> On 25 Jun 2019, at 02:42, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 4:22 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >> The atoms in my brain HAVE been replaced and yet I know for a FACT I have > >> survived; I don't know for a fact that the same is true for you but I > >> think it's reasonable to assume it is. > > > No problem with “reasonable”. My point is that mechanism, nor my > > consciousness in two seconds, or the consciousness of another people, is > > not something provable, > > True but irrelevant if you're trying to decide what to do with your own life.
True, but irrelevant when studying fundamental question. > > >> So even if there is something analog going on inside an atom, if we're > >> talking about consciousness and survival it's irrelevant. > > > That assumes digital mechanism. > > No! The only thing assumed is that if you have observed X then you have > observed X. How would that tautology imply or justify Mechanism? > > The whole point of the defender of non mechanism, is that the continuum is > relevant. > > If the defender of non-mechanism is conscious then he must conclude that the > continuum inside one hydrogen atom is identical to the continuum inside > another hydrogen atom because he has remained conscious despite an > astronomical number of replacement atoms. But the non-mechanist invoke even an infinite here. Astronomical data will not impress him: he already believe to be an infinite being. You argue with him/her like he/she was already a Mechanist. > Meaning needs contrast so if everything has a continuum inside it then it > would be safe to simplify things and just forget about the continuum. That is reasonable, and echoes an argument by discernibility used by Turing. That’s good, but irrelevant in this discussion. The goal is not to defend mechanism and find good argument for its truth, but to understand that mechanism is an assumption. (Everyone believe (A & A) -> A, but without making some assumption, it can only be an assumption. > > > It is a way to keep our uniqueness > > > People may wish to be unique but the universe is not required to conform to > human aspirations . Right. Yet, people wanting to be unique will be motivated to abandon Mechanism, and will try non computationalist theory of mind. > > > You can justify the choice of an hypothesis with some observation, not > > prove it. I use the word “prove” or “justify” in a strong sense. > > To hell with hypothesis and to hell with proof, direct experience outranks > them all. But that cannot be invoked as an argument. It can be reported as an experience report, and compares with a theory. > And nothing is more direct than consciousness. Yes, we agree on this. But a theory has to be third person sharable. > And I have no obligation to justify myself, my actions will have the effect I > expect or they won't and your opinion of their validity will have no effect > on the outcome whatsoever > > >> Atoms in my brain have been replaced many many times and yet my > >> consciousness has continued. My only ASSUMPTION is that you are like me > >> and are also conscious. > > > Which is assumption enough. > > That assumption would only be needed if I wished to advise you on how you > should live your life, but I have no wish to do that because you know more > about your life than I do. I would say yes to the doctor and yes to being > frozen because I like consciousness and would like more of it. You know > better than me if you're conscious or not, if you're not then there would be > no reason to say yes to either. No problem. The debate was on the possible or not rational justification of mechanism, not about its truth or falsity. >> >>> Assuming that you substitution level is above the truncation of the >> >>> decimals used in the atom. But a non computationalist can assert that >> >>> his consciousness requires all decimals. >> >> >>Then the non computationalist must logically conclude that he is not >> >>conscious. > Why? > > I would have thought that was obvious. The non-computationalist knows the > atoms in his brain have been replaced many times, The non-computationalist might not care about its atoms, and believes that his soul has a bit of <whatever-you-want>. Or he could invoke the fact that the atoms are replaced in a continuous way, etc. That is a methodological problem for him/her. There are many options. > he believed the substitute atoms do not contain a sufficient number of digits > for consciousness ( that is exactly what makes a non-computationalist a > non-computationalist) then he would have to think that he does not think. He has also the option to think that after having a brain transplant he will be dead, and the copy is an impostor (not necessarily a zombie). Now, some non-computationalist have argued more simply that the brain transplant would not work at all, and that the copy would be a corpse. > > > > Keep in mind that by “non provable” I mean “need to be assumed” for proving > > Keep in mind “non provable” does not mean wrong, it just means it can not be > constructed from a set of axioms. And yes if something is not provable then > it's not science, but direct experience doesn't need it because it outranks > even science. No theories at all are provable. A theory is always the set of proposition that we assume. All theories are hypothetical. If science reject what is not provable, then science must reject elementary arithmetic, and all current theories which relies on those arithmetical hypothesis. We cannot prove the existence of the number 0. We know this since the failure of logicism. > > If I bang my hand down on a table so hard it breaks a bone I could , if I > wanted to be very pedantic, still doubt the existence of the table or even > the existence of my hand and the bone in it, but I could not doubt the direct > experience of the pain. No problem. > If you had a proof that I felt no pain I would know immediately that you > either made a logical error when you formed the proof or you started from a > bad set of axioms. Absolutely. But this is not relevant for the simple fact that Mechanism is possibly false, and thus has to be assumed if we use it. > > >> It's good enough for me to say yes to the doctor and it's good enough for > >> me to say yes to being frozen. > > > No problem. > > Then what are we arguing about? The fact that Mechanism in cognitive science has to be assumed. It is wrong to believe that it has to be true, or that science can justify it rationally. It belongs to the class of true but non provable truth, if true. Like self-consistency for any consistent machine. That is not useful in practice, but important when we work on the theory. > > > The point is just that a non computationalist can assert that his > > consciousness requires all decimals. > > Sure, anybody can assert anything they want regardless of how silly, but all > those assertions have precisely zero effect on reality. But some can be consistent, and that is what makes the point. If you could prove the inconsistency of all non-computationalist theories, then you would prove Mechanism, but that is impossible. > > > You can believe that he is wrong, but that is not a proof, > > So what? If he asserts "John Clark is not conscious " I know from the most > authoritative source there is, direct experience, that he's wrong. The fact > that I lack a proof to convince him that he is in error does not change the > fact that he has indeed made an error. The discussion is on provability. You keep distracting us from where we started. > > >>if your experience has been similar to mine, if your consciousness has also > >>continued despite your many brain transplant operations, and if you are a > >>true fan of logic, then you must conclude it's good enough for you too. > > > Yes, but typically, first person experience will not prove this to another. > > He might think I am another person, or a zombie, etc. > > What do you care what other people think? The world's greatest expert on the > consciousness of Bruno Marchal is Bruno Marchal, if anybody knows if that > fellow is conscious or not it is him. > > > We are not arguing truth or falsity of mechanism. Just its non rational > > justifiability, or provability. > > Then we're not arguing. Mechanism, as you've defined the word, is certainly > true and certainly can not be proven. So we agree. > Godel tells us there are a infinite number of statements of that sort. Yes, and Solovay provides a complete theory axiomatising the true but not provable proposition (G* minus G). > >> >>> Personal experience is not available when doing science, > >> >>True, and that is exactly why no consciousness theory ever devised is >> >>scientific, and none every will be. > > That does not follow. > > I am absolutely positively 100% certain that it does follow, and not only > that I'm probably correct too. The pint has never been on the truth of mechanism, but on its absence of entire rational justification. > > > We can make hypotheses/theories about consciousness, > > Truer words were never spoken! It's extraordinarily easy to crank out > consciousness theories by the bushel basket, but one is just as good as the > other and, unlike intelligence theories., none of them can be experimentally > tested. You might need to study my papers. I did exactly that. > > > and be led to indirect testing. Example: the mechanist theory of > > consciousness leads to many-histories indirectly testable below our > > substitution level, and that is confirmed by Everett formulation of quantum > > physics. > > Everett theory has nothing to do with consciousness. Yes he says a change > change in consciousness will cause a universe to split but so will a change > in ANYTHING. Everett says there is nothing special about consciousness, it > follows the same laws of physics as everything else and that's why I like it, > it has no need to explain how consciousness works. Everett use Mechanism, with basically the same definition of subjective (first person) than the simple definition I gave in the informal argument (Universal Dovetailer Argument). Of course he knows about nothing in computer science. He would have understood that its argument is lifted on the role of arithmetic. > Copenhagen says mind follows different laws of physics and has a unique > magical superpower that can in some unspecified way collapse the quantum wave > function, so unlike Everett to be complete Copenhagen does need to explain > how consciousness works,needless to say it has been unable to do so. OK. > > >> I'm not sure about the other guy either, he might be a zombie for all I > >> know, everybody except me might be, all I know for certain is I'm not. > > > That’s my point. It is in the same sense that Mechanism is not something > > provable. > > Yes it's not provable but that's not important if you have something even > better than proof, and you do, direct experience. So we agree. Now, it is important for the understanding of how the Gödel logic of self-reference is applied to derive the physical laws from arithmetic. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3odSuXn0wVfB34d5YVu_HbdWcisqAHydrma-9ofdvJig%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3odSuXn0wVfB34d5YVu_HbdWcisqAHydrma-9ofdvJig%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2E37FD81-2703-4422-B22D-D0415E31100D%40ulb.ac.be.
