On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 07:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 7/22/2019 4:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 14:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> <snip> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by >>>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need >>>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of >>>> substitution was correctly chosen. >>>> >>>> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >>>> >>> >>> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's >>> find out -- you go first. >>> >>> >>> Let me rephrase the question: >>> >>> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? >>> >> >> According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. >> The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in >> several different places. >> >> The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original >> disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of >> personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous >> states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of >> whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of >> personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if >> the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single >> continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered >> the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or >> more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", >> then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists >> (dies). >> >> So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your >> simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to >> whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair >> philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed >> possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on >> what will or will not happen. >> >> As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of >> assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are >> building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does any of >> it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other >> matters. >> > > What evidence do you think “the relevant brain scans” could provide that > might have any bearing on the question of personal identity? > > > If the the brain scans showed the same correlations between patterns of > neuron activity and behavior (like speech or problem solving) that would be > evidence that it was the same person. > Yes, but that won’t solve philosophical problems such as, “if it looks like me and acts like me is it really me?” -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWPY%3DgwQZ%3D%2BneNsZgVFuv2juCcQ8i1AZD3ocrKTFKF7dA%40mail.gmail.com.
