I have a t-shirt with a cockroach on it. Captioned beneath: "I woke up like this."
I wear it when I do laundry or when I don't give a fuck. On Monday, July 22, 2019 at 5:55:47 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 6:35 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 21:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >>> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 9:37 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 14:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >>>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <[email protected] <javascript:>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> <snip> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by >>>>>>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will >>>>>>> need >>>>>>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of >>>>>>> substitution was correctly chosen. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and >>>>>> let's find out -- you go first. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me rephrase the question: >>>>>> >>>>>> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is >>>>> cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, >>>>> or >>>>> in several different places. >>>>> >>>>> The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original >>>>> disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of >>>>> personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous >>>>> states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of >>>>> whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of >>>>> personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if >>>>> the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single >>>>> continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered >>>>> the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two >>>>> or >>>>> more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", >>>>> then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists >>>>> (dies). >>>>> >>>>> So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your >>>>> simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to >>>>> whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair >>>>> philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed >>>>> possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely >>>>> on >>>>> what will or will not happen. >>>>> >>>>> As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of >>>>> assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are >>>>> building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does any >>>>> of >>>>> it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other >>>>> matters. >>>>> >>>> >>>> What evidence do you think “the relevant brain scans” could provide >>>> that might have any bearing on the question of personal identity? >>>> >>> >>> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >>> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, questions >>> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed out >>> several times. >>> >> >> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in >> these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. >> > > I am reminded of Kafka's novella, 'Metamorphosis': "When Gregor Samsa > awoke one morning from troubled dreams, he found himself changed into a > monstrous cockroach in his bed."...... > > Is the person just the brain, or is there more to it? > > Bruce > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/372ed6cb-c60a-4f18-9aac-e95cb868cfb9%40googlegroups.com.
