On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 9:09 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 22 Jul 2019, at 06:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> <snip> >> >> >> >>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by >>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need >>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of >>> substitution was correctly chosen. >>> >>> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >>> >> >> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's >> find out -- you go first. >> >> >> Let me rephrase the question: >> >> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? >> > > According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. > The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in > several different places. > > The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original > disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of > personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous > states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of > whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of > personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if > the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single > continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered > the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or > more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", > then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists > (dies). > > > That shows, as I explained in details in my long version, that Nozick’s > closer continuer is incompatible with digital Mechanism. > I agree. So since Nozick's theory is closer to the ordinary understanding of personal identity than something depending only on memories, That is a strong argument against digital mechanism. > But I ma not sure you get it right. From memory, it seems Nozick chose the > closest continuer. In step 4, he would choose the one on the branche > without the delay. > > Anyway, are you saying that you stop at step 4? Then you have to stop at > step 2, then step 1, and then you are just saying that you do not assume > mechanism, but then you are outside the scope of the reasoning. > Of course I do not 'assume' mechanism. I am criticizing it because it does not make any sense when more closely examined. So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your > simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to > whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. > > > Not at all. There is nothing that we can verify empirically at this stage, > except by assessing having personally survived, which typically cannot be > used here. > But the question of whether or not we personally survive is exactly the point that is in need of empirical testing or verification. You are begging the question. > Yet, what I say follows from the theoretical Digital Mechanist assumption, > very easily. > > So rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant > brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we > pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen. > > > Then you condemn all theories, including all theoretical physics. > Really, you do overstep the mark quite often in your pathetic attempts at sarcasm, Bruno. Physics is an empirical enterprise, subject at all stages to empirical test. It is not a matter of armchair philosophizing -- in the opinion of many people, that is where string theory has gone wrong in recent years; it has lost touch with the experimental realities. On the contrary, we have to take our assumptions seriously, to get some > consequences that we can test, in the usual 3p way. Mechanism itself is not > directly testable. > But the real trouble is that you have not been able to make any contact with testable physics. It is doubtful if there is even such a thing as specifically quantum logic. There is just ordinary logic applied to quantum mechanics. As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of assuming > this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are building in > make sense or not. > > > We can never known that in advance. But mechanism is one of the most > fertile assumption in the history of science, used by Darwin. Diderot > consider it to be the most rational theory, and if you shows it making > nonsense, it is up to you to show the contradiction. > It contradicts ordinary experience -- which is the basis of all scientific knowledge. > And that is an empirical matter. > > > Yes. But not from what you say, just from the fact that if mechanism is > true, then the logic of the observable must be given by the “probability” > and credibility one, and that has been tested positively up to now. > Your so-called "tests" are meaningless -- all seen through rose-coloured spectacles. > Does any of it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity > and other matters. > > > It does so, where physicalism needs a non computationalist theory of mind, > which they usually does not even handle yet. > You can't get physics. Allow the neurologists and neuropsychologists the same latitude! It may take some time, but the engineering solution to the problems of consciousness will be clear once we have a functional AI with human-like capabilities. > If you are OK with Digital Mechanism, you are the one who need to abandon > the metaphysical assumption of (weak) materialism. Or just say that you > don’t believe in Mechanism, or find an error in the reasoning (which you > didn’t). > I don't accept digital mechanism. And I (and others) have found many glaring deficiencies in your reasoning. The trouble is that you refuse to see them. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLT0RuTt_ygDLgcEmWy8QCVU%3DBa3V30cPsaapueNeK9Wtw%40mail.gmail.com.
