On Monday, 29 April 2019 16:23:48 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 26 Apr 2019, at 18:51, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < > everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > On Friday, 26 April 2019 18:41:06 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> >> And there can be more said about existence. How I also detail in the >> book, existance is first the act of self-reference of >> looking-back-at-itself and thus creating the first object: "I am". Then >> because of emergence >> >> >> Emergence from what? How? Why? >> >> How could “I am” be an object? It is a proposition about some possible >> object “I”, how do you define “I”? >> >> > Emergence from looking-back-at-itself. With each looking-back-at-itself > self-reference enriches itself. How and why I don't know. > > > I can make sense of this in the Mechanist frame. But there we make the > “ontology” (what we assume at the start) very clear, and very simple. > Staring from consciousness is like starting from the answer, to me. >
Well... you have to start with the data that you have. And the data is: colors, sounds, tastes, emotions, etc., not "particles", "fields", "gravity", etc. Those "physical" things are just conceptual extrapolations starting from the real data that lies in consciousness. And they are even awful extrapolations. Read my paper "The Quale of Time" in which I prove there is no physical time, to truly understand how the concept of "physical time" is such an awful extrapolation starting from shallow looks at the time of consciousness. https://philpeople.org/profiles/cosmin-visan Time in consciousness is retentional, and the nature of retention makes any concept of "succession" incoherent. > > > "I am" is an object because that's what happens when the unformalizable > self-reference looks-back-at-itself: it finds itself, and finding of itself > is necessarily an object. So since on the first looking-back-at-itself > there is nothing else there except itself, it will find itself as an > object. So the "I" is the first object with which self-reference identifies > itself, and automatically that object will have as quality the quality of > ontological subjectivity. > > > “I am” is an object, as it is a sentence, a sequence of symbol. But the > Maning of “I am” is not an object, but more like an event, a thought, an > happening. And if it is the first person self-reference, it is provably not > an object, but a lived experience which cannot be associated to anything in > the third person way. The first person I is a subject, a person, not really > an object in the usual sense. The body is an object, not a soul. > The definition of an "object" is whatever qualia consciousness experiences. "I am" is such a quale that consciousness experiences. Therefore, "I am" is an object. And I'm not talking about the ego (although ego himself is an object). I'm talking about the ontological subjectivity. The ontological subjectivity is itself a quality. And is a quality that appears when self-reference first finds itself inside itself. If you want, you can take self-reference to be the subject, and the "I am" the first object that self-reference experiences. Ultimately, since "I am" is actually self-reference finding itself, then objects are also parts of the subject. Object and subject are both 2 aspects of the same unformalizable self-reference. > > > >> >> where you have qualities inheritance, the quality of "existence" of the >> first object is inherited in all the above objects. So when I see red, >> >> >> But why would you see red in the first place? >> >> > I don't know. Probably some evolutionary reasons. > > > That would explain the easy part of the consciousness problem, but not the > hard problem (which is the well known, by philosopher of mind or > theologian, mind-body problem. > > As far as standard vocabulary goes, the hard problem is the problem of qualia. If you give another definition, please explain. If you mean the mind-body problem to be the hard problem, then there is no hard problem, since the body does not exists, being just an idea in consciousness. > > > As I said, 99,9% of theoretical computer science is based on the notion >> of self-reference, and incompleteness imposes all the nuances already found >> by Plato, so we get a very standard classical theory of mind, which >> explains most aspect of consciousness and the “illusion” of the physical >> reality, and why the illusion does last and why it is first person sharable >> (making the physical reality looking real from inside) >> > > What is the "self" in your "self-reference” ? > > > > That is not easy to explain shortly. In the theology of the machine, > counting large, there are 8 notion of selves. Counting even larger, there > are 4 + 4*infinity notion of self, as the material selves are graded, and > admits infinities of variants. > The two main self are the 3p-self and the 1p-self. The 3p-self is rather > well known by computer scientist, and can be seen as a control structure, > which is the ability to refer to its own code, integrally. The language > SMALLTALK has that control structure build in, and is called “SELF”. It > allows a program to refer to its code, like in this code for the factorial > function: > > BEGIN > READ n, > IF n = 0, OUTPUT 1, ELSE (MULTIPLY N TO (APPLY SELF (MINUS N 1). > END > > That makes possible to have program answering any question on their code, > or giving their own code like the amoeba, which is just > > BEGIN > OUTPUT SELF > END > > If you execute that program, it gives > > BEGIN > OUTPUT SELF > END > > .How to implement it? I cana explain in all details, but I give only the > basic idea, which consist in applying a duplicator to itself. If Dx > produces xx, DD will produce DD. If Dx produces F(xx), then DD produces > F(DD). > It is “diagonalization”. But here, such programs would not stop, and it is > a bit more tricky to make them stop, as you need to define a special > “quote” function. We can come back on this. The solution is really given by > the so called “second theorem of recursion” found by Kleene. It needs some > familiarity with the phi_i, which I have explained more than once in this > list, but, well, it needs some absence of math-anxiety … > > Bruno > > Don't you think that what you do with all these abstractions is just to lose yourself in abstract thinking, forgetting where you started from and so, just going astray ? I think that some things are just unformalizable, and is pointless to search for any 3rd person account of them. Red is red and is only accessible from first person. You can explain all day long to a blind person what red is like, no amount of explanation will do it. So why are you so preoccupied with formalizing everything instead of letting them be whatever they are: unformalizable first person experiences ? Instead, you should focus on general structuring features that can be found by any conscious being in their own consciousness, regardless of the qualia domains that they have. Like the emergent structure of consciousness that I talk about in the book. This is a general structuring principle of first person experiences that anyone can find in their own consciousness, being them blind or not, being them human beings or totally inimaginable alien consciousnesses to us ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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