That's precisely what exists: experiences. And there can be more said about existence. How I also detail in the book, existance is first the act of self-reference of looking-back-at-itself and thus creating the first object: "I am". Then because of emergence where you have qualities inheritance, the quality of "existence" of the first object is inherited in all the above objects. So when I see red, the logical structure of the state of seeing red is: "I am red."/"I exist as red". (of course, is more complicated, since it includes all the previous levels, so it is actually something like: "I am vividness, diversity, memory, time, black-and-white, shades-of-gray, red.")
On Thursday, 25 April 2019 09:48:58 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Apr 2019, at 19:52, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < > [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > Actually, this is precisely what existence is: that which is immediately > knowable. I see red, thus red exists. > > > I see red, so certainly the experience of seeing red exists. I can agree > with that. But it is not existence which I see, it is my own consciousness. > > “Existence” has no meaning if we don’t say what exists, or it means, if > taken in your sense, that you define “existence” by consciousness, but that > is not the usual sense of existence. > > What I mean, is that we say that existence is immediately knowable, people > will me mislead into believing that what we see exist. If I see something > red, “seing red” exists, but it does not mean that it exists a red thing, > only an experience of red can be said to exist. I might see a red unicorn, > for example, in some dream. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
