> On 28 Jun 2019, at 15:36, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:24 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>
> >> There are 2 fundamental questions and we already know the answers to both.
> 1) Question: Is Mechanism as defined by you true?
> Answer: Yes.
>
> > ?
> Hmm… we cannot know that,
>
> Incorrect. We CAN know that, we know it through direct experience, we just
> can't derive it from existing axioms which means we need to add it as a new
> axiom.
We can only know that we are conscious right now, not that the metaphysical
principle involved in YD+CT is true? We already cannot be sure if CT is true.
You based your conviction on your knowledge (belief) in molecular biology, and
I agree that molecular biology can be used as evidence for the theory that
Nature has already bet on Mechanism.
Now with *digital* mechanism, we can reason and eventually derive some
consequence.
Just to be clear, all I say is that we cannot tell a patient that science
guaranties the survive.
It is easy, by using Davis' Turing Machine with Oracle to build a
counter-exempla. I might illustrate this some day.
>
> > but it is almost trivial.
>
> It isn't almost "trivial" it IS trivial, if I experience consciousness then I
> have experienced consciousness; however for some odd reason the ultimate
> simplicity of a tautology seems to confuse some people when something more
> complex would not.
The non trivial “non triviality” comes from the fact that it is not entirely
easy to prove that no consistent machine can ever prove its consistency,
despite it does live in a model which satisfies its belief, and so might “look
obvious”.
That is where the confusion between []p (beweisbar(‘p’)) and ([]p & p) can be
made, and the machine, relatively to the universal number emulating it, cannot
avoid it at first.
>
> > It is really like self-consistency: for all self-consistent machine it is
> > true,
>
> That is of course true
OK. And then it is true, but never provable by any self-consistent
(Turing-universal) machine.
And Gödel saw already that the machine itself, if she believe in enough
induction axioms, can see (prove) this. She knows that if she is consistent,
she cannot prove it. Similarly, the Löbian machine knows that if she survive
teleportation she cannot claim that such event proves computationalism to be
true (whatever she thought on this).
> and if I thought you really meant what you said and were prepared to follow
> the conclusions that follow from that regardless of where they went we could
> bring this conversation to a close. But I know you don't really mean it.
>
> > but none can prove it
>
> And none need to prove it to know it's true
When opening the box, you learn two things: 1) that mechanism is true (but keep
in mind the guy who got blind and still said he lost nothing), and 2) that the
substitution level was enough low to say “I have survived”, bt you cannot be
sure that you did not lose some memory or abilities, although repeating that
experience, on the long run, can help to deepen the confidence.
>
> > We can logically conceive that it is wrong,
>
> Only if you accept the conclusion that you yourself are not conscious.
Consciousness is a first person experience. To relate it to anything require a
“belief”, or a “guess”, or an “hypothesis” or “an axiom”.
I can conceive that I am not conscious right now, but I can conceive that
mechanism wrong, and that indeed, the copy is always unconscious, and when it
acts, it looks like a D-zombie (not a p-zombie! A d-zombie acts like in
Dargentinio horror movie!).
Being conscious, or alive, is of the type <>t (there is an accessible
reality/observer-moment). Saying yes to the doctor is of type
<><>t. It means that there is reality accessible, and from that one, another:
it means you stay alive or stay conscious.
Both <>t and <><>t are true for the sound Löbian machine or entity, and both
are not provable.
The existence of proposition which are true *about a machine* but non provable
*by* the machine is important.
I defined the theology of the machine M by the set of arithmetical truth
concerning M, and the proper theological part are given by the true (about M)
and non prouvable (by M)..
> And as there has never been a definition of consciousness that is worth a
> damn
What about something which is, for the entity concerned
true,
immediately knowable,
indubitable (even knowingly so when the cognitive ability are enough high)
Non definable without invoking truth
Non provable
(And, with Mechanism, we can add:
self-invariant for some digital information preserving transformation).
> and we only have examples and if now we don't even have examples then you are
> in no position to say anything about consciousness at all because not being
> conscious yourself you would quite literally not know what you're talking
> about.
With the definition above, RA is conscious, and PA is already self-conscious,
and indeed G and G*, which, with the simple definition of theology above, give
the logic of propositional theology, axiomatise the propositional theology.
>
> > And we cannot derive Mechanism
>
> And there would be no point in doing so even if we could when we have
> something much better, direct experience,
Only after the first experience. You cannot use molecular biology to prove
mechanism, only to use this as an evidence.
It is just a matter of not putting proposition from the surrational corona G* \
G in G. In the mathematical context, that could lead to beweisbar ('0 = 1’) in
the best case, and 0 = 1 in the worst.
I am neutral on the truth or falsity of mechanism. My point is only that it
give a neoplatonic theology testable experimentally (as the platonic theology
contains physics as a deducible subbranch).
>
> >> 2) Question: Can there ever be a proof of Mechanism?
> Answer: No.
>
> > ?
>
> Which word of the answer didn't you understand?
>
> > Again that depends. “Provable” is always relative to some theory
>
> No, it's dependent on the axioms that are available.
>>> >>>>The only thing assumed is that if you have observed X then you have
>>> >>>>observed X.
>> >>> How would that tautology imply or justify Mechanism?
>>
>> >>Bruno, stop playing dumb.
> >You are the one assuming a tautology.
>
> Tautologies are ALWAYS true and that is the only "assumption" needed to
> figure out that Mechanism as defined by you not me is true, not provable, but
> true.
Mechanism requires arithmetic. In this context, it is important to understand
that you cannot derive arithmetic from logic alone.
>
> > I agree we exêrmeint consciousness, and that we very plausibly share a
> > large part of the physical observable reality, but that does not make
> > Mechanism entirely rationally justifiable.
>
> It is entirely rational to believe in Mechanism
Nobody doubt that. The point is to make it precise enough to derive testable
consequence. It provides a non Aristotelian view of reality, arguably more
rational as it explains where the illusion of the physical reality comes from.
> because I have an absolutely superb reason for doing so, direct experience.
You cannot experience a philosophical assumption in rigorous metaphysics, and
if you could do that, I would think that you re certainly not a machine!
> And who needs this "justification" thing you keep talking about?
We study what sound machine can prove and not prove about themselves, and with
Mechanism, that apply to us as far as we are self-referentially correct. Nobody
needs justification, but we study “justification”, made by machines, in
relation with the truth about those machine; Using the mathematical definition
of truth by Tarski, and the mathematical definition of justification by Gödel.
My point is neutral with respect to any philosophical belief. The thought
experience are the version for kids of the work, which use a result by Solovay
making easy to get quickly a precise mathematics for each notion of self
encountered by the machine looking inward.
So my point is just that Mechanism, like self-consistency is in G* minus G. I
am interviewing some Löbian universal machine on all this. “My theory” is not
my theory, it is the theory of the universal machine. I am not the mathematical
genius here, all this is made possible, and relatively easy, by the work of
Gödel, Löb and Solovay, but also Turing, Church, Kleene Boolos, Goldblatt.
I have to go,
Bruno
> Certainly not me! I don't need a proof to know I'm conscious, and if you are
> not a zombie you don't need one either. And if you are a zombie you STILL
> don't need a proof that you're conscious because such a proof would be
> incorrect.
>
> >> so by your own definition of the word Mechanism is certainly true even if
> >> we can't produce it from the set of axioms that we happen to be currently
> >> using.
>
> >So we agree.
>
> On Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays you agree with me. On Tuesday Thursday and
> Saturday you disagree with me. And on Sunday you're a bit confused.
>
> >> An astronomically large number times an infinite number is infinite, and
> >> the non-mechanist believes atoms contain some sort of mystical analog
> >> process involving infinite digits; and yet the non-mechanist also knows
> >> for a fact that all that swapping in and out those infinite strings of
> >> digits has had precisely ZERO effect on his consciousness.
>
> > That is what we can tested.
>
> Like everything else It hasn't been tested an infinite number of times but it
> has been tested a astronomical number of times, and it has passed every test
> with flying colors.
>
> >> How on earth is that irrelevant? If a complicated thing has no effect on
> >> the phenomena you're researching then forget about it and spend your time
> >> working on things that might have an effect on it.
>
> > It has no relevance because you make the digital truncation. But a non
> > mechanist might tell you that whatever truncation you do, even at a very
> > fine grained level, you become a zombie if a decimal is not correct. He
> > will argue that consciousness needs all the decimals. if a decimal is not
> > correct. He will argue that consciousness needs all the decimals.
>
> If atoms have some mysterious analog process going on inside of them
> involving the continuum then either all hydrogen atoms have the exact same
> infinite sequence of digits inside of then or they don't. If they're
> identical then when 2 atoms exchange their position in the brain one infinite
> sequence has been replaced by a identical infinite series so we can just
> forget about it. If the zombie theory is correct and every digit of the
> infinite needs to be perfect, and if the atoms are not perfectly identical
> then you're a zombie and always have been. If you're not a zombie then a
> infinite sequence of digits is not required for consciousness.
> So here is an important question that only you can answer, are you a zombie?
>
> >> I can see no reason why the truth of Mechanism should not be added as a
> >> axiom and if you know of such a reason you have yet to state it.
>
> > You can added as a sort of meta-axiom once you decide to practice it.
>
> I don't know what you mean by "meta-axiom", I say just treat it like all the
> other axioms.
>
> > It is just that the digital doctor cannot claim that it has been
> > scientifically proved
>
> No axium can be proven, if it could be there would be no point in making it
> an axiom.
>
> > It is needed to understand that Mechanism is refutable.
>
> And the price that must be paid for doing so is to conclude that direct
> experience is wrong and you are not conscious. Are you willing to pay that
> price?
>> >>> No theories at all are provable. A theory is always the set of
>> >>> proposition that we assume. All theories are hypothetical.
>>
>> >> That's nice, but Mechanism is not a theory it is a observation of a
>> >> direct experience.
> > Hmm, I don’t think so. It is a theory inferred from the current knowledge
> > of molecular biology, and quantum mechanics,
>
> People knew from direct experience that they were conscious long long before
> they knew anything about molecular biology or quantum mechanics, and they
> also knew that matter, such as wine or a arrowhead, could effect that
> consciousness.
>
> >>I don't need a proof and I don't need a theory and I don't even need
> >>science if I have direct experience, and in this case I do.
>
> > You don’t need a proof. That’s OK. What remain is called faith,
>
> No, faith is believing in the virgin birth even though direct experience does
> not reveal it. The religious knows correctly that faith exists because he
> directly experienced faith, in this case about virgin birth, but he did not
> directly experience the virgin birth itself, but he believes it anyway. It
> gets worse, he does not have a proof of it but believes it anyway. He doesn't
> even have a plausible argument or one bit of evidence in favor of it but he
> believes it anyway with every fibre of his being. And that's why faith is a
> vice not a virtue.
>
>> >> If you had a proof that I felt no pain I would know immediately that you
>> >> either made a logical error when you formed the proof or you started from
>> >> a bad set of axioms.
>>
>> > Absolutely. But this is not relevant for the simple fact that Mechanism is
>> > possibly false,
>
> If Mechanism is false then I am no longer conscious.
> I am still conscious.
> Therefore Mechanism is not false.
>
> >> It's very relevant because both pain and consciousness are direct
> >> experiences.There is no proof of Mechanism and there never will be but
> >> there is no way it could be false, I know this from direct experience and
> >> if you're conscious you know it too.
>
> > How could I know that?
>
> How do I know I'm conscious, are you really asking that, have we really sunk
> to that point?
>
> > I know only my consciousness here and now. I don’t know I will stay alive
> > in the next seconds.
>
> What the hell does that have to do with it?
>
> > I am the one that insist that mechanism is not provable,
>
> I have insisted it is not provable just as much as you have, although the
> existence or nonexistence of such a proof is something of no importance
> whatsoever.
>
> > Once you get the step 3 [...]
>
> You're never going to fix it so that's never going to happen.
>
> John K Clark
>
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