> On 30 Jul 2019, at 01:29, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 8:00:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 29 Jul 2019, at 13:18, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]
>> <javascript:>> wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 5:47:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 29 Jul 2019, at 03:03, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] <>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sunday, July 28, 2019 at 5:22:39 PM UTC-5, [email protected]
>>> <http://aol.com/> wrote:
>>> I am suspecting that someone who works with Hilbert space, might see
>>> themselves as Hugh Everett friendly? Throw in Bryce DeWitt and John A.
>>> Wheeler too.
>>>
>>>
>>> I am fairly agnostic about quantum interpretations. They are auxiliary
>>> postulates or physical axioms that appear to have no falsifiable content.
>>
>>
>> Everett does not talk about interpretation, but about a new formulation, or
>> new theory. That new theory which is the old Copenhagen one, but with the
>> postulate collapse deleted.
>>
>> I agree, this are different theories, before suggesting different type of
>> interpretation (differing along the lines dividing monism (Everett) and
>> dualist (Copenhagen).
>>
>> Everett ides is the idea that a physicist obey to quantum mechanics too.
>> Eventually this lead to a “relative state interpretation” of the same kind
>> of the “relative computational state” in arithmetic.
>>
>> With mechanism, quantum mechanics is how the digital number reality looks
>> from inside,by machines which are supported by infinitely many computations
>> (which are relatively executed in virtue of pure number theoretical
>> relations (indeed the so called sigma_1).
>>
>> Everett eliminates the wave collapse postulate, but with mechanism, the wave
>> itself is eliminated, and must be recovered through the geometry and
>> topology associated with the material/observable modes of the universal
>> machine (those given by Theaetetus and variants applied to Gödel’s beweisbar
>> (provability) postulate. That gives already the quantum logics needed where
>> they were expected). Quantum mechanics becomes a “theorem” in the universal
>> machine's theory of consciousness and matter.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> MWI is a quantum interpretation because it makes an ontological statement on
>> the nature of the wave function.
>
> I use “MWI” as a synonym as “no assumption of collapse”. Then the theory is
> neutral on the nature of the wave. It can still become purely
> epistemological, as it is necessarily the case if we assume digital
> mechanism. There are still “many-histories”, but this are expected to be the
> same as the computations, which exists in arithmetic.
>
>
>
>
>> Quantum mechanics by itself makes no inference on the existential nature of
>> ψ.
>
> If Quantum Mechanics means the Copenhagen theory, then there is strong
> inference on the existential nature of Psi. There is a physical wave of some
> sort, and the human observation reduces it physically. It is a dualist
> theory, assuming that the ave describes some reality (testable by experiment)
> and that the observation acts on that reality, but is not part of that
> reality.
>
>
>
>
>> The MWI is ψ-ontological,
>
> Not necessarily, as mechanism illustrates. In that case there is nothing but
> the natural numbers in the ontology, and the wave is purely epistemological,
> it describes the map of the consistent extension of the
> observer/universal-machine (in arithmetic).
>
>
>
>> which means it requires the wave function to be ontic or real. By way of
>> contrast the Bohr interpretation is ψ-epistemic, which is to say the ψ is
>> just an epistemological entity used to compute experimental outcomes; it has
>> no reality.
>
> I guess you mean “no physical reality”, but with Mechanism, there is no
> physical reality at all, except a special sharable epistemological reality,
> that we can call “physical”, but is pure first person (plural) histories.
>
> Here, we mix two difficulties, which is that 1) with mechanism, all physical
> terms get a new interpretation in terms of natural numbers (and set of
> natural numbers), 2) that even in the materialist (and thus non mechanist)
> frame, there is no unanimity of how to interpret the wave and the measurement
> operations.
>
> With Mechanism, both Copenhagen and Everett admits purely epistemological
> interpretations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> The MWI is a specific interpretation,
I see you take it that way. But that is not the original idea of Everett, who
propose just a new formulation of quantum mechanics: the wave function. It is
Copenhagen, with the difference that we never eliminate any branch/term in the
(universal) wave function. That gives a monist theory, coherent with mechanism
… at first sight. Eventually, the wave itself has to be eliminated (and
recovered phenomenologically, to be consistent with digital mechanism).
Copenhagen add an axiom to this: not only the wave exists (in some sense at
least), but it collapses when an observer does a measurement, which leads to a
dualist theory where the observed and the observer obeys different logic/theory.
I p^refer to avoid the terming “MWI”, because the notion of “world” is a bit
too much “metaphysical” to be used in serious metaphysics … Eventually, with
mechanism, “worlds” are very abstract sets of “personally-equivalent”
computations (in arithmetic).
> and it maintains an existence of the wave function. We local observers are
> only able to witness a pieces of it. This is in place of collapse. Either way
> one is left with an unsettled sense of how the collapse or this splitting is
> realized.
With Everett, there is no collapse, and the “feeling of collapse” is explained
naturally by the mechanist first person indeterminacy is self-multiplication,
or self-superposition. When the Helsinki guy is duplicated into the Washington
and Moscow guys, each resulting person feel like a collapse has occurred. The
symmetrical 3p description of reality has become dissymmetrical for both (all)
copies.
> With Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation the wave function is a device to
> calculate outcomes and then does this collapse, which really just means
> revealing a result.
After EPR, Bohr agrees that the collapse cannot be a physical event, but then
the is quite unclear on what could be the nature of the quantum reality, and
this complexification has hidden Einstein’s discovery of “non locality” (made
testable by Bell later).
> MWI splits the world, it continues to have a constancy. Bohr's CI is
> epistemic and MWI is ontic.
As a logician; I insist that we have to be clear on the theories, before
tacking their possible interpretations. I see two theories (actually three
theories):
1) Copenhagen:
- wave
- collapse
- dualist theory of mind (not explicitly given)
2) Everett:
- wave
- monist theory of mind (more or less explicitly mechanist)
3) your servitor:
- monist theory of mind (explicitly: digital mechanism, aka
computationalism)
The theory “2)” assumes the wave, and derives a phenomenology of the collapse.
The theory “3)” assumes only elementary arithmetic and derives a phenomenology
of both the wave and the collapse.
Only “3)” seems to me to explain both matter and consciousness, but “2)” is a
natural intermediate between 2 and 3.
Why assume a multiverse when elementary arithmetic proves the existence of a
highly structured multi-computation and the logical obligation to derive the
mathematics of the machine’s observable from that structure?
Bruno
>
> LC
>
>
>
>>
>> LC
>>
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