On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 11:13, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 10:41 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 08:55, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 6:35 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 21:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 9:37 PM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 14:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> <snip> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is >>>>>>>>> by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that >>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>> need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of >>>>>>>>> substitution was correctly chosen. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and >>>>>>>> let's find out -- you go first. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Let me rephrase the question: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is >>>>>>> cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, >>>>>>> or >>>>>>> in several different places. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original >>>>>>> disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous >>>>>>> states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of >>>>>>> whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, >>>>>>> if >>>>>>> the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single >>>>>>> continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be >>>>>>> considered >>>>>>> the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are >>>>>>> two or >>>>>>> more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of >>>>>>> "closeness", >>>>>>> then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists >>>>>>> (dies). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than >>>>>>> your simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical >>>>>>> question as >>>>>>> to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than >>>>>>> armchair >>>>>>> philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed >>>>>>> possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate >>>>>>> absolutely on >>>>>>> what will or will not happen. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of >>>>>>> assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are >>>>>>> building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does >>>>>>> any of >>>>>>> it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other >>>>>>> matters. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> What evidence do you think “the relevant brain scans” could provide >>>>>> that might have any bearing on the question of personal identity? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >>>>> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, >>>>> questions >>>>> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed >>>>> out >>>>> several times. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in >>>> these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. >>>> >>> >>> I am reminded of Kafka's novella, 'Metamorphosis': "When Gregor Samsa >>> awoke one morning from troubled dreams, he found himself changed into a >>> monstrous cockroach in his bed."...... >>> >>> Is the person just the brain, or is there more to it? >>> >> >> If you radically changed your body, you would also change the inputs to >> your brain. So we can maintain the theory that the sense of self comes >> directly from the brain. >> > > You might wish to maintain this theory, but you, yourself, have directly > contradicted it by saying that our sense of self depends on the inputs to > the brain. The qualification "directly" adds nothing but obfuscation. > The inputs to the brain affect the brain state, and our experiences depend on the brain state. If a particular brain state could be implemented in the absence of inputs, the experience would be the same as if the inputs were there. Do you disagree with this? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypX3zD01-Wfa6MoNJe3-PrbCOAtGr-xbArFGNHkTxnyEcw%40mail.gmail.com.
