> On 21 Jul 2019, at 22:33, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/21/2019 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 20 Jul 2019, at 22:08, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/20/2019 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> On 20 Jul 2019, at 00:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected]> >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 7/19/2019 4:49 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>> I share their perplexity. The idea of immaterialism is natural (and >>>>>> arises thousands of years ago), because the only thing that we cannot >>>>>> doubt (as Descartes pointed out) -- our consciousness -- is immaterial. >>>>>> There is not scientific instrument that can detect consciousness. >>>>> That's not really true. Of course doctors assess patients as conscious, >>>>> unconscious, in coma, or brain dead every day. The myth that >>>>> consciousness is a mystery is part hubris >>>> Then mechanism cures that “hubris”. It could be hubris at Descartes’ time, >>>> where many thought that consciousness was a human thing, and animals have >>>> no souls. But today, many attribute consciousness to many animals, and >>>> mechanism makes the point that consciousness begins with Turing >>>> universality, and self-consciousness with Gödel-Löbianity. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> (we are too special to be understood) and part an exaggerated demand for >>>>> understanding. >>>> With mechanism, consciousness is simple, as it is explained by the >>>> distinction between all modes of the self that the machine can be aware >>>> of. >>> That's where I disagree. These two propositions cannot both be true: >>> >>> 1) Consciousness is what I directly experience without mediating inference. >>> >>> 2) Consciousness is the Loebian inference implicit in theories of >>> computation (as defined by Bruno). >> >> You must be careful as I did not say “1)” exactly, nor “2). >> >> 1) is that consciousness is immediately knowable, without the need of a >> reasoning to get the conclusion. It is typical of all experience. > How is that different than what I wrote?
Oh, sorry. You do agree with me. Of course, this is not 3p-immediate, the brain do some (3p) work to provide that 1p-immediacy. > >> >> And 2) that immediate inference comes from the logic of [o]p = []p & <>t & >> p, and is proved to be immediate by using the fact that [o]p does not entail >> [o][o]p. > > But that's not what you have said earlier. You said that 2) was an axiom of > consciousness. "Immediate inference" is a contradiction in terms Subjectively immediate. > and I disagree that proofs define consciousness. Me too. That’s why it is important to distinguish []p and []p & p. Proof is not enough, you need some semantic(fixed point), that is truth. > >> >> >> >>> >>>> The problem which remains is only in deriving the “stable persistent and >>>> sharable dreams” from the web of dreams in arithmetic (which cannot be >>>> avoided if you accept to link consciousness to the person related to the >>>> relevant computations). >>> >>> What "person"? Where did "person" come from? >> >> The person defined by all the modes of the self imposed by incompleteness. > > But that's a Bruno-definition. Not “definition”, but “theory”. Yes, we do a theory. It is very similar to the neoplatonic theory, and in this case, it is not my theory, but a theory no sound universal machine can miss. See, in “conscience & mechanism” the appendice on Artemov for a proof that []p&p is the only possible definition of rational (communicable) knowledge (a knowledge Kp such that Kp -> []p). > It might have a grain of truth in it...but there is a huge gap to be spanned > between that definition and the meaning of "person" in a simple sentence like > "Bruno is a person". Words have meanings and if you're going to introduce > technical definitions of common words then you are obliged to show that the > technical definition has the same extension. Which gap? > >> So the person can be 3p identified with []p, and its first person is >> determined by []p &p, and the other hypostases. The observable is given by >> []p & <>p with p sigma_1, etc. >> >> >> >>> >>>>> There's no scientific instrument that can detect the wave function of an >>>>> electron either. But with the electron we're happy to have an effective >>>>> theory that tells us when the detector will click or not. Mystery >>>>> mongering about consciousness makes us demand something more that mere >>>>> measurement and prediction, something that doesn't exist for any theory. >>>> Assuming a physical reality, >>> >>> It's not an "assumption" when it's supported empirically. >> >> Show me the paper. The only test that I know is the one I have given. I >> think I am the first to show that this is even testable. >> >> (Be careful Brent, I suspect you are taking the whole of physics as an >> empirical support of Primary Matter) but that is an assum^ption is >> metaphysics, not in physics. > > You are the only person I know who ever mentions "primary matter"...and I > know a lot of physicists. Physicists do not metaphysics. The idea to call primary matter simply matter is Aristotelian theology. Once you believe in primary matter, or take this for granted, there is no more need of the term “primary” or “irreducible”. So, it is normal you don’t see often that distinction made, since 1500 years. That explains why I say that in metaphysics/theology, we have to backtrack 1500 years, to come back to scientific metaphysics, are that distinction is important. >> >> >> >>> You have logicians attitude that everything must start from axioms...which >>> are assumptions. >> >> In difficult metaphysical subject, that is wiser, to avoid confusion of >> level, etc. Yes. I studied logic for that very reason. > > It is convenient, especially if you purport to give words special technical > meanings which then divorces then from the experience that engendered them. Like with space, time, atoms, in fundamental physics. That is normal and to be expected. > >> >> >> >>> >>>> but in that case mechanism becomes inconsistent, as I have shown. >>> >>> No. You have argued it. But your argument also implies that physics is >>> necessary. So if it shows physics is unreal, that's a contradiction. So >>> it's a reductio. A reductio indicates something is wrong with the >>> argument; but it doesn't tell you what. >>> >> >> Physics became necessary in the phenomenology, and necessarily Not in the >> ontology. So there is no contradiction. > > You equivocate on "ontology". It means whatever exists. I have defined it by what we have to assume at the start. It is the fundamental, basic, ontology. With mechanism it will be K, S, KK, KS, … (or 0, S0, SS0, SSS0, …). > But you want it to mean an axiomatic minimum. But you're whole construction > of the UD is phenomenology. Arithmetic is the phenomenology of PA by your > meaning. ? No, I assume numbers (or Turing-equivalent). And I have explained that we have to assume it (up to Turing equivalence). The phenomenology is what is derived, and get different self-representation. In p []p []p & p []p & <>t []p & <>t & p Only the first (p) defined the ontology. The seven others give the phenomenology. The person is defined by what she believes, know, observe and feel. If mechanism is correct, we must have quantum logics for ([]p & p) … when p is sigma_1 (the leaves of the universal dovetailing). I have shown that to be the case. > >> >> >> >> >>>> Consciousness is simple, because computer science somehow predicts it, >>>> easily from incompleteness + Theaetetus. >>> >>> You have assumed that you can define it to be something simple >> >> >> I assume YD + CT. >> >> >> >> >>> and then you argue that because this simple thing has one or two >>> similarities to the very complex thing we experience as consciousness it is >>> therefore the same thing. >> >> Absolutely not. I don’t do this even for the natural numbers, as we know >> that we cannot define them “univocally” at all. > > I didn't ask for a definition. I asked for an argument that your "discussion > with a perfect machine" has some relevance to my consciousness. That the question traced in the whole work, and ye, it seems it does, as it implies a quantum reality, and that is confirmed by our observation. But the whole thing is relevant,t for your consciousness right at the start, because mechanism is an hypothesis on your consciousness (its invariance for some substitution), and the consequence are that some theology is correct about you, and that concerns your life and perhaps some afterlife and “parallel life” too. > >> >> >> >>> Even though in addition to similarities it also has some glaring >>> differences, such as being timeless, such as knowing all logical >>> inferences, such as existing independent of a matter. >> >> To fuzzy. I can agree and disagree. I don’t see the relevance. > > What's fuzzy is the relevance of your theorizing to concrete experience. What is missing? That is a fuzzy remark that you could do even on E = mc^2, at a time. Or on string theory. On the contrary, this explain why we are conscious, why we are confronted with a security/liberty issue, why we are confronted with an apparent reality, why it hurts, why qualia seems richer than quanta, why they are apparent many-histories when we look close, etc. All this in a theory which assume only “2+2=4 & Co.”, using the consciousness invariance to link the theory and the concrete experience. Compare with physicalism, which eventually, when done rigorously enough, needs to eliminate or dismiss consciousness entirely. > >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> It is matter the real hard problem in the mind-body problem, but we are >>>> not aware of this, a bit like fishes are not well placed to talk on water. >>> >>> You have made it the hard problem of your theory by simplifying away all >>> the observable complexities of consciousness >> >> I work in a theory, but after Gödel and Traski understanding of the >> essential undecidability of any theory in which there are universal machine, >> you cannot say that it is a simplification a priori. >> >> >> >>> and assuming it is mere Platonic arithmetic. >> >> That is not assume. What is proved is that assuming more than arithmeti >> leads to inconsistency. > > ZFC is more than arithmetic. Sure, but ZFC itself is an arithmetical being, indeed a Löbian machine. But ZFC does not necessity believe in an ontological set theory, and indeed, that is what would lead to a contradiction (actually to an inflation of predictions). > Are you claiming it is inconsistent. ZFC is very plausibly consistent as a theory in mathematics, but inconsistent as an ontology in the mechanist psycho-theo-logy. > Your proof the UD instantiates consciousness, is the same as Borges library > instantiates your life story. Not at all. My proof is trivial from Mechanism. And Borges library contains only texts. It does not run anything, unlike the Model of arithmetic. You confuse the fact that “1+1=2” is contained in some book, and the fact that some reality satisfy the truth such sequence of symbols represent. You confuse a theory and a model of the theory, but that is often the case with physicalists, as in physics the term “model” is often used in the sense of informal (with meaning) theory. Mathematical logic provides the means to avoid such confusion, and that distinction is the very base of all the work done in mathematical logic. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ae59181-0197-8be6-a320-418771e9d823%40verizon.net >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ae59181-0197-8be6-a320-418771e9d823%40verizon.net>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7e563a3c-4112-750b-f5a0-20e07b334cc0%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7e563a3c-4112-750b-f5a0-20e07b334cc0%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FBAA2D8B-DBB8-4D2F-95D2-AC3BBD628E7A%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FBAA2D8B-DBB8-4D2F-95D2-AC3BBD628E7A%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4f010b8e-2a51-ef00-1519-36807dd32def%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4f010b8e-2a51-ef00-1519-36807dd32def%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D23D9991-1B51-4D5A-9B10-69C3CC77DC5F%40ulb.ac.be.
