On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 6:35 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 21:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 9:37 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 14:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> <snip> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by >>>>>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will >>>>>> need >>>>>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of >>>>>> substitution was correctly chosen. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and >>>>> let's find out -- you go first. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Let me rephrase the question: >>>>> >>>>> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? >>>>> >>>> >>>> According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is >>>> cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or >>>> in several different places. >>>> >>>> The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original >>>> disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of >>>> personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous >>>> states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of >>>> whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of >>>> personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if >>>> the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single >>>> continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered >>>> the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or >>>> more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", >>>> then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists >>>> (dies). >>>> >>>> So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your >>>> simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to >>>> whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair >>>> philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed >>>> possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on >>>> what will or will not happen. >>>> >>>> As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of >>>> assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are >>>> building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does any of >>>> it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other >>>> matters. >>>> >>> >>> What evidence do you think “the relevant brain scans” could provide that >>> might have any bearing on the question of personal identity? >>> >> >> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, questions >> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed out >> several times. >> > > The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in > these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. > I am reminded of Kafka's novella, 'Metamorphosis': "When Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from troubled dreams, he found himself changed into a monstrous cockroach in his bed."...... Is the person just the brain, or is there more to it? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSZTcx1hP2DvxC2CPnHDfTFYFcFTQneKmiDOJ3qsCFo_w%40mail.gmail.com.
