"The younger generation of physicists, the *Feynmans*, the Schwingers, etc., may be very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Boltzmann, Mach and so on. But they *are uncivilized savages, they lack in philosophical depth*."
-- Paul Feyerabend [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend ] (Feyerabend personally knew Feynman, might have been sort of friendly. They were together at at least one conference in Berkeley.) @philipthrift On Thursday, July 25, 2019 at 3:03:19 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: > Regarding the identity of particles: A hydrogen atom is a hydrogen atom is > a hydrogen atom. > > “So what is this mind of ours: what are these atoms with consciousness? > Last week’s potatoes! They now can remember what was going on in my mind a > year ago — a mind which has long ago been replaced. To note that the thing > I call my individuality is only a pattern or dance, that is what it means > when one discovers how long it takes for the atoms of my brain to be > replaced by other atoms. The atoms come into my brain, dance a dance, and > then go out — there are always new atoms, but always doing the same dance, > remembering what the dance was yesterday.” > –Richard Feynman (The Value of Science) > > http://www.strange-loops.com/blog/?p=23 > > > Jason > > > > On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 2:04 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> On Thursday, July 25, 2019 at 11:44:26 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote: >>> >>> >>> ... >>> Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of personal >>> identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in light of >>> paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. >>> >>> As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are >>> forced to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the >>> zero universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all observers >>> to a single person (like many worlds). >>> >>> Personal identity theories based on psychological or bodily continuity >>> can always be shown to break down, either by holding the body the same and >>> changing the psyche, or holding the psyche the same and changing the body. >>> >>> "Oneself: the logic of experience" by Arnold Zuboff is a good >>> introduction to the reasoning. Many thinkers, including Shrodinger, Dyson, >>> and Hoyle reached the same conclusion. >>> >>> Jason >>> >> >> One Self: >> >> All experience is equally here, now and mine and all conscious organisms >> are equally I. My argument for this crucial further development is >> presented in ‘One Self – The Logic of Experience’, Inquiry 33 (1991): pp. >> 39-68. >> >> https://philpapers.org/rec/ZUBMUA >> >> Thus would radically differ from the ("real") materialist theory of >> selfhood of Galen Strawson. >> >> (To talk of 100% duplicate persons, A here, B there, is lurking >> functionalism, I think Strawson would say. A and B are not made of the same >> particles.) >> >> @philipthrift >> >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e3dfa74f-7072-4e92-9877-e938f18bb051%40googlegroups.com.
