On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> >>>>> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only >>>>> suspect it). >>>>> >>>>> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly >>>>> visible behaviors). >>>>> >>>>> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed >>>>> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a >>>>> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's >>>>> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic >>>>> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have >>>>> ever met. >>>>> >>>>> Do you dispute any of the above? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary >>>>> program. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes >>>> of the thought experiment). >>>> >>>> >>>> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful. >>>> >>> >>> >>> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we >>> know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could >>> convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness? >>> >>> >>> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as >>> intelligent as some stranger. But note that it would have to be >>> interactive. So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not >>> finitely describable. >>> >> >> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point? >> >> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given >> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer. >> >> >> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly. >> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf His point is >> that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary >> and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs. >> He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a >> memory and doesn't overwrite it. Of course you can say that whatever the >> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is >> potentially inifinite. >> >> > Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I defined, > where the program takes in inputs from the environment via the senses and > feeds those inputs to the program. > > > But those inputs modify the program (what you do depends on your memory). > I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea that you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't not be able to tell the difference? > I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a > finitely describable TM. > If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind. > And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person, > physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively > random at a low level. Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is > not TM emulable. > Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints of the apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is subjective, not objective). When it comes to replicating the behaviors of a close friend, these concern objective out-wardly visible objective behaviors, rather than the first person experience of your friend. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
