On 6/24/2019 11:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le mar. 25 juin 2019 à 08:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 6/24/2019 9:58 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le lun. 24 juin 2019 à 22:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 6/24/2019 1:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le lun. 24 juin 2019 à 22:00, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 6/24/2019 12:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le lun. 24 juin 2019 à 20:52, 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 6/24/2019 11:08 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le lun. 24 juin 2019 à 19:30, 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 6/24/2019 2:29 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le lun. 24 juin 2019 à 11:18, Bruno Marchal
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:55, 'Brent Meeker'
via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
On 6/23/2019 5:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jun 2019, at 21:49, 'Brent
Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
On 6/21/2019 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jun 2019, at 09:04, Bruce
Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM
'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
To disconfirm MWI you'd have to
observe statistics far from the
expected value,
To make my point more strongly, that
is the wrong way round. Observation
of statistics far from the expected
value is what would be required to
confirm MWI.
I don’t see this at all.
The fact that we don't observe such
results is the strongest possible
case against MWI!
?
The probability to see a deviation is
the same in both Everett, and
Copenhagen. The deviation expected is
the same, so if there is a deviation,
it can hardly be used to claim one
theory is more correct than the other.
But as Bruce points out Tegmark's
machine gun experiment is effectively
being carried out by each of us.
That is quantum immortality. On this
list I have defend this, but Tegmark
rejected it, and claimed that the
survival to quantum suicide does not
entail quantum immortality. He might
have changed his mind since, perhaps.
So if each of us lives on a million
years in some branch of the MW, then
each of us will experience 99.9% of
our life as a very old person among
people younger than 100yrs.
Unless there are intimidate realities
in between Earth and Heaven.
It would still imply that each person
would experience only a small part of
their existence surrounded by other
persons whose age differed by less that
120yr from their own. And so each of us
should be surprised that we find ourself
in exactly that kind of world.
Using some anthropoid argument, but like
fine tuning, I tend to agree with Vic
that is is not really convincing, and
should be handled mathematically. Only
progress in the mathematical theology
will show if this threat Mechanism or not.
Bruno
The thing is we should first be born before
being 1000000 years... so it seems not
surprising finding yourself "young", that you
are with other "young" people.
That's seems to implicitly assume that
everybody starts at the same time, so they are
young together and then old together (in the
branches they survive). I see no
justification for conditioning on being young,
since the point of the argument is that given
quantum immortality the time you are young is
of measure zero.
Brent
You have to be young first, your actual moment is
not randomly sampled from all possible you
moments, it is ordered. As very old is very
unlikely, when in your first years, you should not
find yourself around very old people.
What is "ordered"? A sample is just a sample, it
has no order. If quantum immortality is true, then
you must exist at all ages. And a sample from that
distribution is unlikely to find you young. Sure,
if you condition on being young, then you will see
young people around you...because whether you are
young or not you will see young people around you.
The problem is that YOU are most likely to be old.
The thing is you had to be young first. You're talking
with ASSA in mind. ASSA is nonsense.
So if I go on a thousand mile journey I'm most likely to
find myself within a mile of my starting point. I think
THAT's nonsense.
You're not talking about mwi but a theory where moments
exist by themselves and are selected randomly... That's
nonsense.
Can you explain why it's nonsense. Can you explain why I
must find myself on the first mile of my journey?
I don't know for you but when I make a thousand mile journey, i'm
living every miles of it, not a random last portion of it, and it
starts with the first mile.
But why does that change the probability of me being on mile 50 or
mile 900? You seem to be claiming that because they are ordered I
can never be on the last part...
Not that's your point, you are claiming I should find myself in the
last part... but any precise part has measure 0... and life *is not* a
sequence picked up at random... not mine and if your theory is that it
is, then it fails. I always find myself in the present and nowhere
else, and this present follow a previous moment logically connected, I
don't fall into existence in the last part of my life, so there is
absolutely *no wonder* as to why I experience being young, it's
mandatory before being old.
Then there's no wonder as to why I experience being old, it's mandatory
after being young.
Brent
Quentin
which of course then means I couldn't be on the next to last part
either. In fact I apparently couldn't even be on any part,
because that would be later than some earlier part.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/39ca1c65-52dc-20a6-5c68-c824549b7966%40verizon.net.
