On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 11:07:35 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 6:29 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> You still need to explain why your elbow isn't conscious.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>  
>
> The elbow (the matter that is halfway down your arm between your shoulder 
> and hand) could have proto-consciousness (or a proto-experientiality, as 
> some say): 
>
>       https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#PanpVersPanp
>
> But the elbow will not have full consciousness (first-person) because* it 
> cannot do information processing* (at the level of the brain with all its 
> neural connectivity).
>
> *High-level (and higher-order) information processing is necessary, but 
> not sufficient for consciousness.*
>
> That is all of panpsychism in a nutshell.
>
>
> But then "panpyschism" does no work.  It's just a hypothetical property of 
> matter that says if some matter does information processing then that 
> matter is conscious, otherwise it's not.  But that's already what 
> materialists thought.
>
> Brent
>

This was prefaced by:

Information processing absent actual *first-class* entities of *qualia* (or 
experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information processing 
operating in a *material substrate* where those entities are available to 
be combined and manipulated.



There is information processing in an elbow, but that information 
processing is not at the level of information processing in the brain.

But information processing in the brain, while at the level it needs to be 
for consciousness, needs to be operating in that substrate where the 
experiential entities are available to be combined and manipulated.

@philipthift 

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