On 5/6/2019 2:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
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<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
How do we know other humans are conscious (we
don't, we can only suspect it).
Why do we suspect other humans are conscious
(due to their outwardly visible behaviors).
Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an
appropriately programmed computer can
replicate any finitely describable behavior.
Therefore a person with an appropriately
programmed computer, placed in someone's
skill, and wired into the nervous system of a
human could perfectly mimic the behaviors,
speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any
person you have ever met.
Do you dispute any of the above?
It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem
to obtain the necessary program.
You could find the program by chance or by
iteration (for the purposes of the thought
experiment).
In those cases you could never know that you had
been successful.
The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed,
but given that we know it is possible to succeed, given
there ezists a program that could convince you it was
your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?
I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it
just acted as intelligent as some stranger. But note
that it would have to be interactive. So I think
Wegner's point is that makes its computations not
finitely describable.
Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?
I don't see how any computation could be not finitely
describable, given that any programs can be expressed as a
finite integer.
This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf His
point is that human consciousness is an interactive program
that receives arbitrary and unknown inputs from the
environment and is modified by those inputs. He calls this
model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a
memory and doesn't overwrite it. Of course you can say that
whatever the environmental input is, it can be included in
the TM code, but then it is potentially inifinite.
Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I
defined, where the program takes in inputs from the environment
via the senses and feeds those inputs to the program.
But those inputs modify the program (what you do depends on your
memory).
I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea
that you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you
wouldn't not be able to tell the difference?
No, but then I'm easily fooled. The information channel between me and
my friend is very narrow. What's your point?
I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined
as a finitely describable TM.
If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you
mean mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind.
That's what I object to: the idea that the mind is the person and
independent of a physical world.
And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a
person, physics says it will be entangled with the environment and
effectively random at a low level. Even Bruno agrees that the
physics of the world is not TM emulable.
Quantum physics is emulable.
Not really. It's emulable IF you know what computation it
performs...but you cannot know that.
It's the first person viewpoints of the apparent randomness are not.
(but this randomness is subjective, not objective).
Now you're asserting a multiple worlds interpretation of QM as though it
is a fact, which I find dubious.
Brent
When it comes to replicating the behaviors of a close friend, these
concern objective out-wardly visible objective behaviors, rather than
the first person experience of your friend.
Jason
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