On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only >>>> suspect it). >>>> >>>> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly >>>> visible behaviors). >>>> >>>> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed >>>> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a >>>> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's >>>> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic >>>> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have >>>> ever met. >>>> >>>> Do you dispute any of the above? >>>> >>>> >>>> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary >>>> program. >>>> >>> >>> >>> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes >>> of the thought experiment). >>> >>> >>> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful. >>> >> >> >> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we >> know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could >> convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness? >> >> >> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as >> intelligent as some stranger. But note that it would have to be >> interactive. So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not >> finitely describable. >> > > Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point? > > I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given > that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer. > > > This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly. > http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf His point is > that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary > and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs. > He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a > memory and doesn't overwrite it. Of course you can say that whatever the > environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is > potentially inifinite. > > Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I defined, where the program takes in inputs from the environment via the senses and feeds those inputs to the program. Jason > Brent > > > Jason > > >> >> Brent >> >> >> Jason >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> If you encountered a close friend who had to get a computer replacement >>>> for his brain (e.g. due to an inoperable tumor), and this friend displayed >>>> perfect mimicry of the behavior prior to the surgery, would you continue to >>>> tell him he his not conscious, despite his protestations that he is every >>>> bit as conscious as before? On what basis would this your claim rest? >>>> >>>> >>>> Some of my friends I'd tell him it was amazing how much smarter he was. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> Jason >>>> >>>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 1:33 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Re: "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all matter >>>>> is conscious" >>>>> >>>>> I do think the first (human brains at least, and perhaps some >>>>> non-human brains, from primates to down* the "food-chain"). >>>>> >>>>> Some think there was no fully or cognitively conscious (only a sensory >>>>> conscious) human before language. There may be something to that. >>>>> >>>>> But not the second (where there is self and self-awareness). *Rocks >>>>> are not conscious.* But the idea is that all matter does have some >>>>> level of *elementary protoconsciousness* in various types, phases, >>>>> and configurations of matter. When some matter is combined into certain >>>>> configurations (like a human brain), these *protopsychical parts* are >>>>> fused into something conscious. >>>>> >>>>> * Do Insects Have Consciousness and Ego? >>>>> *The brains of insects are similar to a structure in human brains, >>>>> which could show a rudimentary form of consciousness* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't think that societies are conscious, the Earth is conscious, >>>>> the universe is conscious. >>>>> >>>>> The Earth is aware of itself? I don't think so. >>>>> >>>>> @philipthrift >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 8:25:26 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> You keep trotting out the term "cybernetic delusion" as if it's a >>>>>> problem. But it's just an assumption I make, that consciousness is >>>>>> identified with cybernetic dynamics. I'm exploring the consequences of >>>>>> that >>>>>> idea, which are compelling IMO. >>>>>> >>>>>> You or anyone else can feel free to adopt or not adopt that >>>>>> assumption. But it's not a delusion. Calling it that suggests there's a >>>>>> more correct way to view consciousness. But you haven't been clear about >>>>>> what that is, vacillating between "only certain kinds of matter can be >>>>>> conscious" and "all matter is conscious". If you adopt panpsychism, you >>>>>> fall prey to the cybernetic delusion yourself. And when you don't, *you >>>>>> fail to explain what privileges certain kinds of matter over others*. >>>>>> It seems pretty clear to me that there's no principled way to do that... >>>>>> any explanation of why brains can be conscious but not computers starts >>>>>> to >>>>>> sound suspiciously like "spirit" and "soul", in the sense that you're >>>>>> invoking some property of matter that cannot be detected. >>>>>> >>>>>> Terren >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 4:57 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:30:00 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:15 PM 'Cosmin Visan' < >>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *> What happens in cases of telepathy is [...]. For example, in >>>>>>>>> cases of dream telepathy [...] This clearly is a case of dream >>>>>>>>> telepathy.* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> OK, there was little doubt before but you just made it official, Cosmin >>>>>>>> Visan is a crackpot. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> John K Clark >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Telepathy I doubt pretty bigly, but the cybernetic delusion is a >>>>>>> really crackpot idea. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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