On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 21:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 9:37 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 14:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> <snip> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by >>>>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need >>>>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of >>>>> substitution was correctly chosen. >>>>> >>>>> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's >>>> find out -- you go first. >>>> >>>> >>>> Let me rephrase the question: >>>> >>>> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? >>>> >>> >>> According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is >>> cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or >>> in several different places. >>> >>> The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original >>> disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of >>> personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous >>> states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of >>> whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of >>> personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if >>> the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single >>> continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered >>> the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or >>> more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", >>> then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists >>> (dies). >>> >>> So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your >>> simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to >>> whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair >>> philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed >>> possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on >>> what will or will not happen. >>> >>> As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of >>> assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are >>> building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does any of >>> it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other >>> matters. >>> >> >> What evidence do you think “the relevant brain scans” could provide that >> might have any bearing on the question of personal identity? >> > > Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be > replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, questions > about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed out > several times. > The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWV3exQ2Sw14b%3D2JWB--Te9g17VWOn2RX27i0i8WK7jEQ%40mail.gmail.com.
