> On 29 Jul 2019, at 13:18, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 5:47:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 29 Jul 2019, at 03:03, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> On Sunday, July 28, 2019 at 5:22:39 PM UTC-5, [email protected] >> <http://aol.com/> wrote: >> I am suspecting that someone who works with Hilbert space, might see >> themselves as Hugh Everett friendly? Throw in Bryce DeWitt and John A. >> Wheeler too. >> >> >> I am fairly agnostic about quantum interpretations. They are auxiliary >> postulates or physical axioms that appear to have no falsifiable content. > > > Everett does not talk about interpretation, but about a new formulation, or > new theory. That new theory which is the old Copenhagen one, but with the > postulate collapse deleted. > > I agree, this are different theories, before suggesting different type of > interpretation (differing along the lines dividing monism (Everett) and > dualist (Copenhagen). > > Everett ides is the idea that a physicist obey to quantum mechanics too. > Eventually this lead to a “relative state interpretation” of the same kind of > the “relative computational state” in arithmetic. > > With mechanism, quantum mechanics is how the digital number reality looks > from inside,by machines which are supported by infinitely many computations > (which are relatively executed in virtue of pure number theoretical relations > (indeed the so called sigma_1). > > Everett eliminates the wave collapse postulate, but with mechanism, the wave > itself is eliminated, and must be recovered through the geometry and topology > associated with the material/observable modes of the universal machine (those > given by Theaetetus and variants applied to Gödel’s beweisbar (provability) > postulate. That gives already the quantum logics needed where they were > expected). Quantum mechanics becomes a “theorem” in the universal machine's > theory of consciousness and matter. > > Bruno > > MWI is a quantum interpretation because it makes an ontological statement on > the nature of the wave function.
I use “MWI” as a synonym as “no assumption of collapse”. Then the theory is neutral on the nature of the wave. It can still become purely epistemological, as it is necessarily the case if we assume digital mechanism. There are still “many-histories”, but this are expected to be the same as the computations, which exists in arithmetic. > Quantum mechanics by itself makes no inference on the existential nature of ψ. If Quantum Mechanics means the Copenhagen theory, then there is strong inference on the existential nature of Psi. There is a physical wave of some sort, and the human observation reduces it physically. It is a dualist theory, assuming that the ave describes some reality (testable by experiment) and that the observation acts on that reality, but is not part of that reality. > The MWI is ψ-ontological, Not necessarily, as mechanism illustrates. In that case there is nothing but the natural numbers in the ontology, and the wave is purely epistemological, it describes the map of the consistent extension of the observer/universal-machine (in arithmetic). > which means it requires the wave function to be ontic or real. By way of > contrast the Bohr interpretation is ψ-epistemic, which is to say the ψ is > just an epistemological entity used to compute experimental outcomes; it has > no reality. I guess you mean “no physical reality”, but with Mechanism, there is no physical reality at all, except a special sharable epistemological reality, that we can call “physical”, but is pure first person (plural) histories. Here, we mix two difficulties, which is that 1) with mechanism, all physical terms get a new interpretation in terms of natural numbers (and set of natural numbers), 2) that even in the materialist (and thus non mechanist) frame, there is no unanimity of how to interpret the wave and the measurement operations. With Mechanism, both Copenhagen and Everett admits purely epistemological interpretations. Bruno > > LC > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a874a2b6-2269-4a0e-b0bc-d2f418a2e4b6%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a874a2b6-2269-4a0e-b0bc-d2f418a2e4b6%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9D6F7DD7-F8F4-402E-A379-B9C1BEE94F84%40ulb.ac.be.
