On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 3:31 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

> *>>> No problem with “reasonable”. My point is that mechanism, nor my
>>> consciousness in two seconds, or the consciousness of another people, is
>>> not something provable,*
>>
>> >> True but irrelevant if you're trying to decide what to do with your
>> own life.
>
>

> *True, but irrelevant when studying fundamental question.*
>

There are 2 fundamental questions and we already know the answers to both.

1) Question: Is Mechanism as defined by you true?
   Answer: Yes.

2) Question: Can there ever be a proof of Mechanism?
   Answer: No.

After that I don't know what more you can say about it.

> *>>> That assumes digital mechanism. *
>>
>>
>> >>No! The only thing assumed is that if you have observed X then you
>> have observed X.
>
> *> How would that tautology imply or justify  Mechanism?*
>

Bruno, stop playing dumb. We have both directly experienced consciousness
despite the atoms in our brains being replaced many many times, so by your
own definition of the word Mechanism is certainly true even if we can't
produce it from the set of axioms that we happen to be currently using.

>
> >> If the defender of non-mechanism is conscious then he must conclude
>> that the continuum inside one hydrogen atom is identical to the
>> continuum inside another hydrogen atom because he has remained conscious
>> despite an astronomical number of replacement atoms.
>
>
> *> But the non-mechanist invoke even an infinite here. Astronomical data
> will not impress him:*
>

An astronomically large number times an infinite number is infinite, and
 the non-mechanist believes atoms contain some sort of mystical analog
process involving infinite digits; and yet the non-mechanist also knows for
a fact that all that swapping in and out those infinite strings of digits
has had precisely ZERO effect on his consciousness. So a student of
consciousness has precisely ZERO reason to be interested in the continuum
and those infinite digits even if they exist.

>> Meaning needs contrast so if everything has a continuum inside it then
>> it would be safe to simplify things and just forget about the continuum.
>
>
> *> That is reasonable, and echoes an argument by discernibility used by
> Turing. That’s good, but irrelevant in this discussion.*
>

How on earth is that irrelevant? If a complicated thing has no effect on
the phenomena you're researching then forget about it and spend your time
working on things that might have an effect on it.


> > *The goal is not to defend mechanism and find good argument for its
> truth, *
>

Let's recap what we know or strongly suspect is true about Mechanism as you
have defined it:

1) I know for certain it's true.

2) If you're conscious then you also know for certain it's true.

3) We both know for certain a proof of Mechanism can not be derived from
the axioms currently used.

4) Although falling short of a proof very good arguments in favor of
Mechanism can be made.

5) I can see no reason why the truth of Mechanism should not be added as a
axiom and if you know of such a reason you have yet to state it.

>> People may wish to be unique but the universe is not required to conform
>> to human aspirations .
>
>
> *> Right. Yet, people wanting to be unique will be motivated to abandon
> Mechanism, and will try non computationalist theory of mind. *
>

I agree, people abandon logic and engage in magical thinking and believe if
they want something to be true strongly enough then it is true.

>> To hell with hypothesis and to hell with proof, direct experience
>> outranks them all.
>
>
> *>But that cannot be invoked as an argument. *
>

So what? We both know for a fact that Mechanism as you have defined it is
true, so what use could either of us have for an argument or a proof? Even
if I had a proof (which I never could have) it would not make me one bit
more certain of the truth of Mechanism than I already am.

>
>> And nothing is more direct than consciousness.
>
>
> *> Yes, we agree on this. But a theory has to be third person sharable.*
>

I have no need for a proof or a argument in favour of the truth of
Mechanism and can see no reason why a third party would need such a thing
either.


> *> The debate was on the possible or not rational justification of
> mechanism, *not about its truth or falsity
>

When we both already know it's true I don't understand why a rational third
party would want to hear my justification of Mechanism, I certainly don't
want to hear his.


> >> The non-computationalist knows the atoms in his brain have been
>> replaced many times,
>
>
> *> The non-computationalist might not care about its atoms, and believes
> that his soul has a bit of <whatever-you-want>.*
>

If the non-computationalist is such a fool that he doesn't know that a
change in the arrangement of atoms in his brain changes his consciousness
and a change in his consciousness changes the arrangement of atoms in his
brain then no rational argument will convince him of anything and I'm
wasting my time talking to him.


> *> Or he could invoke the fact that the atoms are replaced in a continuous
> way, etc. *
>

Then, because his consciousness remains unaffected, the continuous stream
of continuum rich matter flowing out of the brain must be identical with
the continuous stream of continuum rich matter flowing into the brain, and
so we can simplify things and cancel out the continuum. Even if the
continuum exists, and I have my doubts, it plays no part in consciousness.

>> he believed the substitute atoms do not contain a sufficient number of
>> digits for consciousness ( that is exactly what makes a
>>  non-computationalist a  non-computationalist) then he would have to think
>> that he does not think.
>
>
> > He has also the option to think that after having a brain transplant he
> will be dead,
>

Every non-computationalist in the world has already undergone many brain
transplants. So every non-computationalist in the world thinks he is dead.
So every non-computationalist in the world is insane.

> *and the copy is an impostor*
>

That's a little better, now every non-computationalist in the world just
thinks he's a fraud.

*> No theories at all are provable. A theory is always the set of
> proposition that we assume. All theories are hypothetical.*
>

That's nice, but Mechanism is not a theory it is a observation of a direct
experience.

> *If science reject what is not provable** then* [...]
>

I don't need a proof and I don't need a theory and I don't even need
science if I have direct experience, and in this case I do.

>> If you had a proof that I felt no pain I would know immediately that you
>> either made a logical error when you formed the proof or you started from a
>> bad set of axioms.
>
>
> *> Absolutely. But this is not relevant for the simple fact that Mechanism
> is possibly false,*
>

It's very relevant because both pain and consciousness are direct
experiences.There is no proof of Mechanism and there never will be but
there is no way it could be false, I know this from direct experience and
if you're conscious you know it too.

> *and thus has to be assumed if we use it.*
>

If I live on a desert island and am going to use it for my own purposes I
don't need to assume anything if I want to use mechanism because my
certainty of it's truth was obtained from direct experience, and that is
vastly stronger than if I just had a proof it is true. Proofs are wimpy
compared with direct experience.


> *> It belongs to the class of true but non provable truth,*
>

Yes! An axiom is suposed to be a self evidently true statement that can not
be derived, and that perfectly describes mechanism; so let's just add it to
the list of existing axioms.


> *> If you could prove the inconsistency of all non-computationalist
> theories, then you would prove Mechanism,*
>

I don't know why you keep talking about proof as if it's the
ultimate roadway to truth. If you had an error free proof that X=Y that
proof would not convince me that X is indeed equal to Y if I knew from
direct experience that those 2 things were not in fact equal. Such a proof
would however tell me one thing, you must be using a bad set of axioms
because a proof is only as good as the axioms it's built on.

>
>> If he asserts "John Clark is not conscious" I know from the most
>> authoritative source there is, direct experience, that he's wrong. The fact
>> that I lack a proof to convince him that he is in error does not change the
>> fact that he has indeed made an error.
>
>
>
> *> The discussion is on provability. You keep distracting us from where we
> started.*
>

Distracting from what? You have, at various times, agreed with me that
Mechanism is true and Mechanism has no proof and never will, so I don't see
what more there is to discuss about it.

*> We are not arguing truth or falsity of mechanism. Just its non rational
>>> justifiability, or provability.*
>>
>>

>>Then we're not arguing. Mechanism, as you've defined the word, is
>> certainly true and certainly can not be proven.
>
>
> > *So we agree.*
>

I guess so. Sort of.


> *> The pint has never been on the truth of mechanism, but on its absence
> of entire rational justification.*
>

I have a very rational reason for believing mechanism is true, it's just
that there is no way my reason can be communicated; fortunately that's not
a big problem because you have your own reason for believing mechanism is
true so you don't really need my communication .

>> Yes it's not provable but that's not important if you have something
>> even better than proof, and you do, direct experience.
>
>

> So we agree.
>

 I guess so. Sort of.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0tjDjMH4z%2BtgKPYGHbPah2fdE%2B--nnvj2rkp4iQdsNSA%40mail.gmail.com.

Reply via email to