and nobody has ever understand your point. > > > > They both feel “I see only one city”. > > You say "both" so that means there are 2 of them, Of course. That is part of the experience description. > so if Mr. I is the Helsinki Man then the Helsinki Man saw 2 cities. Here you do exactly the error you want me to have done. “The” in the second occurence is ambiguous. Is is “the” body (3p) or is it the “soul” (1p). The body will see, in the 3p sense, 2 cities, but all first person available see only once city. > And Mr. I is the Helsinki Man if you really meant what you said about the > Helsinki Man being anyone who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday, but > of course you didn't really mean it and will now start equivocating. I will just distinguish the first person 1 from the thread person I. In the mathematical translation, those are distinguished by the modal logics G and G*, for the 3p view, and the (unique) SGrz for the 1p. Any ambiguity that you see comes from apparent inability to distinguish (here) that difference. That is why for the confirmation, we need to interview both copies, or, in the iteration case, a sample of them. Then it is a child play to see that all copies confirmed “I can predict with certainty that I will feel seeing only once city, never being sure which one”. > > > Both copies knows very well what happened. > > Yes they know what happened, everybody does, but nobody understands what > question has been asked. Certainly you don't. On the contrary, everybody has no problem with this, and certainly not the first person associated to the copies. > > > They pushed on a button, and they got a results that they understand was > > not predictable with certainty. > > Everybody correctly predicted that the Moscow Man will see Moscow and the > Washington man will see Washington and everybody correctly predicted that > both will have a first person experience tomorrow, Indeed, and in particular that first person experience is, for both copies, I see one city and not the other, and I could not have written, in Helsinki, which one. That is the FPI. > and nobody in Helsinki will. Then the Helsinki guy has been killed in the process, but then we have to abandon the Mechanist Hypothesis. > There is nothing more to predict. The Helsinki guy can easily predict that he will be a guy seeing only one city, for the same reason he can predict that he will drink coffee. Why? Because such events happens in BOTH cities. > > > We know that both are right, by Mechanism, in saying “I was in Helsinki, > > yesterday, > and now I am still in only one city”. > > If both say "I see a city” “I see only one city” > and if the cities are different and if both say “I was in Helsinki, > yesterday" and both are right and if the Helsinki Man is anybody who remember > being in Helsinki yesterday then it does not require a PhD in logic to > conclude that the Helsinki Man ended up seeing 2 cities. At no moment at all is there any person seeing 2 cities. You are again obliterating the 1P/3P distinction. > Yes each individual only saw one city but each individual is only half of the > Helsinki man because THE HELSINKI MAN HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and that is what > the word "duplicated" means. No body has been cut in half. A duplication is not a division. You forget that the question is about the first person experiences, AS SEEN BY THE FIRST PERSON, NOT ABOUT ALL POSSIBLE FIRST PERSON EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS GIVEN IN THE PROTOCOL OF THE EXPERIENCE. We already know since the start that the H-guy will be both the W-guy and the M-guy, but unless you add telepathy, BOTH SEE ONLY ONCE CITY, AND NONE LIVES THE TWO FIRST PERSON EXPERIENCES. If you think that there is no first person indeterminacy, just gives the algorithm. But if your prediction is that you will see two cities, then both copies will admit that it was wrong, as both lives now in only one city. Bruno > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
