On Sun, Jun 30, 2019 at 1:25 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> We CAN know that, we know it through direct experience, we just can't >> derive it from existing axioms which means we need to add it as a new axiom. > > > > > *We can only know that we are conscious right now, * > Obviously, nobody knows what the future will bring. And since we most certainly do know from direct experience that we are conscious right now there is no reason not to add it as an axiom. *> Just to be clear, all I say is that we cannot tell a patient that > science guaranties the survive.* > Science can guarantee that the new brain transplant operation you're about to have today will be no different from the brain transplant operation you've already had that turned the man you were a year ago into the man you are today. Science can guarantee if you've survived the one then you'll survive the other. >> It isn't almost "*trivial*" it *IS* trivial, if I experience >> consciousness then I have experienced consciousness; however for some odd >> reason the ultimate simplicity of a tautology seems to confuse some people >> when something more complex would not. > > > *The non trivial “non triviality” comes from the fact that it is not > entirely easy to prove that* [...] I don't understand why on earth you keep talking about proof when we have direct experience. You don't know for a fact that I'm conscious but do YOU really need a proof to know that YOU are conscious? If I had a error free proof that you were not conscious would that really enough for you to override direct experience and become convince that you were a zombie?? > >>> *It is really like self-consistency: for all self-consistent machine >>> it is true, * >> >> >> >>That is of course true > > > *> OK. And then it is true, but never provable * > And from that we can conclude that proof and truth are not the same thing and the wisdom of saying yes or no to the doctor or yes or no to being frozen has nothing to do with proof, it has to do with truth. * > Similarly, the Löbian machine knows that if she survive teleportation > she cannot claim that such event proves computationalism to be true * I don't know about Löbian machines because nobody on Earth except you knows what that is, but yes you're right, she can't claim computationalism is true, she can't claim she survived the teleportation, she can't even claim she survived BEFORE the teleportation. She can't claim those things because she can't prove them. Nevertheless she knows the truth, she knows for certain if she survived or not and she knows for certain if computationalism is true or not. > *the substitution level was enough low to say “I have survived”, bt you > cannot be sure that you did not lose some memory or abilities, * > And the exact same thing is true every time you wake up in the morning. You have yet to give me a good reason, or even a mediocre reason, for saying No to the doctor or No to being frozen. *> Consciousness is a first person experience. To relate it to anything > require a “belief”, or a “guess”, or an “hypothesis” or “an axiom”.* > Being an axiom is a very exalted position but can you think of ANYTHING more worthy of becoming an axiom than "Bruno Marchal is conscious"? I'll bet you can't think of anything more obvious than that, although I can. > *I can conceive that I am not conscious right now,* > Bruno, what you say above is like saying in a loud clear voice "I AM UNABLE TO SPEAK" because if you can "conceive" of *ANYTHING* then you are conscious. > > *but I can conceive that mechanism wrong, and that indeed, the copy is > always unconscious,* > Then you are always unconscious because YOU ARE A COPY of the man you were last year, the atoms that made up that fellow have been replaced. > > I defined the theology [...] > I'm not interested in theology. I'm more interested in the mythology of Harry Potter than the mythology of God; it's more fun, it's more profound, and it has killed far fewer people. >> there has never been a definition of consciousness that is worth a damn > > > *> What about something which is, for the entity concerned* > *true,* > *immediately knowable,* > *indubitable (even knowingly so when the cognitive ability are enough > high)* > *Non definable without invoking truth* [...] > So the definition of consciousness is stuff that doesn't have a definition? As I said there has never been a definition of consciousness that is worth a damn. But that's OK, examples are better than definitions. > *>>> we cannot derive Mechanism* >> >> >>And there would be no point in doing so even if we could when we have >> something much better, direct experience, > > > Only after the first experience. > No idea what you mean by that. > > *You cannot use molecular biology to prove mechanism,* > To hell with molecular biology and to hell with proof, I don't need either to know mechanism is true. > *I am neutral on the truth or falsity of mechanism.* > Then you're neutral about you being conscious right now, and I don't believe that for one nanosecond. > * > My point is only that it give a neoplatonic theology* [...] > Plato was a bore. -Friedrich Nietzsche Nietzsche was stupid and abnormal. -Leo Tolstoy Tolstoy's book are loose baggy monsters. -Henry James Henry James writes fiction as if it were a painful duty. -Oscar Wilde *> as the platonic theology contains* [...] > There is nothing so absurd but some philosopher has said it. - Cicero > >>Tautologies are ALWAYS true and that is the only "assumption" needed to >> figure out that Mechanism as defined by you not me is true, not provable, >> but true. > > > Mechanism requires arithmetic. > Mechanism requires arithmetic in the same way a brick requires the English word "brick". >> It is entirely rational to believe in Mechanism > > *> Nobody doubt that. The point is to make it precise enough to derive > testable consequence.* > There is no point in testing mechanism because direct experience even out ranks the scientific method. > *It provides a non Aristotelian view of reality,* > Non Aristotelian? How odd to divide things up between stuff Aristotle knew and stuff he didn't, one pile is infinitely larger than the other. >>because I have an absolutely superb reason for doing so, direct >> experience. > > *> You cannot experience a philosophical assumption* > Absolutely positively 100% correct. I can therefore logically conclude that direct experience is NOT a philosophical assumption. > *in rigorous metaphysics* [...] > There is a word for rigorous metaphysics, it's called "physics", you should try it someday. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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